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Abstract 
Women hold political beliefs that differ systematically from those of men, a phenomenon 
scholars call “gender gaps.”  The collective opinions of women tend to favor social welfare 
policies and spending on these policies, while women oppose the use of force at home and 
abroad.  Far from being inconsequential, empirical research indicates that these gender gaps in 
political preferences create gender gaps in vote choice and party identification (Kaufmann and 
Petrocik, 1999; Norrander, 1999; Kanthak and Norrander, 2004).  The partisan gender gap has 
done a great deal to shape modern American politics. A majority of the last five presidents won 
office with thin margins of victory. More women identifying with the Republican Party or its 
candidates would have changed electoral returns and, in some cases, the winning candidate.   
The implications of gender gaps also reach far beyond political science.  For instance, 
some scholars argue that fostering human freedom and individual autonomy is the best way to 
alleviate poverty, ensure social justice, and cultivate human development (Nussbaum 1995; 
1999; 2003; Sen 1990a; 1990b; 1993; 1997; 1999a; 1999b).  This human capabilities approach 
advances human freedom, understood in terms of opportunities available to individuals rather 
than traditional economic indicators, as a way to evaluate a state's developmental status (Sen, 
1990a; 1990b; 1993; 1997; 1999a; 1999b).  Other scholars argue that governments must go 
beyond merely creating the conditions sufficient for an individual to choose to exercise certain 
capabilities (Phillips, 2001).  Distributional differences in economic, social, and political 
resources limit the ability of some individuals to fully develop these capabilities.  Scholars like 
Anne Phillips argue that this fundamental problem becomes obscured by an emphasis on choice: 
those concerned with advancing human development must consider not only capabilities, but 
also the structural inequalities that place some at a political disadvantage in developing or 
exercising them.  This critique focuses scholarly attention on what preconditions must be 
considered essential for individuals to make a “meaningful” political choice. 
The practical and normative importance of how choices, or political preferences, emerge 
suggests the centrality of gender gaps for those studying politics and those trying to advance 
human development.  Despite this importance, much remains unknown about how these gender 
gaps have changed over time and what factors influence their emergence.  This dissertation 
begins to address these questions. 
I begin by studying how gender gaps have changed over the last sixty years and by 
examining how these gaps vary across different demographic groups who possess different levels 
of politically relevant resources.  In Chapter Two, I use American National Election Studies 
(NES) data from 1948 to 2008 to determine how gender gaps in policy preferences have changed 
as women have made significant economic, political, and social gains.  My results indicate that 
gender gaps have been decreasing in the areas of civil rights and government function, while 
holding steady or increasing slightly on preferences related to morality, social policy, and foreign 
policy.  
The next section of Chapter Two uses data from the 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg 
Election Surveys (NAES) to determine the size of gender gaps across demographic groups.  
Empirical political science research suggests that low levels of political knowledge may impede 
the functioning of one capability, an individual’s ability to exercise control over his or her 
environment (Nussbaum, 2000).  I examine whether four demographic characteristics correlated 
with levels of political knowledge alter the size of gender gaps among citizens: gender, race, 
income, and education.  I find that gender gaps in these years vary based on characteristics that 
may place some at a political advantage relative to others.  The largest gender gaps tend to 
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emerge among citizens of higher socioeconomic status, a surprising finding since research 
suggests that these individuals are best able to form political preferences that reflect their 
underlying political predispositions.  These results provide empirical evidence of how gender 
gaps vary with different distributions of politically relevant resources, a central concern for 
critics of the human capabilities approach.   
After describing gender gaps in multiple issue areas over a sixty year period and gender 
gaps within demographic subgroups, Chapter Three begins to explore the various biological, 
sociological, and political frameworks scholars use to explain gender gaps.  Chapter Three also 
draws testable hypotheses from each framework.  By drawing together these disparate theories 
and areas of research, this chapter facilitates more complex theoretical tests of women’s 
preference formation than political scientists have previously articulated.  I conduct such tests in 
Chapters Four and Five.   
Chapters Four and Five explore the nature and causes of gender gaps in two issues areas 
where gender gaps appear most prevalent and stable: foreign policy and social policy.  Using 
data from the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections, I demonstrate that the opinions 
expressed by women during the three presidential election years follow the expectations that 
emerge from the literature on gender gaps.  Women surveyed across these presidential elections 
express less support for military interventions than men.  Women also express more support for 
social welfare programs than men.    
One potential cause of these gaps may be different attitude structures used by men and 
women to form political preferences.  I analyze attitude structures, providing evidence men and 
women use similar considerations when forming policy preferences.  These chapters then go on 
to use data simulations to estimate how much gender differences in the factors identified in 
Chapter Three affect the size of gender gaps (Althaus, 1998; 2003; Bartels, 1996; Delli Carpini 
and Keeter, 1996). This analysis suggests that the uneven distribution of these factors between 
men and women contributes to the development of gender gaps.  Yet different factors emerge as 
more important contributors to the development of gender gaps in different issue areas.  
Biological considerations and political knowledge appear to contribute to gender gaps in foreign 
policy, while feminist consciousness and gender role socialization appear to contribute more to 
gender gaps in social policy.   
The concluding chapter of this dissertation outlines the findings of the three empirical 
chapters.  It also returns to a discussion of the practical and normative significance of these 
findings.  The empirical analyses in this dissertation trace gender gaps across time and issue 
domains, identify the factors that may underlie them, and estimate how these factors alter 
political preferences and, consequently, the size of gender gaps.   This approach provides 
political scientists with a better understanding of the nature and origins of gender gaps.  Studying 
these different factors together begins to move political scientists away from a fragmented study 
of women’s behavior in separate topical domains toward broader theoretical tests of gender gaps 
in preferences, tests that recognize the complex interplay between gender and political behavior.  
This approach also ties questions about gender gaps to those in fields such as evolutionary 
biology and economics, which ask important questions about how material and social differences 
condition women’s political behavior.  A richer theoretical and empirical study of gender gaps 
can improve our understanding of women’s political behavior, and remains a fascinating area of 
political science that warrants further study. 
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Chapter One:  Introduction 
 
It would be a thousand pities if women wrote like men, or lived like men, or looked like men, for 
if two sexes are quite inadequate, considering the vastness and variety of the world, how should 
we manage with one only? 
 
--Virginia Woolf  
 
In A Room of One’s Own, Virginia Woolf hoped that women would continue to think and 
behave differently than men.  The same year her book was published, two scholars noticed that 
American women expressed less interest in politics than did men (Merriam and Gosnell, 1924).  
One female they interviewed claimed that women should not ―stick their noses in politics,‖ 
because ―women do not understand politics and…should not butt in men’s work‖ (Merriam and 
Gosnell, 1924: 133). 
Many changes have occurred since Merriam and Gosnell published the first scholarly 
findings on gender gaps in political interest and participation.  At the turn of the 20
th
 century, 
women comprised approximately one-third of college and university students.  Information 
released by the U.S. Census Bureau in 2010 shows that women now surpass men in college and 
advanced degree completion (Yen, 2011).  Women no longer consider politics outside their 
grasp.  Yet educational parity has not erased the gender gap in political interest.  A recent Social 
Capital Benchmark Survey indicates that one-third of men claimed to be very interested in 
politics and national affairs, while only a quarter of women claimed to be very interested in 
politics (2000).   
 Gender differences go far beyond political interest. Political science studies confirm 
many political differences exist between the sexes.  Gender affects party identification and vote 
choice.  Gender also affects political values and preferences.  Such research advanced political 
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scientists’ understanding of the political importance of gender.  This research also indicates the 
fulfillment of Virginia Woolf’s wish.  Politically, women are not like men.     
Scholars identify these systematic differences between men and women as ―gender gaps.‖  
A vast majority of scholars frame these differences in terms of the unique behavior of women.   
Some works identify problems inherent in the assumption that women, or characteristics they 
possess, create gender gaps.  Empirical studies indicate that a realignment of male opinion 
widened gender gaps in areas like party identification, vote choice, and policy preferences 
(Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Norrander, 1999; Kanthak and Norrander, 2004). These studies 
argue that gender gaps have widened as men become more likely to identify themselves as 
Republican, become more likely to vote for Republican candidates, and become more likely to 
express policy preferences in line with the Republican Party.   
These studies draw our attention to the problems involved in the assumption that 
women’s political behavior creates gender gaps.  Scholars need to proceed carefully when 
attributing changes to the sizes of gender gaps to changes in the political behaviors or beliefs to 
citizens of a particular gender.  Women becoming more liberal while men become more 
conservative differs from women remaining the same while men become more conservative.  Yet 
gender gaps remain, by definition, relative differences.  Finding that men tend to express more 
support for military conflict is no different than finding that women tend to express less support 
for these conflicts.  Either way, gender gaps in political preferences exist and prove politically 
and normatively significant.  We need look no further than gender differences in voting to find 
proof of this fact.   
Studies analyzing party identification and vote choice in the early 20
th
 century indicated 
that women were more likely than men to identify as Republican and to support Republican 
3 
 
candidates (for reviews, see Dolan, Deckman, et al., 2007; Norris, 2003).  This gender gap in 
vote choice diminished in the 1960s and 1970s, only to re-emerge in a different form in 1980.  
That year would be a political turning-point for women, one which marked the beginning of the 
―modern gender gap.‖  Female voters have been more likely than men to identify as liberal and 
to vote for Democrats in every election since 1980 (Box-Steffensmeier, et al. 2004; Chaney, et 
al. 1998; Cook and Wilcox, 1995; Carroll, 2006).   Scholars studying the causes of gender gaps 
in party identification and vote choice attribute their development to gender gaps in policy 
preferences (Chaney et al., 1998; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; Shapiro and 
Mahajan, 1986).   
Studies suggest that the partisan gender gap, tied to gender gaps in policy preferences, 
has done a great deal to shape modern American politics.  A majority of the last five presidents 
won office with thin margins of victory.  More women identifying with the Republican Party or 
its candidates would likely have changed electoral returns and, in some cases, the winning 
candidate.  Consider 1996, the year of the largest recorded gender gap in presidential voting.  
Female support propelled President Clinton into a second term as sixty percent of women 
favored Clinton, while only twenty-four percent voted for Dole (Carroll, 1999; Norris, 2003).  
Men’s opinions were more evenly split.  Men favored Dole over Clinton, forty-six percent to 
forty-five percent.  The importance of gender gaps in American elections continues in 2012.  A 
LexisNexis search indicates that four hundred and fifty-five articles with by-lines from January 
1
st
 to May 1
st
, 2012 include the term ―gender gap.‖1   
Gender gaps in political preferences also have implications on world politics.  The 
problems facing women around the world have captured the attention of scholars and policy-
                                                 
1
 This count likely underestimates the actual coverage of gender gaps, because LexisNexis does not have access to 
stories written by wire sources, including the Associated Press.   
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makers.  In no country have women achieved parity with men.  Addressing these gender-based 
inequalities remains an important objective for those concerned with human development.   
Some of the most prominent approaches for advancing human development rest on 
ensuring positive freedoms, including citizens’ capabilities to shape their political and social 
environment according to their political preferences.  In the past, many scholars advancing 
theories of human development have looked to economic indicators, like gross domestic product 
(GDP), to measure a country’s level of development.  An increasingly popular approach to 
human development, the human capabilities approach, argues that economic indicators overlook 
the systemic inequalities that harm citizens, even within countries where economic indicators 
suggest that the basic needs of all citizens could be met (Sen, 1971; 1985).   
The economist that first advanced the capabilities approach, Amartya Sen, drew on his 
personal experience of the 1943 famine in Bengal.  During this famine, three million Bengalese 
citizens died.  Sen provided evidence that this famine did not occur because of food shortages 
(Sen, 1971).  In 1943, the food production in Bengal had decreased relative to the preceding 
year.  However, production was still greater than it had been in many years when famines did not 
occur.  Sen argued that famines like the 1943 famine in Bengal occurred because of social and 
economic inequalities, including rising food prices and poor distribution systems, which placed 
some citizens in vulnerable positions.   
Sen’s early work on famine laid the groundwork for a broader claim that fostering human 
freedom and individual autonomy is the best way to alleviate poverty, ensure social justice, and 
cultivate human development (Nussbaum, 1995; 1999; 2003; Sen, 1990a; 1990b; 1993; 1997; 
1999a; 1999b).  Amartya Sen first articulated this argument, known as the capabilities approach 
(1985).  The capabilities approach focuses attention on positive freedoms, or an individual’s 
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ability to do something, rather than on negative freedoms, or the lack of interference from others 
in attempting to exercise those abilities.  Since then, other scholars have applied Sen’s ideas to a 
vast array of questions about human development (for example, see Nussbaum, 1995; 1999; 
2003).  Yet scholars using the capabilities approach, which places substantial emphasis on the 
preferences expressed by individuals, do so without considering how the existence of gender 
gaps may call the meaning of individual preferences into question.   
Gender gaps in policy preferences may exist because women possess different values 
than men, reflecting genuine differences in the political goals of men and women.  However, 
these gaps may also emerge because of differences in upbringing and experience, or gender role 
socialization.  If socialization causes gender gaps in political preferences, these gaps may reflect 
differences in what society teaches women to want.  This argument does not imply that certain 
expressions of preference lack value, merely that policy programs based on the expressions of 
preference may benefit from a more nuanced understanding of what causes these gender gaps. 
Scholars advancing the capabilities approach do not study gender gaps in political 
preferences, and this certainly does not diminish the importance of this approach.  Sen’s work 
has changed how scholars and policymakers view poverty and human development, creating a 
new language to discuss problems and to propose solutions for problems of enormous 
importance.
2
   The United Nations Development Programme and the World Bank use a measure, 
the Human Development Index (HDI), to assess individual well-being derived from Sen’s belief 
that economic development must mean more than growth in a nation’s gross domestic product 
(GDP).  The Economic Sciences Prize Committee provided additional acknowledgement of the 
                                                 
2
 Sen and Nussbaum proved instrumental in creating the Human Capability and Development Association, which 
publishes the Journal of Human Development and Capabilities and host conferences for scholars to discuss 
concepts, measurement tools, and policy alternatives on human development. 
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importance of Sen’s work applying social choice theory to poverty, awarding him a Nobel Prize 
in Economics.   
Gender gaps certainly have important implications for scholars using the capabilities 
approach, as they have for political scientists studying political behavior.  The remainder of this 
introductory chapter will summarize the existing research on gender gaps in policy preferences.  
It will also identify two areas of gender gap research that would increase our understanding of 
this phenomenon.  The first area involves changes in gender gaps over time and the second 
involves potential causes of these gaps.  This dissertation will address both these areas. 
In the following chapters, I examine the origins of gender gaps using longitudinal and 
cross-sectional analyses of gender gaps in public policy preferences.  By integrating disparate 
ideas about the causes of gender gaps, I construct for the first time a broader theoretical 
framework through which scholars can assess the impact of gender on political preferences.  
Using a mix of statistics, I describe the nature of gender gaps in policy preferences over a sixty-
year period.  Using regressions and data simulations, I explore the origins of these gender gaps.    
 
Gender Gaps in American Politics  
Studies by American and comparative political scientists reveal several gender-based 
tendencies in collective opinions.
3
  A rough summation of the literature on gender gaps in policy 
preferences indicates that the collective opinions of women tend more than those of men to favor 
social welfare policies, and to oppose the use of force at home and abroad.  Yet the studies that 
provide this information share two limitations.  These studies do not provide scholars 
information about how gender gaps have changed after the early 1980s and they do not provide a 
                                                 
3
 These general predispositions narrow or widen the gender gap in vote choice depending on which issues become 
salient during presidential campaigns (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006).   
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comprehensive theoretical framework that allows scholars to test competing causes of gender 
gaps.  This section reviews previous findings in studies of gender gaps in political preferences, 
then discusses how new survey data and emerging research in other fields may address the 
limitations of this previous work. 
Women express more support than men for ―compassion issues,‖ such as social welfare 
policies (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  Women express more support for an expansive 
government that provides for its citizens (Chaney, et al. 1998; Clark and Clark, 1993; Gilens, 
1988; Howell and Day, 2000; Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  
Government programs providing citizens with healthcare, childcare, housing, and education 
typically receive higher support from women than men (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  Women 
are willing to go beyond merely supporting such programs, expressing a greater willingness to 
increase spending on them (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).   
Gender gaps also exist for social issues outside the realm of ―compassion issues.‖  On 
some social issues, women tend to be liberal.  For example, women express more support than 
men for gay rights (Herek, 2002; LaMar and Kite, 1998).  On other social issues, women are 
more conservative.  Women are more likely to support school prayer and to support restricting 
access to pornography (Clark and Clark, 1993).  They are less likely than men to support 
individual rights to engage in non-conventional behaviors like drug use, and are less likely to 
support legalizing these behaviors (Eagly et al., 2004).   
Finally, women express less support for the use of force in foreign and domestic realms.  
They tend to oppose armed interventions, favoring less aggressive means of resolving 
international conflicts (Chaney et al., 1998; Eichenberg, 2003; Fite, Genest, et all, 1990; 
Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; Nincic and Nincic, 2000; Shapiro and Mahajan, 
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1986).  They also express greater disapproval for the use of force by the state, such as the death 
penalty for criminals and violent responses by police officers (Halim and Stiles, 2001; Stack, 
2000; Whitehead and Blankenship, 2000). 
This body of research has two limitations.  First, the attention of recent gender gap 
scholarship has shifted away from over-time trends in policy preferences.  Those studies that 
examined multiple issue areas over long spans of time leave scholars with an understanding of 
gender gaps only until 1983 (e.g., Shapiro and Mahajan).  Recent longitudinal descriptive studies 
of gender gaps often focused on multiple issues areas over shorter spans of time (e.g., Howell 
and Day) or they focused on one issue over longer periods of time (e.g., Nincic and Nincic).   
Unprecedented changes in the social and political lives of women occurred over the past 
thirty years, but gender gaps remain.  In some areas, including public opinions on foreign policy, 
these gaps actually appear to be increasing in size over time (Baxter and Lansing, 1980; Klein, 
1984; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  The continued existence of these gaps in policy areas where 
longitudinal studies have been done, like foreign policy, suggests that gender gaps continue to be 
an enduring reality of political life (Kaufmann, 2006; Nincic and Nincic, 2002; Shapiro and 
Mahajan, 1986).  A study utilizing public opinion data since 1983 would provide scholars with a 
better sense of how gender gaps have changed with the social advances made by women over the 
past thirty years.  A study of what causes these gaps may provide scholars with a better sense of 
why these gender gaps occur.   
Men and women differ in a number of ways, which may contribute to the emergence of 
gender gaps.  Biological differences provide one potential contributor to the development of 
gender gaps (e.g., Burris, 1992; Fukuyama, 1998: Pratto, 1996).  Scholars from many disciplines 
suggest that biological sex differences predispose women and men to exhibit distinct behaviors.  
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They argue that ―humans are hard-wired to act in certain predictable ways‖ (Fukuyama, 1998: 
30).  Drawing on the works of primatologists, evolutionary biologists, and psychologists, they 
assert that genetic predispositions ensure that physical and verbal aggression remains the 
purview of men.   These genetic characteristics explain why phenomena like ―aggression, 
violence, and war…are more closely associated with men than women‖ (Fukuyama, 1998: 27).   
Another prominent explanation for the gender gap suggests that socialization, rather than 
biology, shapes political preferences (e.g., Chodorow, 1978; Elshtain, 1981; Gilligan, 1982; 
Langton, 1969; Ruddick, 1980).  Many of these socialization arguments base women’s 
preferences in their pre-adult experiences.  These arguments find significance in the tendency of 
children to engage in certain types of play, which teach them what society considers gender-
appropriate behavior (Caldera et al., 1989; Fagot, 1978; Peretti and Sydney, 1984; Pomerleau et 
al., 1990).  In contemporary western societies, young boys tend to play games based on violent 
scenarios like war, which emphasize competition and individualism.  Young girls tend to engage 
in play that focuses on cooperation and nurturing.  These differences in socialization may then 
affect the political preferences of both sexes later in life. 
Empirical works support biological and sociological explanations of gender gaps in 
policy preferences.  For example, Burris (1992) and Brandes (1992) find that American women 
were less supportive of the Gulf War than men.  They attributed this difference to the fact that 
women were less aggressive and more fearful, characteristics that could result from either 
biology and/or socialization.  Proponents of both explanations would not be surprised that 
empirical analyses of American public opinion reveal that women express greater concern for 
American troops and citizens living in areas where interventions are conducted (Bendyna et al., 
1996). 
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Biological and sociological arguments could also explain why women tend to more 
strongly support social welfare programs and spending on these programs (Chaney et al., 1998; 
Eichenberg, 2003; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986), 
but less strongly support conservative positions on social issues.  If women are by nature, or by 
nurture, ―more conciliatory and cooperative‖ than men, this may explain their greater willingness 
to make economic sacrifices to benefit others or to support different lifestyle choices (Fukuyama, 
1998: 33).   
Other political scientists narrow the source of gender gaps even further.  They posit that 
differences in the values of men and women explain gender gaps in political preferences (e.g., 
Cook and Wilcox, 1991; Conover, 1988; 1993; Eagly et al., 2004; Howell and Day, 2000).  
Some scholars tie these gaps to different views about equality and compassion (Howell and Day, 
2000; Eagly et al., 2004).   They believe that the liberal tendencies of women on ―compassion 
issues‖ reflect their commitment to equality of opportunity and helping the less fortunate.   
Pamela Johnston Conover maintains that feminists, both male and female, hold these 
values with an increased awareness of issues such as hierarchy, domination, the use of force, and 
exploitation (Conover, 1993).  This awareness leads to basic differences in policy preferences 
between feminists and those who are not feminists.  Women tend to identify with feminists, and 
feminism, more than men.  These gender-based differences, may contribute to the development 
of gender differences in policy preferences (Conover, 1988; 1993).  Conover’s empirical work 
on support for the first Persian Gulf War suggest that these feminist values are largely 
responsible for creating the gender gap in support for this conflict (Conover, 1988; 1993).  The 
empirical works of other scholars identify egalitarian values associated with feminism to be a 
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mediating variable between gender and increased support for social welfare policies (Howell and 
Day, 2000). 
Even if biology, socialization, or feminist attitudes play a role in the preferences women 
express, political resources might also have an independent effect.
4
  Political scientists speculate 
that gender gaps in resources like education and income create gender gaps in policy preferences 
(Frankovic 1982; Nelson 1984) and political participation (Schlozman et al., 1994).  Michael 
Delli Carpini and Scott Keeter (1996) argue that such resources affect preferences through 
political knowledge.  Women comprise an increasing percentage of the poor.  This feminization 
of poverty may alter the opportunities, motivations, and abilities women have to seek out 
political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).
5
   
Lower levels of political knowledge may contribute to the creation of gender gaps.  
Political knowledge affects many aspects of political behavior.  Knowledgeable citizens have 
more stable opinions (Feldman, 1988; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).  They are more likely to 
hold opinions that correspond with their underlying political predispositions (Zaller, 1992; 
Bartels, 1996; Sniderman et al., 2001), to update those opinions when new and relevant 
information becomes available (McGraw and Pinney, 1991; Zaller, 1992), and to use those 
opinions to select candidates that reflect their political predispositions (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 
1996; Lau and Redlawsk, 1992).  Even the cognitive shortcuts and heuristics political scientists 
believe can stand in for political knowledge require some political knowledge to be properly 
employed (Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; 2006).   
                                                 
4
 Some argue that the gender gap in knowledge may cause the lower levels of political efficacy long documented for 
women (McGlen et al., 2005).  According to the 2003 NES, 50 percent of men claimed political was too 
complicated for them to understand.  64 percent of women made this same claim. 
5
 Empirical analyses of political interest indicate women’s lack of motivation to learn about politics relative to men 
(Berelsen, 1954; Merriam and Gosnell, 1924; Verba and Nie, 1972).   
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Empirical work indicates that women tend to possess less political knowledge than men 
(Althaus, 2003; Bennett, 1988; Burns et al., 2001; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Neuman, 
1986; Sigelman and Yanarella, 1986).  Even with women’s levels of education increasing over 
time, this gender gap remains (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).
6
   
Given the gendered differences in who possesses political knowledge, it is possible that 
political knowledge plays a role in the systematic differences scholars have noted between 
women’s opinions and those expressed by men.  Women’s tendency to lack political knowledge 
may be distorting their preferences, making their opinions appear to be systematically different 
from those of men.   
The various theories outlined above suggest gender gaps may result from gender 
differences in biology, socialization, political values, or political knowledge.  These theories 
draw together the empirical or theoretical work of various scholars analyzing the origins of 
gender gaps in a wide array of fields.  Inarguably, these studies also further our understanding of 
gender gaps.  Yet their narrow focus, addressing only one small amount of time or one issue 
area, produce a literature lacking a solid theoretical framework.  So while studies provide 
evidence that certain political values play a role in the development of gender gaps in issues 
areas like military policy, it is impossible to determine if socialization and political values play 
the same role in issue areas like social policy.  The same problems exist in longitudinal studies 
describing gender gaps.  Scholars examine gender gaps in specific policy areas (e.g., Bendyna et 
al., 1996; Brandes, 1992; Burris, 1992; Conover, 1988; 1993; Nincic and Nincic, 2003) or for 
short periods of time (e.g, Conover, 1988; 1993; Howell and Day, 2000).  Scholars do not know 
the generalizability of the results presented in these studies.  From 1960 to 1980, gender gaps 
appeared to narrow (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  Scholars do not know whether these gaps 
                                                 
6
 The possibility that this difference is a methodological artifact will be explored in detail in Chapter Two.   
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have continued to narrow, stayed the same, or begun to increase.  Nor do scholars know how 
much each different proposed cause of gender gaps affects preferences relative to others.  
Political scientists have drawn attention to gender gaps and provided compelling evidence of 
their importance, but much work remains to be done in understanding how they come about, why 
they persist today, and what their root causes are.  Addressing these lingering questions is the 
purpose of this dissertation. 
 
Working Toward a Richer Understanding of Gender Gaps 
Early works in political science proved integral in advancing our understanding of many 
aspects of individual political behavior.  Nevertheless, the treatment most scholars gave to 
gender was far too simplistic.  For example, in The American Voter, Campbell and his fellow 
political scientists write of ―the dependence of a wife’s vote upon her husband’s partisan 
predispositions‖ (Campbell et al., 1960: 261).  Decades of subsequent research indicate that this 
perspective misses fundamental influences on the lives of women, including biology, 
socialization, political values, and resource distribution.  However, this research does little to 
explain the nature and origins of systematic differences between men and women.   
It is possible that biological differences and early childhood socialization create or 
magnify gender gaps.  It is also possible that the uneven distribution of political resources and 
values creates or magnifies these gaps.  However, a better understanding of the nature and 
origins of gender gaps requires three types of analyses that remain undersupplied in the literature 
on this topic.   
First, descriptive longitudinal studies across multiple issue areas are rare.  When gender 
gaps first captured the attention of political scientists and pundits, descriptive studies appeared 
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with greater frequency (Erskine, 1971; Opinion Roundup, 1982; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  
Empirical analyses of the gender gap continued in subfields like American foreign policy, but 
political scientists have yet to take advantage of the longitudinal data at their disposal to 
determine how gender gaps in policy preferences increase or decrease across time.  The 
longitudinal studies done on this topic tend to focus on gender gaps in one issue area over a 
longer period of time (Bendyna et al., 1996; Brandes, 1992; Burris, 1992; Conover, 1998; 1993; 
Nincic and Nincic, 2003) or in multiple issue areas over a short period of time (Howell and Day, 
2000; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  The discipline needs a study that does both.   
Second, few studies examine the origins of gender gaps (except, Bendyna et al., 1996; 
Conover, 1988; 1993; Day and Howell, 2000).  These studies provide a basis for comparing 
multiple explanations, but tend to focus on comparisons between only one or two explanations.  
Their work should be extended to include other explanations; including the biological factors 
previous work operationalized using a dummy variable indicating a respondent’s identification 
as a man or woman.  While some political scientists have begun to draw from works in the 
biological sciences, including evolutionary biology or psychology (e.g., Fukuyama, 1998), they 
have done so without empirically testing whether theories from chimpanzees, or humans one 
hundred years ago, apply to men and women today.  Before accepting these controversial 
explanations for gender differences, a more thorough test is in order.   
Those scholars that do attempt to identify the origins of gender gaps focus on gender gaps 
in only one issue area (e.g., Bendyna et al., 1996; Conover, 1988; 1993), or they study multiple 
issue areas at one point in time (e.g., Howell and Day, 2000).  Political scientists find value in 
narrowly-focused studies, but this approach obscures the generalizability of empirical findings 
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about gender gaps.  Scholars interested in gender gaps are left to wonder whether the origins of 
policy differences in one area explain their emergence in others.   
Finally, scholars need estimates of the extent to which biology, socialization, or resource 
distribution serve as the most proximate influence on women’s collective opinions.  It is unlikely 
that any one source causes gender gaps in isolation from others (for discussion see Shapiro and 
Mahajan, 1986). Estimating how much each source contributes to creating these gaps relative to 
others would provide political scientists a more complete understanding of the nature and origins 
of gender gaps. 
Gender gaps in political preferences are important.  They underlie gender gaps in party 
identification and vote choice.  Why, despite increasing levels of gender parity that have taken 
shape over the past century, do women still exhibit political behaviors and express political 
opinions that differ systematically from those of men?  Given the real-world implications of 
gender gaps on how scholars understand women’s political behavior and on how academics and 
policy-makers advance the interests of women world-wide, gender gaps continue to be an 
important topic that deserves further attention.  Political scientists need to develop a more 
comprehensive theory of gender gaps, one that ties together preferences across issue domains 
and tests competing explanations against one another.  The following chapters do this, providing 
political scientists with a more nuanced understanding of gender gaps.   
 
Plan for the Dissertation 
The first section of Chapter Two examines gender gaps in policy preferences over time 
using American National Election Study (NES) data from 1948 to 2008.  This longitudinal 
analysis extends early works on the gender gap in policy preferences over longer periods of time, 
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paying particular attention to patterns emerging in specific issue areas.   The next section of 
Chapter Two uses data from the 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES) to 
determine the size of gender gaps within subgroups.  Scholars use characteristics like education 
and income as control variables in their models of political preferences, because we believe such 
characteristics matter in preference formation.  Yet studies of gender gaps have not explored the 
size of gender gaps within these demographic subgroups, since national surveys like the NES do 
not include enough respondents to disaggregate the data in this way.  The 2000 and 2004 NAES, 
which include thousands of respondents, allow for such disaggregation.  These analyses provide 
evidence of how gender gaps vary based on the uneven allocation of resources within American 
society, a problem of particular relevance for those advancing theories of development like the 
human capabilities approach.   
 After describing gender gaps in multiple issue areas over a sixty year period and gender 
gaps within demographic subgroups, Chapter Three begins to explore the various biological, 
sociological, and political frameworks scholars use to explain gender gaps.  Chapter Three also 
draws testable hypotheses from each framework.  By drawing together these disparate theories 
and areas of research, this chapter introduces a more complex theory of women’s preference 
formation than political scientists have previously articulated.   
Chapters Four and Five explore the nature and causes of gender gaps in two issues areas 
where gender gaps appear most prevalent and stable: foreign policy and social policy. 
Using data from the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections, I demonstrate that the opinions 
expressed by women during the three presidential election years follow the expectations that 
emerge from the literature on gender gaps.  Women surveyed across these presidential elections 
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express less support for military interventions than men.  Women also express more support for 
social welfare programs than men.    
Scholars and pundits accept that these aforementioned policy predispositions characterize 
female opinions.  This dissertation evaluates what causes these gender gaps in foreign and social 
policy, using newer surveys with more power to explore the nuances of American public 
opinion.  One potential cause of these gaps may be different attitude structures used by men and 
women to form political preferences.  I analyze attitude structures, providing evidence men and 
women use similar considerations when forming policy preferences.  These chapters then go on 
to estimate how much gender differences in the factors identified in Chapter Three affect the size 
of gender gaps. This analysis suggests that the uneven distribution of these factors between men 
and women contribute to the development of gender gaps.  Yet different factors emerge as more 
important in different issue areas.   
The concluding chapter of this dissertation outlines the findings of the three empirical 
chapters.  It also returns to the discussion of the practical and normative significance of these 
findings.  The empirical analyses in this dissertation trace gender gaps across time and issue 
domains, identify the factors that may underlie them, and estimate how these factors alter the 
political preferences and, consequently, the size of gender gaps.   This approach provides 
political scientists with a better understanding of the nature and origins of gender gaps.   
I find that gender gaps in many areas appear to be increasing over time and remain larger 
among citizens of some socioeconomic groups more than others.  Biological considerations and 
political knowledge appear to contribute to gender gaps in foreign policy, while feminist 
consciousness and gender role socialization appear to contribute more to gender gaps in social 
policy.   
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Studying these elements together begins to move political scientists away from a 
fragmented study of women’s behavior in separate topical domains toward a broader theoretical 
framework of gender gaps in preferences, a theory that recognizes the complex interplay between 
gender and political behavior.  It also ties these questions to those in fields such as evolutionary 
biology and economics.   These literatures ask important questions about how material and social 
differences condition women’s political behavior.  A richer theoretical and empirical study of 
gender gaps can improve our understanding of women’s political behavior, and remains a 
fascinating area of political science that warrants further study. 
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Chapter Two:  Exploring Gender Gaps among American Citizens 
 
A substantial number of descriptive studies analyze the nature of gender gaps in policy 
preferences.  As discussed in the previous chapter, these works suggest that women possess 
different preferences than men on questions about social policy, moral issues, and foreign policy.  
Women tend to express greater levels of support than men for ―compassion issues,‖ such as 
social welfare policies (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  Government programs providing citizens 
with healthcare, childcare, housing, and education typically receive higher support from women 
than men (Chaney et al., 1998; Clark and Clark, 1993; Gilens, 1988; Howell and Day, 2000; 
Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  Women exhibit a willingness to 
go beyond merely supporting such programs.  They express a greater willingness to increase 
spending on them.   
Women express somewhat conflicted preferences on questions of traditional values.  
Women tend to be more supportive than men of gay rights (Herek, 2002; LaMar and Kite, 1998).  
Yet they exhibit more conservative preferences than men on other moral issues, expressing more 
support for school prayer and restricting access to pornography (Clark and Clark, 1993).  Women 
are less likely than men to support the right to engage in illegal behaviors such as drug use 
(Eagly et al., 2004).   
Finally, women express less support than men for the use of force in foreign and 
domestic realms.  They tend to oppose armed interventions, favoring less aggressive means of 
resolving international conflicts (Chaney et al., 1998; Eichenberg, 2003; Fite, Genest, et al., 
1990; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; Nincic and Nincic, 2000; Shapiro and 
Mahajan, 1986).  They also express greater disapproval for the use of force by the state, such as 
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the death penalty for criminals and violent responses by police officers (Halim and Stiles, 2001; 
Stack, 2000; Blackhead and Blankenship, 2000). 
These studies provide a solid foundation for describing gender gaps in policy preferences.  
This chapter builds on these studies by identifying areas of gender gaps that warrant further 
exploration and connecting these areas to a prominent economic theory of human development, 
the human capabilities approach.  The human capabilities approach transformed how many 
scholars and policymakers conceptualize human development.  Yet this approach, introduced in 
Chapter One, remains controversial.  The human capabilities approach advances human freedom, 
understood in terms of opportunities available to individuals rather than traditional economic 
indicators, as a way to evaluate a state's developmental status (Sen, 1990a; 1990b; 1993; 1997; 
1999a; 1999b).  Yet some scholars argue that governments must go beyond merely creating the 
conditions sufficient for an individual to choose to exercise certain capabilities (Phillips, 2001).  
Distributional differences in economic, social, and political resources limit the ability of some 
individuals to fully develop these capabilities.  Scholars like Anne Phillips argue that this 
fundamental problem becomes obscured by an emphasis on choice: those concerned with 
advancing human development must consider not only capabilities, but also the structural 
inequalities that place some at a political disadvantage in developing or exercising them.   
The human capabilities approach makes the assumption that sufficiency, rather than 
equality, should be the goal of human development (Phillips, 2001).  This assumption holds that 
governments must provide only what is essential establishing the minimum threshold for human 
functioning and ―maintains that resources have no value in themselves, apart from their role in 
human functioning‖ (Nussbaum, 1999: 34).  Even if all people have enough of a certain resource, 
such as money, scholars like Phillips argue that those interested in human development must still 
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focus on whether that resource is distributed evenly among individuals.  ―Because equality is 
relational, it directs us more urgently to differential powers and capabilities – not just whether 
individuals have the minimum necessary for choice, but whether their positioning in social 
hierarchies shapes their choices in unequal ways‖ (Phillips, 2001: 264).  Conceptualizing 
equality in this way means that providing human beings with what is merely sufficient to make 
political choices is not the best way to advance human development.  Unequal economic and 
social arrangements also constrain choice (Okin, 1987; 1989; 1994; 1995; 1998; Phillips 2001).  
Developmental programs should therefore aim to address distributional problems, be they related 
to material resources or to actual political power.   
For supporters of the human capabilities approach, focusing on capabilities such as being 
able to participate effectively in political choices that govern one’s life and having the right of 
political participation, respects cultural differences and individual autonomy.
7
  For detractors, 
this approach shifts attention too soon from the uneven distribution of resources that place some 
individuals at a political disadvantage relative to others.  Studying gender gaps over time and 
across different demographic groups provides scholars with a way to examine how the size of 
gender gaps correlates with the uneven distribution of resources.  These analyses provide 
                                                 
7
 Sen has advanced the idea of capabilities without articulating what capabilities are necessary for human freedom.  
Lists have been proposed by a number of scholars (Alkire and Black, 1997; Nussbaum, 1995, 1999, 2003; Robert 
Erikson and Rune Aberg, 1987; Robert Erikson, 1993; Robeyns, 2003).  The understanding of human capabilities 
that has gained the most traction in feminist political theory is that of Martha Nussbaum.   
The list of capabilities articulated by Nussbaum represents a universal and comprehensive understanding of 
those abilities that are ―so central that they seem definitive of a life that is truly human‖ (Nussbaum, 1999: 39). 
Given her contention that human-beings share similar needs and characteristics, Nussbaum establishes two 
thresholds that must be met in order to improve the lives of women and promote human development worldwide.   
The first concerns those capabilities that are essential to life and without which a person could no longer be 
considered human, like permanent loss of consciousness or of the ability to think and reason.  Such conditions can 
occur at the end of one’s life or may result from social arrangements and environmental conditions; however, they 
are not a matter of autonomous choice.  The second threshold encompasses those characteristics that Nussbaum 
identifies as indicators of a ―good human life‖ (Nussbaum, 1995: 85).  These encompass a diverse and extensive list 
of basic human functional capabilities that she believes should be endorsed by all democratic governments, 
including, but not limited to, adequate nourishment, guaranteed protection from unwarranted search and seizure, and 
the ability to form an individual conception of the good.   
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empirical evidence of how gender gaps vary with different distributions of politically relevant 
resources, a central concern for critics of the human capabilities approach. 
I begin this chapter by identifying two aspects of gender gaps that warrant further study: 
how gaps have changed over time and how gaps vary based on socio-demographic 
characteristics.  I use public opinion data from 1948 to 2008 to determine how gender gaps in 
policy preferences have changed over the past sixty years, as women have made significant 
economic, political, and social gains.  Finally, I explore whether the size of gender gaps varies 
across demographic groups.  Empirical political science research suggests that low levels of 
political knowledge may impede the functioning of one capability, an individual’s ability to 
exercise control over his or her environment (Nussbaum, 2000).  I examine whether four 
demographic characteristics correlated with levels of political knowledge alter the size of gender 
gaps among citizens: gender, race, income, and education.  The results outlined below indicate 
that as women have made important economic, political, and social gains over the past sixty 
years, gender gaps in some topical areas have increased rather disappeared.  At the same time, 
gender gaps in the contemporary era are found to vary based on characteristics that place some at 
a political disadvantage relative to others.   
 
Longitudinal Studies of Gender Gaps 
Previous longitudinal studies of gender gaps provided scholars with an understanding of 
how gender gaps changed between the early 20
th
 century and the 1980s (Shapiro and Mahajan, 
1986).  For instance, gender gaps on foreign policy questions remained rather stable over that 
period.  Gender gaps on questions concerning the government function, social policies, and 
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traditional values decreased.  Yet there are good reasons to expect that the nature of gender gaps 
has changed since these studies were published.   
In the 1980s, the women’s movement was just beginning to make progress addressing 
inequalities between men and women.  Since that time, the socio-economic position of women in 
American society has changed.  In 1990, 18% of women and 23% of men had earned a college 
degree.  Yet in 2000, 23% of women and 26% of men had earned such degrees,
8
  and by 2010, 
women surpassed men in college and advanced degree completion (Yen, 2011).  Similar 
increases occurred in women’s income.  In 1990, the median income for women was only half 
that of the median income for men.
9
  By 2010, the median income for women had grown to 65% 
of the median income for men. 
Other areas of research also suggest that gender gaps can change in size, or even reverse 
directions.  In the early part of the 20
th
 century, women were more likely to identify as 
Republicans than Democrats (for reviews, see Dolan, Deckman, et al., 2007; Norris, 2003).  
Since 1980, women have been more likely to identify as Democrats than Republicans (Box-
Steffensmeier et al., 2004; Chaney et al., 1998; Cook and Wilcox, 1995; Carroll, 2006).   
The social and political changes described above indicate the importance of continuing 
the tradition of studying gender gaps longitudinally.  Yet over-time studies of gender gaps in 
policy preferences appear infrequently relative to studies of gender gaps in areas like party 
identification or vote choice (the two exceptions include Conover, 1988; Shapiro and Mahajan, 
1986).  Part of the reason for the absence of longitudinal studies of gender gaps lies in the data 
that political scientists use.   
                                                 
8
 This data comes from the United States Census Bureau.  http://www.census.gov/ 
9
 These numbers include adjustments for inflation.   
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Longitudinal studies of gender gaps require mass surveys that include comparable 
questions over time.  Few surveys of American public opinion could provide such data.  Those 
surveys designed to examine trends over time and maximize comparability across survey years, 
such as the General Social Survey (GSS), include few specific policy questions.  The National 
Election Studies (NES) provide more data on particular policy preferences and repeats questions 
over multiple years.  Page and Shapiro conducted one of the most recent longitudinal studies of 
gender gaps in political preferences in 1986 using NES data (Page and Shapiro, 1986).  Yet no 
similar study has been published in the quarter century since. This chapter brings the gender gap 
literature up to date by adding almost thirty more years of data to what was previously studied, 
and tracing whether recent developments in gender gaps have followed the same tendencies as 
those studied prior to 1986.   
 
 Gender Gaps with Demographic or Socioeconomic Groups 
 New data also make it possible to explore another aspect of gender gaps absent from 
early studies, how the size of gender gaps varies across different socioeconomic characteristics.  
An increasing number of studies find systematic differences in policy preferences based on 
differences in socioeconomic characteristics (e.g., Bartels, 2010; Gilens, 2012).  Analyzing 
whether gender gaps covary with these factors will improve our understanding of the nature of 
gender gaps.  This analysis may also provide scholars with a better understanding of how 
differences in the possession of politically relevant resources correlate with preferences, a central 
question for those uncomfortable with the human capability approach.    
Empirical research suggests that socioeconomic characteristics, particularly education 
and income, shape policy preferences.  Those with high levels of education tend to express more 
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liberal social policy preferences (Erikson and Luttbeg, 1973; Knoke, 1979; McClosky, 1958).   
Those with high incomes tend to express more support for economic conservatism (e.g., Knoke, 
1979).  Although scholars studying public opinion note these demographic and socioeconomic 
correlates with public opinion, those studying gender gaps in policy preferences have yet to 
explore whether gender gaps differ in size across demographic and socioeconomic groups.  Nor 
until recently have scholars possessed the survey data necessary to explore the interactions that 
these demographic and socioeconomic characteristics have with one another.  For example, 
women tend to express more liberal social policy preferences.  Highly educated citizens tend to 
express more liberal social policy preferences.  Yet scholars do not know if gender gaps are 
greater among highly educated citizens than among the less-educated.   
Until recently, scholars have lacked the data appropriate to studying the effects of 
socioeconomic characteristics on gender gaps.  Such studies require surveys with large enough 
samples to allow disaggregation of individuals with various characteristics.  The largest General 
Social Survey (GSS), a commonly used political survey, samples approximately 4,500 
respondents.  Most NES samples contain fewer than half that number.  While these surveys 
allow scholars to draw inferences about the aggregate policy preferences of Americans, they do 
not allow scholars to disaggregate the data in ways that permit clear inferences about gender 
gaps within different socioeconomic groups. 
These demographic and socioeconomic differences may also prove important for those 
interested in the human capabilities approach.  For critics of this approach, the unequal 
possession of resources remains a central problem for human development.  These scholars 
assume that differences in resource allocation will condition the formation of preferences in 
significant ways and they believe that scholars and policymakers should continue to focus on 
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these inequalities (Phillips, 2001: Okin, 1987; 1989; 1994; 1995; 1998).  Some political science 
research suggests that these differences may affect an individual’s ability to express political 
preferences that reflects his or her underlying political predispositions.   
Knowledgeable citizens tend to hold opinions that correspond with their underlying 
political predispositions (Zaller, 1992; Bartels, 1996; Sniderman et al., 2001).  Yet the 
distribution of political knowledge in American society remains uneven, with members of some 
socioeconomic groups more likely to possess this knowledge than others (Althaus, 2003, Delli 
Carpini and Keeter, 1996).  Studying how gender gaps vary in size across different demographic 
and socioeconomic groups provides a basic description of how gender gaps vary with differences 
in socioeconomic characteristics considered politically important.   
In this chapter, I conduct a longitudinal study of gender gaps across a wide range of issue 
areas.  This study, spanning a sixty-year period, reveals sizeable gender gaps on questions related 
to social policy and foreign policy that appear to be increasing over time.  Next, I use a very 
large national survey to examine gender gaps within socioeconomic groups.  I find that the 
largest gender gaps tend to emerge among citizens of higher socioeconomic status, a surprising 
finding since research suggests that these individuals are best able to form political preferences 
that reflect their underlying political predispositions.  
 
Gender Gaps in Policy Preferences from 1948 to 2008 
 NES surveys from 1948 to 2008 provide data on policy preferences in multiple issues 
areas: civil/minority rights, social policy, defense/foreign policy, social morality, government 
function, and economic policy.
10
  The NES includes twenty-nine questions about civil/minority 
                                                 
10
 These responses to these questions have been standardized by those compiling the cumulative NES files.  When 
multiple question wordings appear, and they cannot be standardized, I include both question wordings in this 
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rights, thirteen questions about social policy, thirteen questions about defense/foreign policy, six 
questions about government function, eight questions about morality, and two questions about 
the economy.  Over this sixty year period, seventy-one policy opinion question trends appeared 
in multiple surveys (See Table A.1 in Appendix A).  Gender gaps, defined as differences 
between the collective opinions of men and women greater than three percent, emerge in at least 
one year for 92% of these question trends. 
 Differences in men’s and women’s opinions in this dataset tend to follow those outlined 
in previous works.  Women express more support for social welfare programs, but less for 
tolerance of non-conventional behaviors like drug use.  Women express greater levels of support 
for civil rights and minority rights, while also exhibiting more conservative tendencies than men 
on moral issues like school prayer.  Finally, women express less support for military spending 
and interventions than do men. In short, the differential tendencies among men and women 
observed a quarter century ago remain today. 
If these data add little to previous research on where gender gaps emerge, they do reveal 
other interesting trends in the size of gender gaps that were previously undocumented.  As 
column I in Table 2.1 indicates, gender gaps emerge in all six issues areas (Table 2.1).  Columns 
II and III give the average size of gender gaps on questions within an issue domain in the first 
and last year they were asked.
11
   Column IV indicates the difference in size between the last 
year questions within each domain were asked and the first year they were asked.  This table 
                                                                                                                                                             
analysis.  For instance, respondents were given different options for school prayer from 1964 to 1984 than in 1986 to 
1998.  One included allowing children to pray silently during a proscribed time, the other did not.  I kept both 
wordings separate in subsequent analyses. 
11
 This average includes only gender gaps equal to or larger than 3 percentage points.  I chose this as a conservative 
metric that will work across all the surveys I use.  Since the NES samples approximately 1500 individuals, it has a 
higher margin of error than the NAES, which samples approximately 80,000 individuals.  Since the NAES is a 
rolling cross-sectional survey, some questions have much larger standard errors than others.  Given the differences 
between the NES and the NAES and the differences between various questions on the NAES, 3 percentage points 
seems like a reasonable cut point for determining gender gaps.   
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indicates that gender gaps in policy preferences appear to be decreasing in the areas of civil 
rights and government function, while holding steady or increasing slightly on preferences 
related to morality, social policy, and foreign policy.
12
    
 
Diminishing Gender Gaps 
From 1948 to 2008, gender gaps in civil/minority rights and government function tended 
to decrease over time.  On civil rights, these gaps seem to be narrowing because men now 
express more liberal preferences about minority rights than they did in the past, while the 
preferences of women have tended to remain stable.  On government function, the preferences of 
both sexes seem to be moving closer to one another.  These simultaneous shifts in preferences 
have narrowed gender gaps.   
As Table 2.1 indicates, in the first years that NES respondents answered questions related 
to civil and minority rights, substantial gender gaps emerged.  These gaps averaged 8.2 
percentage points.  In the most recent years respondents were asked these questions, they 
averaged 7.2 percentage points.
13
  This one point reduction occurs as gender gaps on questions 
related to integration and Black equality decreased, with male opposition decreasing at a greater 
rate than female opposition.  Figure 2.1 provides an example of this trend.  In 1986, an eight 
percentage point gap emerged between men’s and women’s opposition toward affirmative 
action.  Men expressed higher rates of opposition than women.  By 2008, this gender gap had 
                                                 
12
 Too few economic policy questions appear in multiple NES surveys to have much confidence in inferences based 
on these questions.  Nor are the gender gaps that emerge on these questions large, or consistent enough to present 
here.  In only two years does a gender gap on either question emerge larger than the survey’s margin of error.  While 
I include data on these questions in Appendix A, I do not present results based on these questions throughout the 
chapter.     
13
 These averages measure the final gender gap in each category, if a gap is over three percentage points.  The last 
year a question is asked varies by question.  This means that these averages include final gaps from various years, 
depending on the survey data available. 
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virtually disappeared.  Men’s opposition to affirmative action had decreased to the level of 
women’s opposition. 
Some civil/minority rights policy preferences still exhibit gender gaps, particularly on the 
subject of gay rights.  Figure 2.2 shows men’s and women’s opposition to allowing gays to serve 
openly in the military (dashed line) and to adopt children (solid line).  The gender gap on gays in 
the military has begun to decrease, because men’s opposition has decreased at a greater rate than 
that of women.  The gender gap in opposition toward gay adoption, however, has increased.  
This increase stems from women’s lessening opposition toward gay adoption.  While men’s 
opposition has been decreasing, the steep drop in women’s opposition in the late 1990s has 
opened a five percentage point gap in 1992 into an 11 percentage point gap in 2008.    
Gender gaps on questions about government function also appear to be decreasing.  In 
this issue area, gender gaps in the first year questions were asked averaged 8.9 percentage points.  
By the last year, these gaps had fallen to 7.1 percentage points.
14
  For example, Figure 2.3 shows 
support for the statement that ―government is too strong.‖  Gender gaps emerged on this question 
briefly in the late 1960s and again throughout the 1980s and 1990s.  By 2000, this gender gap 
diminished to only two percentage points.  The cause of this narrowing is a convergence between 
the preferences expressed by both sexes.  Men’s agreement with the statement that the 
―government is too strong‖ decreased, while women’s agreement with the statement increased.   
 
Increasing Gender Gaps 
                                                 
14
 These measures average the size of gender gaps in diverse years, which is problematic.  Many social and cultural 
changes have occurred between the beginning and ending points for the data used here.  To accommodate these 
political changes, the public opinion questions asked to respondents over the sixty-year period studied here changed.  
No questions were added, questions were dropped, and wording was changed.  As a result, there is no easy measure 
of the ending size of gender gaps.  Relatively few gender gaps included in this average emerge in years before 1980.  
This smaller range of years may mitigate concerns about averaging gender gaps in 1948 with gender gaps in 2008, 
even if it does not alleviate these concerns.   
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While gender gaps have decreased in many areas of civil/minority rights and on 
government function, these gaps have increased in other areas.  Gender gaps have increased a 
small amount on preferences related to morality, from 7.2 percentage points to 7.4 percentage 
points.  These gaps have increased a greater amount on preferences related to social and foreign 
policy.  On social policy, these gaps have increased from7.5 percentage points to 8.5 percentage 
points.  On questions of foreign policy, these gaps have increased from 8.9 percentage points to 
10.6 percentage points.  The cause of this increase seems to be different rates of opinion change 
between men and women.  While both sexes have begun to express more liberal attitudes on 
questions related to morality, women have done so at a slower rate than have men.  The attitudes 
of both sexes also appear to be liberalizing on questions related to social and foreign policy, but 
these attitudes are liberalizing at a greater rate among women than among men.   
Women tend to hold a stronger commitment to traditional morality than do men.  This 
commitment has decreased at a slower rate among women than men, which increases the size of 
gender gaps on a number of questions tapping moral concerns.  Women continue to be more 
likely to support minority rights than men, including the right of gay couples to marry or adopt 
children.  Women also express more opposition to restrictions on school prayer (Figure 2.4).  On 
both these issues, women’s opposition continues to decrease at a slower rate than does men’s.   
On questions about social policy, gender gaps have increased over time.  These increases 
seem to reflect women expressing more liberal preferences over time.  Figure 2.5 shows men’s 
and women’s opposition to the federal government guaranteeing employment.  In 1972, a six 
percentage point gap emerged on this question.  By 2008, this gap had increased to 15 percentage 
points.  This increase indicates a change in the collective preferences of men and women.  In 
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1972, both men and women opposed job guarantees by the federal government.  By 2008, 
women supported these guarantees while men still opposed them.   
 While gender gaps in social policy appear sizable, larger increases in gender gaps emerge 
for questions involving foreign policy.  Both men’s and women’s opinions changed dramatically 
over time, beginning around the time of the First Gulf War and increasing after the terrorist 
attacks on September 11
th
.
15
  Nevertheless, women continue to express more dovish foreign 
policy preferences than men.  Support for policies, including defense spending, increased across 
the board during the 1990s and 2000s.  Yet this support has since decreased, and decreased at a 
greater rate among women than among men.  For example, between 1980 and 1982, support for 
defense spending decreased (Figure 2.6).  By 1992, this support reached the lowest point for men 
and women, 31 percentage points and 28 percentage points respectively.  This decrease coincides 
with the relaxing of Cold War tensions.  After the First Persian Gulf War, however, support for 
defense spending increased to 80 percentage points among men and 73 percentage points among 
women.  This increased gender gap remains evident in opinions on defense spending, even as 
both men and women express less support for increases in government allocations on this area.   
Gender gaps in defense and foreign policy that had begun decreasing in earlier years have 
also reversed course.  For example, gender gaps on concern about the possibility of nuclear war 
began to decrease around 1990 (Figure 2.7).  The gap reached a low of four percentage points by 
2000.  By 2002, it had increased again to 27 percentage points.   In that year, only 14 percent of 
women claimed to be ―not at all worried‖ about the possibility of nuclear war, while 41 percent 
of men offered the same response.  These changes over time suggest that the preferences of men 
and women have been diverging.  Given the importance of issues related to foreign policy in 
                                                 
15
 I do not intend to infer causality with the discussion about the correlation between changes in opinion and political 
events.  This discussion is merely meant to provide context.   
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recent elections, these gender gaps may become increasingly important consideration in 
American politics. 
 
Summary of Trends in Gender Gaps 
The analysis presented above examines changes in gender gaps across six issues areas.  
In some of these areas, gender gaps appear to be decreasing.  On civil rights, men have become 
more accepting of minority rights, particularly concerning African-Americans.  This shift has 
narrowed gender gaps, moving men’s opinions closer to those of women.  On government 
function, women’s increasing skepticism about government has moved their opinions closer to 
those of men, narrowing gender gaps.   
In other issue areas, gender gaps appear to be increasing.  Women’s opinions on 
questions of morality are changing more slowly than those of men, increasing gender gaps 
slightly.  On questions of social and foreign policy women increasingly adopt more liberal 
preferences than men, increasing the size of gender gaps in both policy areas. 
In all six issue areas, when gender gaps occur, they average approximately eight 
percentage points in size.  This eight percentage point gap describes only the difference between 
the opinions of men and the opinions of women.  Yet, as discussed earlier, gender gaps may be 
greater within different socioeconomic groups.  The next section of this chapter examines gender 
gaps based on education and income, separating out African-Americans.  The results suggest that 
in most issue areas, the largest gender gaps tend to emerge among those with higher levels of 
education and income.   
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Gender Gaps within Various Socioeconomic Groups 
Politically important resources, like political knowledge, vary across socioeconomic 
groups.  Research suggests that individuals with high levels of income and education find 
themselves among the most knowledgeable (Althaus, 2003, Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1993), 
perhaps because the costs of acquiring knowledge are less for them than those of lower 
socioeconomic status (Downs, 1957).  If socioeconomic status facilitates the development of 
political preferences that better reflect political predispositions, then studying the differences in 
gender gaps across individuals of different socioeconomic levels may offer scholars some insight 
into how the uneven distribution of two politically important resources shapes the size of gender 
gaps.   For critics of the human capabilities approach, variation in the size of gender gaps across 
demographic groups may provide empirical evidence of the continued importance of resources in 
political preference formation.  Such evidence may justify the skepticism of critics of autonomy 
based approaches to human development, like the capabilities approach.  In the remaining 
portion of this chapter, I will use the 2000 and 2004 NAES to examine the size of gender gaps 
among individuals of different levels of education and income.
16
  My results suggest the largest 
gender gaps tend to emerge among those of different socioeconomic statuses.   
 
Data and Socioeconomic Characteristics 
The 2000 and 2004 NAES surveys include information on more than 80,000 respondents.  
This information includes respondent’s demographic characteristics and their opinions on 151 
questions.  These questions cover five issue areas: economic policy, social policy, moral issues, 
government function, and defense/foreign policy.  The average size of gender gaps over all five 
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 The NES surveys used in the previous section sample too few respondents to analyze the size of gender gaps 
among citizens with various combinations of demographic and socioeconomic characteristics.   
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policy areas is approximately nine percentage points.  Gender gaps appear on approximately 
65% of these questions.   
These gender gaps range from 10.0 percentage points on government function among 
African-Americans to 5.6 percentage points on moral issues (see Tables 2.2 & 2.3).  For both 
African-Americans and those of other ethnicities, the average size of gender gaps are larger in 
the 2000 and 2004 NAES than the average size in the cumulative NES data for economic issues, 
social issues, and questions of government function (see Tables 2.1, 2.2 & 2.3).  Often, these 
differences appear substantial.  For instance, the average gender gap on questions of economic 
policy for the entire sample in the NES was 3.7 percentage points.  Among African-Americans 
sampled in the NAES, the average gender gap on questions of economic policy more than 
doubled, reaching 8.6 percentage points.   
On questions about defense/foreign policy and morality, the size of gaps appears about 
the same for African-Americans across the NES and NAES.  For those not identifying as 
African-American, gender gaps on defense/foreign policy and morality appear slightly smaller.  
For instance, the average size of gender gaps on questions about defense/foreign policy for the 
entire sample was 9.8 percentage points in the NES.  In the NAES, the gap for those not 
identifying as African-American was 8.1 percentage points. 
While both surveys contacted respondents over a thirteen month period, the questions 
changed over time.  This means that more respondents provided opinions on some questions than 
others.  I omit gender gaps where there are fewer than thirty male or female respondents.   
For most of these opinion questions, there are enough observations to analyze gender gaps 
among Americans with (1) high or low levels of education, (2) high or low incomes, and (3) high 
education and income or low education and low income.  High education distinguishes 
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individuals with a four year college degree or greater, while low education indicates a high 
school diploma or less.  High income captures those in the top third of the survey’s income 
distribution, while low income captures those in the bottom third of the income distribution.   
This division of education and income presents the extreme ends of both characteristics, 
ignoring the middle.  Since our interest in the present discussion is to compare the size of gender 
gaps across different characteristics rather than to detail the size of gaps across every value of a 
particular characteristic, contrasting the extremes and ignoring the middle values will provide a 
clear point of comparison for understanding how gender gaps vary across different demographic 
groups.  
 
Ethnicity 
A number of empirical studies indicate large gender gaps between members of different 
ethnic groups, particularly among African-Americans.  Given the sizable distinctions between 
African-Americans and Americans of other ethnicities noted by scholars studying public opinion, 
I conduct separate analyses for African-Americans.  For example, differences in support between 
those who do not identify as African-Americans and African-Americans for race targeted 
policies, including affirmative action and school desegregation, range from 35 to 50 percentage 
points (Tate, 1993; Dawson, 1994; Kinder and Sanders, 1996; Smith and Seltzer, 2000; Kinder 
and Winter, 2001).  Differences over 20% exist on many other social policy preferences, such as 
spending on social services (Schuman et al., 1997; Kinder and Winter, 2001).  These same 
differences emerge on preferences concerning egalitarianism and the ideal size of government 
(Bobo and Hutchings, 1996; Kinder and Winter, 2001).   
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Substantial racial differences also appear in preferences about foreign policy.  ―Race may 
well be emerging as one of the more powerful sources of foreign policy cleavages‖ (Holsti, 
2007: 228).  Studies of public opinion concerning Desert Storm reveal racial differences in 
support for this conflict.  African-Americans expressed less support for military intervention in 
the Gulf than did Anglo citizens (Wilcox et al., 1993).  Public opinion for the War in Iraq eleven 
years later indicate a 49 percentage point gap in war support, with 78 percent of Anglo-
Americans supporting the war and only 29 percent of African-Americans expressing the same 
opinion (Jeffrey Jones, 2003).   
Empirical research suggests systematic differences in the political preferences of 
individuals of different ethnicities.  Ideally, the NAES data would allow for more nuanced 
studies of other ethnicities, in addition to African-Americans.  Yet measuring ethnicity involves 
substantial challenges.  Comparative scholars find that lumping Asian and Hispanic Americans 
used in the NAES provides a poor measure of ethnicity, because these categories ignore 
important cultural and social differences that influence political attitudes or behavior (Cho, 1995; 
DiPietro & Bursik, 2012).    Research also suggests that among Hispanic women, an individual’s 
country of origin influences the nature of policy preferences.  For instance, Puerto Rican women 
support more militaristic policy preferences than do women of Mexican heritage (Montoya, 
1996).  Studies of Asian-American women suggest gender gaps in participation, but more limited 
gender differences in policy preferences (Lien, 1998).   
Since the NAES does not differentiate country of origin among Asian-Americans or 
Hispanic Americans, I do not examine gender gaps among these groups.  While examination of 
gender gaps for these groups would be fascinating, the data do not allow me to undertake such a 
study.  Instead, I contrast the opinions of African-Americans with those of the rest of the 
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American population.  The results suggest interesting differences between gender gaps among 
Americans.  Among those who do not identify as African-American, the largest gender gaps 
emerge among citizens of high and low socioeconomic status, depending on the issue area.  
Among African-Americans, the largest gender gaps consistently emerge among citizens of high 
socioeconomic status.   
 
Gender Gaps by Socioeconomic Group among Those Not Identifying as African-American 
Aggregate analyses disguise some important socioeconomic differences in gender gaps 
among those citizens who do not identify themselves as African-American.  More nuanced 
analyses using the NAES surveys suggest that gender gaps tend to be greatest among those with 
the highest socioeconomic status, on economic policy, moral issues, and foreign policy.  On 
questions of social policy and government function, however, the largest gender gaps emerge 
among those with lower socioeconomic status. 
Table 2.2 and Table 2.3 show the average size of gender gaps across the five issue areas 
covered by the 2000 and 2004 NAES.  Within every issue area except government function, a 
larger gender gap emerges among a particular socioeconomic group that does not identify as 
African-American than among their African-American counterparts.   
On questions of economic policy, the average size of gender gaps for those who do not 
identify as African-American is 6.7 percentage points.  This average size increases to almost nine 
percentage points among highly educated, high income individuals.  A smaller average gap 
emerges on questions gauging moral issues.  This gap again increases among those with the 
highest levels of education and income.  The average gender gap on questions related to foreign 
38 
 
policy is 8.1 percentage points.  Among those with the most education, this gap increases by an 
additional three percentage points.   
On opinions about the economy, morality, and foreign policy, the largest gender gaps 
emerge among individuals who do not identify as African-American and have high 
socioeconomic status.  Gender gaps on support for the Republican or Democratic candidate for 
president on economic issues in 2000 provide a good example of the importance of high 
socioeconomic status within these three issue areas (Figure 2.8).  Women express more support 
than men for the Democratic candidate, Vice President Al Gore.  This creates a gender gap of 14 
percentage points among all Americans who do not identify as African-American.  Among those 
less educated, that gap is only 8 percentage points.  Among those less affluent, that gap is only 
seven percentage points.  Among those with both low levels of education and low income, the 
gap shrinks to six percentage points.  Gender gaps reach 16 percentage points among those with 
high levels of income and 20 percentage points among those with high levels of education.  The 
gender gap is slightly lower—19 points—among those with high levels of both income and 
education.   
If men and women who do not identify as African-American and possess high 
socioeconomic status express the largest levels of disagreement on questions of economic policy, 
moral issues, and foreign policy, far different patterns emerge within this group on questions 
related to social policy and government function.   On questions of social policy, this difference 
between those with low income and those with high education is almost five percentage points 
(Table 2.2).   
For instance, women who do not identify as African-American expressed more support 
than men for restrictions on gun purchases, causing an 18 percentage point gender gap (Figure 
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2.9).  Among less educated of within this group and the lowest income within this group, this 
gender gap increased to 20 and 19 percentage points, respectively.  Among the most educated or 
highest income Americans, this gender gap decreased to 16 percentage points. 
Research suggests that socioeconomic characteristics influence policy preferences 
(Downs, 1957; Erikson and Luttbeg, 1973; Knoke, 1979; McClosky, 1958).  The results outlined 
above indicate these characteristics are also associated with differently-sized gender gaps among 
those who do not identify themselves as African-Americans.  Yet whether the largest gender 
gaps appear among those of high socioeconomic status or low socioeconomic status varies across 
issue domains.  Among those who do identify as African-American, different patterns emerge.   
 
Gender Gaps by Socioeconomic Group among Those Identifying as African-American 
Among African-American, the highest gender gaps tend to emerge among individuals of 
high socioeconomic status (Table 2.3).  The only exception to this pattern concerns foreign 
policy, where larger gaps emerge among individuals of low income.  Within most issue domains, 
the average gap among African-Americans of high socioeconomic status is more than two 
percentage points larger than for individuals of low socioeconomic status.   
Table 2.3 indicates that among respondents identifying as African-American, the average 
size of gender gaps among respondents of high socioeconomic status in all five issue areas were 
larger than the gaps among the entire sample of African-Americans.  In the figures that follow, 
―overall average‖ reflects the size of gender gaps among all African-Americans.  Most of the 
time, the gender gaps among those of high socioeconomic status appears considerably larger than 
the overall average.  On economic issues, the average gender gap was about nine percentage 
points.  Among those with high levels of education and income, this gap reaches almost 14 
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percentage points.  On moral issues, the average gender gap among blacks is 6.5 percentage 
points.  Among those with the highest levels of education and income, the size of this gap more 
than doubles.  The average size of gender gaps on questions about government function increases 
from 10 percentage points among all African-American respondents to 17 percentage points for 
those with the highest levels of income and education.  On questions about morality, the increase 
from between the average overall gender gap and the gender gap among those with the highest 
education and income is not quite so dramatic.  Here, the overall gender gap is 9.6 percentage 
points and among those of the highest socioeconomic status, this gap increases to 10.2 
percentage points.   
For instance, African-American women expressed greater opposition than African-
American men to repealing tax cuts for the wealthiest Americans.  This created a gender gap of 
four percentage points (Figure 2.10).  Among high income African-Americans, this gap 
increased to 21 percentage points.  Among high income and highly educated African-American 
respondents, the gap increased to 19 percentage points.  However, among the least educated 
African-Americans, the gap decreased to just two percentage points, hardly a difference at all.   
Foreign policy is the only issue area in which the largest gender gaps do not emerge 
among African-Americans of the highest socioeconomic status.  In this issue area, the average 
overall gap is approximately 10 percentage points, and the largest gender gaps emerge among 
those with the lowest incomes, reaching over 15 percentage points.  For instance, African-
American women expressed greater skepticism about the Iraq War being ―worth it,‖ creating a 
six percentage point gender gap among blacks (Figure 2.11).  Among low income and among 
less educated respondents, this gap increases to 9 percentage points.  Among high income 
African-American respondents, this gap is only 2 percentage points.   
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Data from only two years provides only a limited idea of the nature of these patterns.  
Yet, on economic and moral issues, the largest gender gaps emerge among those of the highest 
socioeconomic status.  For Americans who do not identify as African-American and for those 
who do, gender gaps appear larger among citizens of different socioeconomic characteristics.  
Most often, these gaps are largest among those with high socioeconomic status.  Yet sometimes 
larger gender gaps emerge among individuals with low socioeconomic status.  These results 
suggest that gender gaps are complex and that the size of these gaps depends on socio-
demographic characteristics and on the issue area.  However, they may also suggest that the 
factors that contribute to the size of gender gaps vary across issues domains.  Chapter Three will 
delve into four plausible causes of this variance. 
 
Conclusions 
 Although gender equality has been increasing over time in the United States, gender gaps 
in policy preferences remain. Some gaps appear to be decreasing over time, but many have held 
steady or increased.  This trend for increasing gaps appears most evident on issues concerning 
social and foreign policy.  Women continue to support a more expansive welfare state.  They 
also continue to express more dovish foreign policy preferences than men.   
Analyses of the demographic distribution of gender gaps in 2000 and 2004 also indicate 
that gender gaps appear largest among those at the extreme ends of the socioeconomic spectrum.  
This finding seems particularly surprising concerning the highly educated.  Education is the 
strongest predictor of political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).  Political scientists 
often consider knowledgeable citizens to be best situated to learn about politics and to form 
political judgments (Downs, 1957; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).  The politically 
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knowledgeable tend to hold opinions that correspond with their underlying political 
predispositions (Zaller, 1992; Bartels, 1996; Sniderman et al., 2001).  If politically 
knowledgeable citizens can best form policy opinions that correspond with the underlying 
political predispositions, these findings suggest that men and women may possess different 
values or use different values to form political preferences.  When members of both sexes 
translate these values into political preferences, sizable gender gaps often emerge.  This 
possibility will be explored further in Chapters Four and Five.   
The fact that low socioeconomic status affects the size of gender gaps in various issue 
areas may seem less surprising than that high socioeconomic status matters.  Yet that men and 
women with similar demographic and socioeconomic characteristics express different political 
preferences may be evidence that these particular environmental characteristics provide distinct 
challenges to men and women.  According to the American Psychological Association, 
individuals of low socioeconomic status experience higher levels of poverty than the average 
American.
17
  They also tend to be less healthy than the average American.  Yet there may be 
reasons that women of low socioeconomic status respond differently to these challenges.   
Women of low socioeconomic status tend to have dependents that they support alone.  
Given the expense required to raise a child and the difficulties inherent in caring for children 
alone, women of low socioeconomic status face considerable challenges.  While the data 
presented here do not allow for causal arguments, it seems plausible that some women may 
respond to these distinct challenges tied to poverty by looking for government support.  It is also 
plausible that, even if women of low socioeconomic status do not take government support, the 
difficulties they face may provide them with a more sympathetic view of social welfare spending 
and other forms of institutional support.  Chapter Five will examine whether variations in 
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 http://www.apa.org/pi/ses/resources/publications/factsheet-women.aspx 
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women’s environmental conditions actually contribute to increased support for social welfare 
policies. 
Gender gaps tend to be highest among those socioeconomic groups that political science 
researchers identify as best situated to develop political preferences that reflect their values and 
beliefs.  The variation across these different characteristics suggests that differences in the 
resources citizens possess may affect the opinions they express.  Smaller gaps among those of 
lower socioeconomic status may reflect a decreased ability to translate political values into 
political preferences that reflect those values.  These findings provide some support for critics of 
approaches that rely on choice, including the human capabilities approach.   
This chapter provides evidence of the continued existence of gender gaps in American 
politics, even among the most educated American citizens.  However, the analysis presented so 
far provides no indicate of how and why these gender gaps might emerge.  The next chapter 
addresses this question.  Drawing from a wide range of literatures, I identify four possible factors 
contributing to the development of gender gaps.  Later chapters then test the impact of these 
factors on gender gaps on foreign and social policy preferences, two issue areas in which gender 
gaps appear to be widening.    
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Chapter Three:  Theoretical Foundations of Gender Gaps 
Women tend to express political opinions systematically different than those of men.  
Data from the previous chapter suggest that, in the aggregate, women express greater support for 
―compassion issues,‖ such as social welfare policies (Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  Women also 
express less support for the use of force in foreign and domestic realms (Chaney et al., 1998; 
Eichenberg, 2003; Fite, Genest, et al., 1990; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; 
Nincic and Nincic, 2000; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  These findings, while covering a larger 
time frame and more issues areas than previous studies, mirror those presented by American and 
comparative political scientists.  These general predispositions narrow or widen the gender gap 
in vote choice depending on which issues become salient during presidential campaigns 
(Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006).  Nevertheless, these gender gaps remain an 
enduring phenomenon in American politics, and a politically important one.   
For example, President Barack Obama received a narrow plurality of male votes in the 
2008 presidential election.  Yet he received 13% more female votes than his Republican rival, 
Senator John McCain (Benen, 2012).  Such gender gaps in presidential vote choice emerge in 
every election since 1980.  Women favor Democrats, and men favor Republicans.  Political 
strategists label gender gaps a ―serious long-term problem‖ for the Republican Party.18  Gender 
gaps exist within political parties, too.  In February of 2012, Republican women expressed more 
support for Governor Mitt Romney, a moderate candidate in the Republican Primary (9%).  
Republican men expressed more support for the more socially conservative Rick Santorum 
(10%).
19
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 Schmidt, S. ―Can the GOP close the gender gap in 2012?.‖  Ames Tribune.  Retrieved from  
 http://www.amestrib.com/sections/opinion/columns/steffen-schmidt-can-gop-close-gender-gap-2012.html  
19
 Steinhauser, P.  ―CNN Poll: Gender and income gaps in GOP nomination battle.‖  Retrieved from 
 http://politicalticker.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/14/cnn-poll-gender-and-income-gaps-in-gop-nomination-battle/ 
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Political scientists identify the gender gaps in political preferences as the cause of gender 
gaps in party identification and vote choice.  Yet little consensus exists about what causes these 
political preferences.  Theories from a variety of academic disciplines may explain gender gaps 
in political preferences.  Work from evolutionary biology and primatology provides evidence 
that behavioral tendencies rooted in our biology cause gender gaps.  Psychological and 
sociological research argues that gender role socialization, the process through which individuals 
learn the characteristics society considers gender appropriate, cause these gaps.  Other 
psychological and political science research indicates that gender differences in political values 
underlie gender gaps in political preferences.  Still more political science research suggests that 
gender differences in the possession of political knowledge, a resource important in opinion 
formation and stability, create gender gaps in political preferences.   
Behavioral tendencies, gender role socialization, political values, and political knowledge 
are the four main explanations which appear in studies of gender gaps.    The empirical analyses 
undertaken in this dissertation draw these four explanations together into a broader theoretical 
framework, which allows component theories to be tested against one another.  Chapters four 
and five will use hypotheses derived from these theories to identify factors influencing the 
development of gender gaps on preferences on foreign policy and on social issues.  The 
empirical analyses in these chapters provide scholars with a basic sense of what factors 
contribute to the creation of gender gaps in two areas where scholars often find gender gaps.  
They also provide scholars with an estimate of how much each factor contributes to the creation 
of these gaps relative to others.  This empirical approach to the study of gender gaps offers a 
more nuanced answer to a question looming over public opinion research—why women express 
political preferences so distinct from those of men. 
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The Biological Foundations of Gender Gaps 
Over the last two decades, political scientists have fused the study of political behavior 
and findings from the biological sciences.  These studies suggest our DNA may influence the 
development of political characteristics such as party identification (Hatemi, 2007; Hatemi et al., 
2009; Settle et al., 2009).  Biological reactions, including disgust, may condition human 
responses to emerging social issues (Smith et al., 2008; Smith et al., 2011).  Such findings, and 
the discussion they provoke, serve as a reminder that human beings are biological organisms.  
Even when we can overcome our biological reactions or predispositions, we may never 
completely eradicate or control them. 
A number of scholars in various disciplines identify biological differences between the 
sexes as a potential cause of gender gaps (e.g., Hatemi et al., 2009; Kristeva, 1981; Fukuyama, 
1998; Pratto, 1996).  One prominent scholar contends that these gender differences in behavior 
create gender differences in political attitudes (Fukuyama, 1998).  However, no scholar has yet 
tested this contention. 
Women tend to behave and to respond to external stimuli less aggressively than men.  
Women also tend to behave in ways characterized as nurturing and conciliatory.  Women’s 
tendency to oppose aggressive foreign policies and to favor policies providing social welfare 
benefits to individuals may be rooted in these behavioral tendencies.  Evolutionary biologists 
suggest an explanation for the behavioral tendencies scholars note among women—natural 
selection.  Environmental forces ―select‖ traits that give an organism a reproductive advantage, 
increasing the prevalence of these traits over time (Darwin, 1859).  Consequently, gender 
differences in what behaviors maximize reproductive success may explain why women engage in 
less aggression and display more nurturing and conciliatory behaviors.   
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Maximizing Reproductive Success 
Success for animals involves the survival of their genetic material (Haldane, 1959; Orr, 
2009).   From an evolutionary perspective, however, success requires more than offspring.  The 
environment of an organism ―selects‖ traits that give organisms a reproductive advantage, a 
process called ―natural selection‖ (Darwin, 1859).  ―Natural selection favors organisms that 
survive and reproduce‖ (De Waal, 2005: 33).  Natural selection also requires that an organism’s 
offspring survive childhood and pass genetic material to their own offspring.   
Violent and individualistic behaviors may increase a man’s number of mates, increasing 
his reproductive success.
20
  For example, a recent genetic study analyzed the Y-chromosomes of 
Central Asian men (Zerjal et al., 2003).  Only men possess this chromosome, passing it on to 
their male offspring.  About eight percent of Asian men possess virtually identical Y-
chromosomes, evidence that these men share a male ancestor who lived about one thousand 
years ago.
21
  Empirical evidence suggests that this ancestor is Genghis Khan, and scholars 
estimate that he has about sixteen million male descendants (Zerjal, et al. 2003).  Khan, a brutal 
warrior, slaughtered entire populations.
22
  By engaging in this violence, Khan eliminated male 
rivals and the offspring of these rivals.  However, historical evidence indicates that this warrior 
did not slaughter the young women within the populations he conquered.  These women bore his 
offspring.
23
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 As will be discussed in subsequent portions of this chapter, violence that may increase the reproductive success of 
males includes violence directed at women, male competitors, or the offspring of other males. 
21
 This 8% of the Central Asian population is approximately .5% of the human population. 
22
 Scholars estimate that Khan’s invasion of the Iranian Plateau resulted in the deaths of ¾ of the population of 
Iran—10 to15 million people (Ward, 2009). 
23
 Mayell, H.  ―Genghis Khan a Prolific Lover, DNA Data Implies.‖  National Geographic News.  Retrieved on  
http://news.nationalgeographic.com/news/2003/02/0214_030214_genghis.html 
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As the reproductive success of Genghis Khan illustrates, a male’s upper limit for 
offspring can be in the hundreds or thousands and violence can help to maximize the number of 
offspring he produces.  A female’s upper-limit for offspring is only about twenty.   
Among great apes, including humans, the female parent carries offspring until birth and 
provides much of the care for that offspring until it reaches maturity.
24
  To give birth to healthy 
offspring, women must expend a significant amount of energy and increase their resource 
consumption.
25
  After giving birth, primary care for the infant/child usually remains the 
responsibility of the mother (Bond, 2003; Anderson and Hamilton, 2005).  As a result, the 
parental investment for women remains quite high.  This provides her incentive to carefully 
select her mates, choosing those with traits that maximize survival (Bateman, 1948).  The nature 
of parental investment among females also suggests that reproductive success involves different 
traits for women than men.  Two effective female traits may be pacifism and compassion.   
While violence may reap reproductive rewards for males, females put themselves and 
their offspring in danger when engaging in violence (Pusey et al., 2008).  Should a female die, 
her offspring would likely die.  Should she become injured, her ability to care for offspring 
would suffer.  Consequently, female violence decreases the likelihood of reproductive success in 
a species in which infants take so much time to reach maturity.  Given the potential negative 
consequences of aggressive behavior, it makes sense that females do not engage in aggression at 
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 The assertion that women provide primary care for infants and children is not meant to diminish the parental 
investment made by human males, which far exceeds that of other great apes.  The development of the nuclear 
family, which places limitations on sex, human males can be far more certain about the paternity of their offspring 
than many other animals (de Waal 2005).  This increases parental investment among men.  (Scholars also suggest 
that the importance to men of ensuring the paternity of one’s offspring within agricultural, rather than nomadic 
communities, helped to create patriarchal social and political institutions (Ryan and Jethá, 2011). Nevertheless, 
studies indicate that females do provide the majority of care for children (Bond, 2003; Anderson and Hamilton, 
2005) 
25
 Human gestation is approximately nine months.  Once pregnant, a woman needs approximately three to four 
hundred additional calories a day.  While breastfeeding, women may need to consume five hundred calories more 
than they did prior to their pregnancy (See 
http://www.nutritionmd.org/nutrition_tips/nutrition_tips_pregnancy_nutrition/lactation.html, 
http://www.americanpregnancy.org/gettingpregnant/preconceptionnutrition.html, ) 
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the same rate as do males. Similar considerations may underlie the tendency to display 
compassion, a characteristic thought to underlie certain aspects of female political behavior. 
Ensuring offspring survive until mature also requires maternal care, usually involving 
nurturing behaviors.  Without adequate care, the offspring would die.  The high parental 
investment required to give birth to offspring provides a woman with additional incentive to care 
for her young until the reach maturity, at which point they can reproduce successfully. Females, 
even as infants, seem more responsive to the needs of others (Brizendine, 2006).   From an 
evolutionary perspective, this responsiveness appears unsurprising.  The ability to nurture 
offspring and protect offspring from violence affects a female’s ability to raise offspring 
successfully.   
Natural selection favors the traits of skillful mothers (Goodall, 1970), even as it may 
favor the traits of violent fathers.
 26
   Traits like conflict avoidance and compassion often improve 
women’s chances of genetic success.  These characteristics also predispose members of each sex 
to behave in certain ways.  Such predispositions may underlie the systematically difference 
preferences women express.  For example, conflict avoidance may underlie women’s tendency to 
oppose militaristic foreign policy options, while compassion may underlie their tendency to 
support social welfare policies targeting those in need.  
For those inclined to dismiss arguments about the biological foundations of gender gaps 
as sexist notions rooted in patriarchal societies, proponents of such arguments can point to 
gender differences in the animal kingdom.  Female primates, including chimpanzees and 
bonobos, exhibit the some propensity to avoid violence and play a primary role in caring for 
family members as do women (Boesch, 2009; Goodall, 1971; 1986; 1990; de Waal, 1982; 1997; 
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 Studies of chimpanzees indicate that mothering is not a natural skill.  Primatologists have documented a number 
of cases in which females proved incompetent mothers, and their offspring died (Goodall, 1990). 
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2005).  That gender differences in animals share some similarities with those of humans 
indicates a biological foundation for these differences.   
Yet this primatology research indicates that gender gaps in chimpanzees result from a 
complex environmental-biological interaction.  Rather than asserting men and women are 
biologically programmed to behave differently, this research suggests that men and women are 
biologically predisposed to act in different ways under different conditions (Boesch, 2009; de 
Waal, 2005).  In the following section, I outline the genetic proximity of human beings to 
chimpanzees and bonobos.  I also draw on recent findings in primatology that may provide 
political scientists with a more nuanced biological explanation of gender gaps in political 
preferences.   
   
Using Non-Human Primate Behavior to Explain Human Behavior 
While human beings may cling to the belief that we have advanced far beyond our 
primate ancestors, studies indicate our advances may be smaller than we would like.  Human 
beings bear substantial genetic and behavioral similarities to the great apes closest to us from an 
evolutionary perspective.  These similarities provide a strong justification for using the vast 
amount of primatology research on gender differences to enrich the biological theories of gender 
gaps advanced by scholars (e.g., Hatemi et al., 2009; Kristeva, 1981; Fukuyama, 1998; Pratto, 
1996) 
The evolution of humans suggests a relatively recent divergence from our closest 
ancestors among the Great Apes (Boesch, 2009; de Waal, 2005).  Approximately 30 million 
years ago, the Old World primate branch split in two (Figure 3.1).  The first branch resulting 
from this split includes monkeys, such as the baboon and the macaque.  The second branch 
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includes orangutans, gorillas, chimpanzees, bonobos, and humans.  Approximately 6 million 
years ago, this second branch split.  Human beings emerged from this split.  Yet as Figure 3.1 
shows, chimpanzees and bonobos remain close to human beings on this ―family‖ tree.  Studies of 
the human genome provide strong evidence of our biological proximity to chimpanzees and 
bonobos.
27
  
Behavioral similarities exist between human beings and our close relatives among the 
great apes.  Chimpanzees and bonobos use tools, form complex communities, and engage in 
power struggles (Goodall, 1970; de Waal, 1982; 1997).  They display ―sympathy, empathy, 
reciprocity, and a willingness to follow social rules‖ (Angier, 2001).  These animals even possess 
self-awareness, demonstrated by their ability to recognize themselves in mirrors (de Waal, 1997).   
Given their close evolutionary proximity to humans and their behavioral similarities, 
studies of chimpanzee and bonobo behavior may provide leverage in how human biology shapes 
political behavior.  Recent research on gender differences among chimpanzees and bonobos 
indicates that environmental characteristics facilitate or impede the development of the gender 
differences in behavior long noted by scholars.  Under certain circumstances, female primates 
exhibit less aggressive behavior than their male counterparts (de Waal, 2005; Boesch, 2009).  
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 A genome consists of all the biological information required to build and maintain an organism.  This information 
is encoded in an organism’s DNA, a nucleic acid made up of molecules called nucleotides.  Segments of DNA, 
called genes, carry genetic information that guides the development and functioning of organisms.  DNA 
comparisons between humans and our close primate relatives indicate significant biological similarities to 
chimpanzees and bonobos.  Estimates indicate that human beings and chimpanzees/bonobos share 96% of their 
DNA.   
More nuanced studies suggest even greater levels of shared genetic material between humans and these 
great apes (Chen and Li, 2001; Ebersberger et al., 2002; Fukuyama, 2002; Mikkelsen et al., 2005)  Single nucleotide 
polymorphisms (SNPs) indicate an alteration in a single nucleotide in the genome sequence, occurring in at least 1% 
of the population (Human Genome Project Information).  There are about 1.4 million SNPs.  Scientists estimate the 
similarity between nucleotides changes in humans and chimps at about 98% (Mikkelsen et al., 2005). 
Because of the great biological similarities between humans and chimpanzees, scientists have long used 
chimpanzees in biomedical research.  Scientists also use chimpanzees to study the development of memory, 
language and laughter (Gardner and Gardner, 1969; Allen and Gardner, 1980), and interpersonal awareness (de 
Waal, 2005).   
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Under these same circumstances, female primates engage in fewer cooperative acts meant to aid 
community members outside their immediate families (de Waal, 2005).   
The next section of this chapter will discuss primatology findings relevant to the study of 
human gender gaps in more detail.  This body of work provides a useful starting point for 
explanations of how biology might cause gender gaps.  It also provides a strong theoretical 
foundation through which scholars can identify the conditions under which biological 
predispositions should increase the size of gender gaps.  Such theories allow scholars to move 
beyond conceptualizations of biology that use gender as a proxy measure for biology.  They also 
facilitate the creation of more accurate, and nuanced, empirical tests of how biology influences 
the development of gender gaps.   
 
Gender Differences in Behavior among Primates 
Primatologists studying chimpanzee communities in captivity and the wild find many 
behavioral differences between males and females.  Recent research on chimpanzees and 
bonobos indicates that the environment acts as a mediating variable between biological 
predispositions and behavior.  Gender differences among primates appear to increase or decrease 
based on the variation in the availability of resources and the presence of predators.   
For decades, primatologists studying chimpanzees found considerable differences in the 
behavior of male and female chimps.  Primatologists attribute Machiavellian cunning to male 
chimpanzees, describing the behavior of these animals in ways that invoke images of ambitious 
politicians among political scientists (Byrne and Whiten, 1988; Goodall, 1971; 1990; de Waal, 
2007).  In the Shadow of Man and Through a Window describe the rise to power of a young male 
chimpanzee named Figan (Goodall, 1971; 1990).  As an adolescent, Figan mimicked the 
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behavior of the alpha male in his group, Mike.  As an adult, Figan challenged Mike.  Figan 
proved expert at forming coalitions with other male chimpanzees and seizing every opportunity 
to take advantage of the perceived weakness of his rivals.  He maintained his privileged status 
largely through alliances with other males, well-timed charging displays that made him appear 
larger and more dangerous than he actually was, and acts of aggression.    
Goodall presents Figan as an animal adroit at using violence to obtain, and maintain, 
power.  Yet Figan’s aggressive nature was by no means exceptional among the male 
chimpanzees studied by primatologists including Goodall and Frans de Waal.  Male chimpanzees 
commit acts of violence against females and infants of their own and neighboring groups.  They 
even engage in coordinated ―intercommunity attacks and cannibalism‖ that can only be called 
war-making (Goodall, 1990: 109).   
Male chimpanzees also exhibit dominance over female chimpanzees, controlling aspects 
of food distribution and reproduction (Boesch, 2009; Goodall, 1986).  In all her time in the 
Gombe of Tanzania, Goodall never witnesses a female participating in a baboon hunt (Goodall, 
1986: 127).  Meat is a nutrient-rich food for animals, and smaller baboons are a source of meat 
for chimpanzees.  Since they do not participate in hunts, females are forced to rely on males to 
provide meat for themselves and their offspring.  Male chimpanzees also use violence to 
convince fertile females to venture to the periphery of their communities territory to mate (De 
Waal, 2005; Goodall, 1986; Muller and Wrangham, 2009).
28
   Males may use ―a fair amount of 
brutality‖ to force a female to accompany him on these forays (Goodall, 1986: 453).29   
                                                 
28
 In the Kibale Forest in Uganda, primatologists Carole Hooven and Richard Wrangham witnessed males beating 
females with large wooden sticks (http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/734779/posts).  Scientists note the use 
of this ―wife-beating‖ equipment seems aimed at cultivating obedience in females, as males usually mate with the 
females they beat (de Waal, 2005).  In fact, Hooven and Wrangham argue that the use of sticks showed restraint on 
the part of the male chimps, since the use of heavy rocks could kill the females.   
29
 Female chimpanzees frequently find themselves the objects of such violence.  Three-quarters of Gombe females 
encountering males from other communities experienced severe attacks (Boesch, 2009: 129).   
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With the exception of a few isolated acts, however, female chimpanzees avoid violence 
and engage in fewer aggressive actions than males.
30
  From the perspective of an animal trying to 
ensure its own survival and that of her offspring, female pacifism seems rational.  Female chimps 
are, on average, twenty-percent smaller than their males.  Biologists call this size difference 
between the males and females sexual dimorphism.  A characteristic shared by chimps and 
humans, sexual dimorphism makes physical retaliation by males dangerous for females.  
The behaviors female chimps exhibit in the wild also include many compassionate and 
nurturing behaviors.  Female chimpanzees in the wild spend most of their days foraging for food 
with their offspring (de Waal, 2005).  They also spend more time guiding the development of 
their offspring (Goodall, 1986).  Females play with their infants or children, teach them 
necessary life skills, and mediate their conflicts with siblings and other playmates (Goodall, 
1986).   
For years, many leading primatologists presented these gender differences in behavior as 
natural extension of different types of parental social responsibilities (Goodall, 1970; 1986).  
Female chimps bear the responsibility of carrying and rearing young.  Male chimps found their 
days dominated by struggles over status (Goodall, 1986; de Waal, 2005).  However, emerging 
research on chimpanzees outside the Gombe and on bonobos indicates that an animal’s 
environment can exacerbate sex differences.  This environmental component undermines 
biological arguments that aggression and domination remain natural characteristics of only one 
sex. 
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 Primatologists have observed female chimpanzees in the Gombe engaging in brutal acts of aggression.  In The 
Chimpanzees of Gombe (1986), Jane Goodall describes a high-ranking female, Passion, and her adolescent daughter, 
Pom, attacking two females from their own community and eating their infants.  Scientists speculate that female 
chimpanzees engage in such violent attacks to maximize the odds of survival for themselves and their offspring.  
The slain chimp provides meat for the attacker and her offspring, and eliminates a competitor for food, mates, and 
male protection (Pusey et al., 2007).  Such acts of female aggression are rare. 
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Tai chimpanzees in the Côte d’Ivoire face greater threat from predators and live in an 
environment with more food (Boesch, 2009).  These factors suggest differences between the 
material environment, comprised of feeding ecology and predation, between the Gombe and Tai 
chimpanzees.  Under these conditions, chimpanzees spend more time traveling as a group, 
allowing females to form social relationships with one another (Boesch, 2009; de Waal, 2005).  
These relationships increase the collective powers off females within their communities, altering 
the behavior of females (Boesch, 2009; de Waal, 2005).   
Female Tai chimpanzees display greater levels of aggression and social cooperation than 
female chimpanzees in the Gombe (Boesch, 2009; de Waal, 2005).  Among the Tai chimpanzees, 
female chimpanzees help males in their group control access to meat during hunts and support 
their preferred male during struggles for social dominance (Boesch, 2009).
31
  Tai chimpanzees 
also exhibit greater levels of social cooperation and compassion for others within their group 
than did the Gombe chimpanzees.  Male and female Tai chimpanzees ―took care of group mates 
wounded by leopards, licking their blood, carefully removing dirt, and waving away flies that 
came near the wounds. They protected injured companions, and slowed down during travel in 
order to accommodate them‖ (de Waal, 2009).  
The research on chimpanzees indicates that no biological mandate exists ensuring women 
behave less aggressively and more compassionately than men.  Female Tai chimpanzees behave 
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 ―Don’t believe anyone who says that since nature is based on a struggle for life, we need to live like this as well. 
Many animals survive not by eliminating each other or by keeping everything for themselves, but by cooperating 
and sharing. This applies most definitely to pack hunters, such as wolves or killer whales, but also our closest 
relatives, the primates. In a study in Taï National Park, in Ivory Coast, All of this makes perfect sense given that 
chimpanzees live in groups for a reason, the same way wolves and humans are group animals for a reason. If man is 
wolf to man, he is so in every sense, not just the negative one. We would not be where we are today had our 
ancestors been socially aloof. What we need is a complete overhaul of assumptions about human nature. Too many 
economists and politicians model human society on the perpetual struggle they believe exists in nature, but which is 
a mere projection. Like magicians, they first throw their ideological prejudices into the hat of nature, then pull them 
out by their very ears to show how much nature agrees with them. It’s a trick for which we have fallen for too long. 
Obviously, competition is part of the picture, but humans can’t live by competition alone‖ (de Waal, 2009). 
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differently than their Gombe relatives, exhibiting higher levels of violence and compassion 
toward members of their own group.  Bonobos provide an even greater contrast.  Higher resource 
availability among bonobos, like among the Tai chimpanzees, makes it possible for the 
community to travel as a group.  Since females spend less time alone foraging for food with their 
young, they have the ability to form social bonds with other females.  This increases their power 
within the group and over its resources.   
In fact, female bonobos dominate males.  It may be disingenuous to discuss bonobo 
hierarchies, as the status of high ranking females depends on age more often than power 
struggles (de Waal, 2005; Ryan and Jethá, 2011).  Nevertheless, bonobos appear to be a 
matriarchal species.  The position of males depends on the status of their mothers (de Waal, 
2005).  Studies of food competition within zoos indicate that when a male bonobo and two 
females live together, the male bonobo may not receive any of the food given to the animals (de 
Waal, 2005).  The male bonobo ―can make as many charging displays as he wants, but the 
females ignore the commotion and divide the food among themselves‖ (de Waal, 2005: 63).  
Under the same conditions, a male chimpanzee will claim all the food for himself (de Waal, 
2005).   
However unlike chimpanzees, bonobos rarely use violence to assert power or to resolve 
conflicts.  Instead they use sexual contact (de Waal, 2005; Ryan and Jethá, 2011).  This method 
of conflict resolution protects females and their offspring by obfuscating paternity (de Waal, 
2005).  Any bonobo male within the community could have fathered the infant of any female.  
As a result, no incentive exists for the male to harm the female or her offspring.   
Studies of Tai chimpanzees and bonobos indicate that the biological constraints placed on 
female primates by their material environment may be overcome under particular environmental 
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conditions or, as with bonobos, under different forms of social organization.  This finding from 
primatology provides political scientists with a way to capture the genetic-environmental 
interactions which shape gender differences in human behavior, which may contribute to the 
development of gender gaps in political preferences. 
 
Biology and Gender Gaps 
Studies of Tai chimpanzees and bonobos indicate that our genes only explain a portion of 
our behavior.  ―We tend to think of the chain of command passing from genes, to hormones, to 
brain, to environment….yet most developmental scientists will tell you that one-way arrows of 
causality are just so last century…the circuits of the brain are quite literally a product of your 
physical, social, and cultural environment, as well as your behavior and thoughts‖ (Fine, 2010: 
235-236).  This limits the utility of studies that seek to explain gender gaps through genes, thus 
accepting a one-way arrow of causality.  Twin studies, while interesting, underestimate the 
amount that our environment contributes to gender gaps in political preferences (for review, see 
Charney 2011).  This limitation may explain the weak results presented in works using twin 
studies to explain gender gaps in political preferences (Hatemi et al., 2009; Hatemi et al., 2011).   
While political scientists tend to root gender gaps in differences between men and 
women, research done on chimpanzees indicates the intra-sex variation provides a more fruitful 
area to look for causes of gender gaps.  Political scientists have conducted studies of inter-sex 
variation, arguing that biological differences between males and females create gender gaps in 
political preferences.  Francis Fukuyama draws upon the work of early primatologists, arguing 
that female chimpanzees have relationships and their male counterparts engage in realpolitik 
(Fukuyama, 1998).  Other scholars attributed gender gaps in political preferences to behavioral 
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tendencies, such as aggression (Burris, 1992; Brandes, 1992) and social cooperation (Chaney et 
al., 1998; Eichenberg, 2003; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; Shapiro and 
Mahajan, 1986). Yet the intra-sex variation between female chimpanzees in the Gombe and Tai 
forests indicate levels of aggression and compassion vary females as a function of their 
environment.  This observation may offer political scientists leverage to explain gender gaps in 
humans.
 32
   
 Chimpanzee research suggests the following hypotheses, the first applying to foreign 
policy preferences and the second to social policy preferences. 
  : If women live under conditions of (1) scarcity and (2) low external threat, they would 
behave less aggressively toward outsiders than they would absent this combination of 
environmental conditions. 
 
  : If women live under conditions of (1) scarcity and (2) low external threat, they would 
behave less cooperatively and exhibit less responsiveness to the needs of those outside their 
immediate family than they would absent this combination of environmental conditions. 
 
The biological explanations above capture more of the complex interaction between 
biology and environment than many previous attempts to operationalize biological influences. 
Yet for many scholars, socialization seems more likely to cause gender gaps than biological 
considerations.   How biology influences behavior within primate societies provides one 
potential explanation of gender gaps.  How we learn to behave within societies provides another.  
The next section of this chapter outlines how socialization influences the behaviors and attitudes 
of women, an influence that may create gender gaps in political preferences.   
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 I focus on the research done on chimpanzees because bonobos exhibit a social structure so different from our own.  
The hierarchical societies created by chimpanzees mirror human societies more closely than the matriarchal non-
violent societies created by bonobos. 
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Sociological Foundations of Gender Gaps 
Many canonical works of western philosophy contend that the human mind at birth is a 
blank slate, or tabula rasa (Aristotle, 2006; Locke, 1996).  The experiences of children soon fill 
this blank slate.  These experiences teach individuals about their society and what that society 
considers appropriate behavior, a process called socialization.  Many scholars identify one 
particular type of socialization, gender role socialization, as the primary force underlying gender 
gaps.   
Gender role socialization reflects the process through which individuals learn what 
society considers ―feminine‖ and what society considers ―masculine‖ (Freeman, 1985).  These 
early understandings of femininity and masculinity teach individuals how to behave, resulting in 
a gendered division of certain social roles, as the characteristics required for tasks associated 
with the roles of one sex become stereotypical of that sex (Eagly and Steffen, 1986; Eagly et al., 
2004; Jennings, 2006).    
Scholars advancing gender role socialization as the most likely cause of gender gaps 
reject the idea that these gaps result from behavioral tendencies rooted in biology (e.g., 
Chodorow, 1978; Elshtain, 1981; Gilligan, 1982; Langton, 1969; Ruddick, 1980).  They argue 
that gender differences in aggression and social cooperation or compassion, which underlie 
gender differences in political preferences, reflect different societal understandings of feminine 
and masculine.  In contemporary society, we associate pacifism and compassion with women 
and aggression and individualism with men.  A large body of sociological and psychological 
research indicates that these understandings shape human behavior from infancy through 
adulthood, making gender role socialization another plausible cause of gender gaps in political 
preferences. 
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Learning to “Act Like a Girl” 
Empirical studies of gender gaps indicate that women’s collective preferences involve 
less aggression and greater levels of compassion.  For scholars advancing gender role 
socialization as the cause of gender gaps, these preferences appear unsurprising.  Soon after 
birth, individuals learn that certain attitudes and behaviors are ―male‖ or ―female.‖  Individuals 
will then adapt those behaviors typical of their own sex, conforming that behavior to traditional 
stereotypes of masculinity and femininity.   
From a very early age, infants can distinguish between men and women.  At three months 
old, babies show preference for one sex or the other (Quinn et al., 2002).  By ten months old, 
babies have absorbed enough of the gendered nature of the world around them to show surprise 
when an object usually paired with one gender appears in a picture with an individual of the 
opposite gender (Levy and Haaf, 1994).  This gendered understanding of the world around them 
becomes more salient to children once they learn their own gender.   
Toddlers develop the ability to label themselves as a member of one gender before the 
age of two.  Developmental psychologists contend that once toddlers identify themselves as a 
member of one sex, they become ―gender detectives‖ (Martin and Ruble, 2004).  Children begin 
searching for cues about what it means to be a ―boy‖ or a ―girl.‖  They become motivated to 
behave like other members of their own sex and to engage in activities associated with members 
of their sex.  They identify objects like trucks or dolls with members of a specific gender (Zosuls 
et al., 2009).  As they get older, children tend to engage in certain types of play based on what 
society considers gender appropriate behavior (Caldera et al., 1989; Fagot, 1978; Peretti and 
Sydney, 1984; Pomerleau et al., 1999).   
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In contemporary western societies, young boys tend to play games based on violent 
scenarios like war, which emphasize competition and individualism.  Young girls tend to engage 
in play that focuses on cooperation and nurturing.  Children feel enough pressure to conform to 
these gender stereotypes that they will increase the time they play with objects deemed gender 
appropriate with other children present than they will on their own (Serbin et al., 1979; 
Bannerjee and Lintern, 2000).   
The media and popular culture further reinforce traditional gender roles, affecting the 
attitudes and behaviors of children (Johns, 1981; Narahara, 1998; Trepanier-Street, 1999).  
Consider findings from studies of children’s picture books.  Diane Turner-Bowker studied the 
descriptions of males and females in books given or considered for the Caldecott Award 
(1996).
33
  The adjectives most frequent in descriptions of females included beautiful, frightened, 
worthy, sweet, weak, and scared.  The adjectives most frequent in descriptions of males included 
big, horrible, fierce, great, terrible, furious, brave, and proud.  The portrayals of women focused 
on passivity and on their status as wives and mothers (Weitzman et al., 1972).  The portrayals of 
males focused on their active and career-oriented characteristics.  When fathers appear, they are 
―withdrawn and ineffectual parents‖ (Anderson and Hamilton, 2005).   
Gender role socialization reinforces gender stereotypes.  For example, these stereotypes 
present women as more pacific and compassionate than men.  Gender role socialization also 
reinforces gendered divisions of labor.  ―Traditional divisions of household labor‖ result in 
women shouldering more responsibility for domestic tasks within the families they will later 
create (Anderson and Hamilton, 2005: 145).  Even within families where both parents work, 
women shoulder the majority of domestic responsibilities.  They perform about thirty-three 
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 The Caldedcott Medal is given annually to a children’s picture book artist. 
62 
 
percent more housework than men, and complete the majority of tasks related to cooking and 
childcare (Bond et al., 2003).   
As the large body of research on the development of gender identity demonstrates, male 
and female children learn to view certain characteristics through the prism of gender.  Gender 
role socialization leads children to believe that women should be cooperative and nurturing, 
while men should be aggressive and individualistic.  Babies learn gender roles.  Children 
perform these roles during play.  Adults live them.  It certainly seems plausible that gender role 
socialization could explain gender gaps in political preferences. 
 
Gender Role Socialization and Gender Gaps 
Gender role socialization results in gender differences in attitude and behavior, 
differences that could create gender gaps in political preferences.  Early childhood experiences 
and media exposure teach individuals the attitudes and behaviors associated with each gender.  
The occupational and family roles of men and women reinforce these stereotypes (Eagly, 2004: 
796).  For women, conforming to traditional gender roles involves behaviors emphasizing 
―nonviolent conflict management, compromise, and conciliation,‖ which make women more 
empathetic and less concerned about individual autonomy (Huddy et al., 2008: 42).  Conformity 
also makes women behave with more ―sensitivity,‖ ―warmth,‖ ―soft-heartedness,‖ and 
―pacifism‖ (Williams and Best, 1982).   
The characteristics inculcated in women through gender role socialization may explain 
many of the systematic patterns evident in gender gaps.  Women tend to express more support 
for social welfare programs and social welfare spending (Chaney et al., 1998; Eichenberg, 2003; 
Halim and Stiles, 2001; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; Shapiro and Mahajan, 
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1986; Whitehead and Blankenship, 2000).  Women tend to be more averse to the use of force in 
domestic and international politics (Chaney et al., 1998; Eichenberg, 2003; Fite, Genest, et al., 
1990; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; Nincic and Nincic, 2000; Shapiro and 
Mahajan, 1986).  If women conform to gender roles and exhibit characteristics like empathy, 
soft-heartedness, and pacifism, we would expect them to express just such opinions.   
This research suggests the following hypotheses, the first applying to foreign policy 
preferences and the second to social policy preferences. 
  : If women did not conform to traditional gender roles, they would behave more 
aggressively toward outsiders than they would if they conformed to these gender roles. 
 
  : If women did not conform to traditional gender roles, they would exhibit less 
responsiveness to the needs of those outside their immediate family than they would if they 
conformed to these gender roles. 
 
Gender role socialization remains a powerful force in human development.  From infancy 
to adulthood, individuals encounter societal expectations about what constitutes gender 
appropriate behavior.  Conformity to gender roles may underlie gender gaps.  Society associates 
femininity with lower levels of aggression and greater levels of compassion.  Conformity to 
these societal standards may create the gender gaps long noted in the areas of foreign and social 
policy.   
However, recent empirical studies of gender gaps suggest another gender difference 
which may explain gender gaps.  Biological differences separate men and women.  Gender role 
socialization teaches men and women to behave in distinct ways.  Yet differences in the political 
values held by men and women may do more to create gender gaps in political preferences than 
biology or socialization. 
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Feminist Foundations of Gender Gaps 
Beyond biology and gender role socialization, men and women differ in another 
significant way.  Women possess a stronger feminist consciousness than men (Conover, 1988; 
Conover and Sapiro, 1993), a factor that may contribute to the formation of gender gaps. 
Feminist consciousness is a social identity, which provides a political foundation for 
group consciousness (Conover, 1988; Conover and Sapiro, 1993).  This social identity involves 
cognitive and emotional elements.  Cognitively, those possessing a feminist consciousness 
believe that women occupy an unequal position in society, and that structures within that society 
remain gendered.  They also express commitment to alleviating inequalities and changing the 
social structures that create inequalities between individuals.   Emotionally, those possessing a 
feminist consciousness share a group identity.  They express agreement and identification with 
feminists.  They also feel an emotional and psychological bond with other group members.   
At its most basic feminism concerns ―equality between women and men, to the benefit of 
both men and women; it is a critique of present inequalities that provides tools for analysis and 
generates programmes for change‖ (Stokes, 2005: 5).  Two aspects of this definition warrant 
further attention.   
First, feminism involves a strong commitment to specific democratic values.  The 
primary democratic values scholars identify as ―feminist‖ include freedom, equality, and self-
government (Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Cook and Wilcox, 1991).  Those who identify as 
feminists hold these democratic values with an acute awareness of patriarchy.  Feminists express 
skepticism about attitudes or institutions involving hierarchy, domination, exploitation, and the 
use of force (Conover and Sapiro, 1993).  This skepticism ensures that feminist political values 
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apply to all groups disadvantaged by the current status quo (Eagly et al., 2004).  This includes 
groups of men, such as homosexuals or racial minorities.   
Second, feminism involves the acknowledgement of gender-based inequalities within 
modern society (Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Eagly et al., 2004).  Feminists recognize traditional 
hierarchies that place individuals at a political or social disadvantage, and express a desire to see 
these inequalities eradicated.  These societal changes may require substantial reform of 
traditional social institutions, and feminists express willingness to use government to alleviate 
these inequalities (Conover and Sapiro, 1993).   
The definition outlined above identifies feminism as a specific set of values.  For most 
individuals, feminism also involves group identity.  Individuals who identify with the values 
outlined within feminism are feminists.  This multifaceted interaction between identity and 
ideology represents feminist consciousness (Conover and Sapiro, 1993).   
Female concern with equity, and with ensuring equality of opportunity, may predispose 
women toward liberal political preferences aimed at reducing ―the hierarchical differences‖ that 
give some social groups more power than others (Dio et al., 1996; Eagly et al., 2004; Howell and 
Day, 2000; Jost and Thompson, 2000).  Since citizens participate in politics by translating 
political values into preferences, differences in the distribution of political values may create 
gender gaps in political preferences (e.g., Cook and Wilcox, 1991; Conover, 1988; Conover and 
Sapiro, 1993; Eagly et al., 2004; Howell and Day, 2000).   
 
Defining Feminist Values 
Feminist values may create gender gaps in political preferences, but defining feminism 
and the values associated with it remains a difficult endeavor.  Arguing that feminism and 
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feminist values address the concerns of all ―women‖ ignores the fact that women are a 
heterogeneous group.  Any classification scheme that divides individuals into two groups based 
on sex masks important and politically relevant differences among individuals of the same 
gender.   Women differ in social class, race, and sexual orientation.
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  Any useful definition of 
feminism must allow for differences among women, but accommodate the common concerns 
they share as citizens.   
Despite a hesitancy to identify as feminists, women exhibit a stronger feminist conscious 
than men (Conover and Sapiro, 1993).  This gender difference may result from a transformation 
in the social and political position of women (Eagly, 2004).  The last century involved many 
changes, but these changes have not always resulted in gender equality (Bianchi, 2000; Cancian 
and Oliker, 2000; Reskin et al., 1999; Smith, 2002).  For example, women gained the franchise 
less than one hundred years ago, and today they vote with greater frequency than men.  
Nevertheless, men participate more than women in most other forms of political participation 
(Verba, Schlozman, et al., 1995).  These differences indicate continuing areas of political 
inequality.  Scholars argue these continuing differences underlie the development of feminist 
consciousness in women.   
As individuals gain knowledge about politics and think about political issues, they 
develop mental structures.  These mental structures result in more coherent and consistent 
political attitudes (Lavine, Thomsen, et al., 1997; Lusk and Judd, 1988).  When coupled with the 
continued political and social inequality, these mental structures increase women’s ―interest in 
eliminating their subordination‖ (Eagly, 2004: 806).  This process provides the basis for the 
development of the cognitive and emotional elements of feminist consciousness. 
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 This short list misses many other important distinctions that differentiate women.   
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Scholars point to the recent development of gender gaps as evidence of the relationship 
between women’s increased political awareness and their development.  Most evidence of such 
gender gaps emerged in the last decades of the twentieth century (Sapiro, 1983).  Chapter Two 
suggests that, in some areas, these gaps are continuing to grow.  The emergence of these gaps 
coincides with increases in political activism (Gurin, 1985; Gurin and Townsend, 1986) and 
knowledge among women (Rapoport, 1982; Slevin and Aday, 1993).
35
  If increased awareness of 
their political subordination lead women to develop strong feminist consciousness than men 
(Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Conover, 1988; Eagly et al., 2004), it remains plausible that gender 
differences in feminist consciousness create gender gaps in political preferences.   
 
Feminist Consciousness and Gender Gaps 
Empirical studies provide some support that feminist values contribute to the creation of 
gender gaps.  Scholars identify egalitarian values associated with feminism to be a mediating 
variable between gender and increased support for social welfare policies (Howell and Day, 
2000).  Scholars advancing explanations based on political values also argue that the liberal 
tendencies of women on ―compassion issues‖ reflect their commitment to equality of opportunity 
and helping the less fortunate (Howell and Day, 2000).  Feminist values appear an important 
factor in creating gender gap in support for the first Persian Gulf War (Conover and Sapiro, 
1993).   
These findings suggest that feminist consciousness contributes to the formation of gender 
gaps (Conover 1988; Conover and Sapiro, 1993).  Women with high levels of feminist 
consciousness express more liberal preferences on a variety of issues (Conover, 1988; Conover 
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 It remains plausible that women’s tendency to mimic their husbands’ political preferences hid gender gaps during 
the middle part of the twentieth century (Campbell et al., 1960). 
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and Sapiro, 1993).  They express more support for egalitarian policies and policies that benefit 
the disadvantaged.  They exhibit fewer racist tendencies.  They also exhibit less support for 
traditional morality and sex roles.    
This research suggests the following hypotheses, the first applying to foreign policy 
preferences and the second to social policy preferences. 
  : If women did not possess any of the characteristics associated with a feminist 
consciousness, they would behave more aggressively toward outsiders than they would if they 
possessed any of the characteristics associated with a feminist consciousness. 
 
  : If women did not possess any of the characteristics associated with a feminist 
consciousness, they would exhibit less responsiveness to the needs of those outside their 
immediate family than they would if they possessed any of the characteristics associated with a 
feminist consciousness. 
 
Gender gaps in policy preferences may emerge in political preference because of gender 
differences in the extent to which each sex possesses a feminist consciousness.  Those ―who 
strongly identify themselves as feminists tend to have distinctive political and basic value 
orientations‖ (Conover, 1988: 1000).  Yet another potential explanation for gender gaps posits 
that resources underlie gender gaps.  These gaps may reflect gender differences in the dispersion 
of political knowledge, a resource that helps people form preferences that accord with their 
underlying political predispositions. 
 
Resource-Based Foundations for Gender Gaps 
Political values may contribute to the creation of gender gaps.  Yet translating these 
underlying values into political preferences requires political knowledge (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter, 1996; Lau and Redlawsk, 1992).  Individuals acquire political knowledge when they 
have the opportunity, motivation, and ability to do so (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).  
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However, possessing the opportunities, motivation, and ability to learn about politics remains 
intertwined with other resources, such as education and income (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).  
These resources remain unevenly distributed in American society, and affect political 
preferences through political knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).  Resource inequalities 
may create gender differences in policy preferences (Frankovic, 1982; Nelson, 1984) and 
political participation (Schlozman et al., 1994).   
Women comprise an increasing percentage of the poor.  In fact, they are fifty percent 
more likely than men to live in poverty (McLanahan and Kelly, 1999).  This feminization of 
poverty may alter the opportunities, motivations, and abilities women have to seek out political 
knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).
36
  For instance, women working long hours to 
support themselves, and possibly their dependents, will have less time to read newspapers or 
watch news programs that outline political events.  Tired from long work weeks, they may have 
little motivation to seek out these media products.  Since poverty most affects those with low 
levels of education, those in poverty may lack some of the abilities required to consume these 
media products (McLanahan and Kelly, 1999).   
By altering the opportunities, motivation, and abilities of women, resource disparities 
could create gender gaps in political knowledge.  A number of studies reveal such gaps (Bennett, 
1988; Burns et al., 2001; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Neuman, 1986; Sigelman and 
Yanarella, 1986).  Since political knowledge affects most, if not all, aspects of political behavior, 
gender gaps in political knowledge may contribute to the creation of gender gaps in political 
preferences.   
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 Empirical analyses of political interest indicate women’s lack of motivation to learn about politics relative to men 
(Berelsen, et al., 1954; Merriam and Gosnell, 1924; Verba and Nie, 1972).   
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Political Knowledge  
Political knowledge plays an important role in opinion formation.  Knowledgeable 
citizens hold more stable opinions (Feldman, 1988; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).  They hold 
opinions more likely to correspond with their underlying political predispositions (Zaller, 1992; 
Bartels, 1996; Sniderman et al., 2001), update those opinions when new and relevant information 
becomes available (McGraw and Pinney, 1991; Zaller, 1992), and use those opinions to select 
candidates that reflect their political predispositions (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Lau and 
Redlawsk, 1992).  Even the cognitive shortcuts and heuristics political scientists believe can 
stand in for political knowledge require some political knowledge to be properly employed 
(Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000; Lau and Redlawsk, 2001; 2006; Sniderman, Brody, et al., 1991).   
Women tend to possess less political knowledge than men (Bennett, 1988; Burns et al., 
2001; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Neuman, 1986; Sigelman and Yanarella, 1986).  Women’s 
average level of education has increased over time.  At the turn of the 20
th
 century, women 
comprised approximately one-third of college and university students.  Information released by 
the U.S. Census Bureau in 2010 shows that women surpass men in college and advanced degree 
completion (Yen, 2011).  Women should no longer find politics outside their grasp because of an 
educational disadvantage.  Yet educational parity has not erased the gender gap in political 
knowledge (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).   
These enduring gender gaps in political knowledge may be exacerbated by how political 
scientists measure knowledge.  Women excel in some areas of political expertise.  Women 
appear as knowledgeable as men when tested on ―feminine‖ forms of knowledge, or policy areas 
and political information more relevant to women than men (Dolan, 2011).  Some of these areas 
include women’s issues, including abortion or female equality, (Hansen, 1997), awareness of 
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women candidates and politicians (Verba, et al., 1997), and local politics (Dolan, 2011).  Women 
also exhibit a lower propensity to guess on political knowledge questions when uncertain about 
the correct answer (Mondak, 2001).  Their lower propensity to guess may magnify the apparent 
size of gender gaps in political knowledge, or even create gaps where none exist (Mondak, 
2001).   
That women possess levels of local political knowledge equal to those of men should not 
diminish the importance scholars place on general political knowledge.  Women may know more 
than men about certain political issues, but their relative lack of political knowledge, or factual 
information about politics stored in long term memory, remains important (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter, 1996: 10).  ―Knowledge is the currency of democratic citizenship‖ (Delli Carpini and 
Keeter, 1996: 8).  Strong evidence indicates that knowledge affects political behavior.  The fact 
that women possess less knowledge than men in any area is problematic, even if they possess as 
much as men in others.   
Corrections proposed to lessen the effects of propensity to guess on political knowledge 
scores do not erase knowledge gaps in many American political surveys (Mondak, 2001).  
Surveys like the National Annenberg Election Studies (NAES) instruct interviewers to prompt 
respondents to ―take your best guess‖ on factual questions if their initial response is ―don’t 
know.‖  Mondak advances this technique as a way to lessen the impact of personality traits on 
measures of political knowledge (Mondak, 2001).  Even with these correctives, women still 
appear to possess less political knowledge than men.
37
  Given the gendered differences in who 
possesses political knowledge and the importance of political knowledge in opinion formation, 
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 On a political knowledge index comprised of a five-item political knowledge battery and interviewer ratings of 
respondent knowledge, interviewer prompts to ―take your best guess‖ fail to erase gender gaps in political 
knowledge (2004 NAES).  The lowest possible knowledge score is zero and the highest is six.  The average score 
for women in this sample is approximately three, while the average score for men is approximately four.   
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political knowledge could play a role in creating the systematic differences scholars have noted 
between women’s opinions and those expressed by men.   
Gender gaps emerge because women tend to be less conservative on foreign policy and 
social issues.  Gender differences in political knowledge may explain some of these female 
tendencies.  Those possessing the most political information tend to express more conservative 
preferences than other respondents (Bartels, 1990).  Studies estimating how information 
asymmetries distort collective preferences suggest that a fully informed public may express more 
conservative preferences on questions about ―big government,‖ spending on certain social 
policies, and military interventions (Althaus, 1998).  Women’s lower levels of political 
knowledge relative to men may explain why women they tend to approve of programs and 
spending associated with big government and to disapprove of military interventions.
38
 
This research suggests the following hypotheses, the first applying to foreign policy 
preferences and the second to social policy preferences. 
  : If women possessed the highest possible levels of political knowledge, they would 
behave more aggressively toward outsiders than they would if they possessed lower levels of 
political knowledge. 
 
  : If women possessed the highest possible levels of political knowledge, they would 
exhibit less responsiveness to the needs of those outside their immediate family than they would 
if they possessed lower levels of political knowledge. 
 
An important relationship exists between the possession of political knowledge and 
political preferences.  Given the importance of gender gaps in forming political judgments and 
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 Fully informed preferences do not correspond exactly with the areas where gender gaps emerge (Althaus, 1998; 
Althaus, 2003; Bartels, 1996).  For instance, fully informed opinion tends to be more dovish.  Gender gaps emerge 
because women already express more dovish opinions.  However, it is still possible that women’s relative lack of 
political information may interfere with their ability to form stable preferences that correspond with their underlying 
values.  These stable opinions that correspond with underlying values may look more like those expressed by men.   
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the systematic differences between informed and uninformed opinion, differences in political 
knowledge could create gender gaps in political preferences.   
 
Separating Potential Cause of Gender Gaps 
 This chapter provides four potential explanations for gender gaps.  The first roots gender 
gaps in our biological predispositions, the second in the process of gender role socialization, the 
third in the uneven distribution of feminist consciousness, and the fourth in the uneven 
distribution of political knowledge.  These explanations arise from theoretical and empirical 
work in a number of different fields, and each suggests different mechanisms underlying gender 
gaps.  However, explaining any aspect of human behavior proves complicated, and so it is with 
gender gaps.  Three of these complications should be kept in mind in the analyses of gender gaps 
in subsequent chapters.  First, one explanation may explain gender gaps in one policy area, but 
fail to explain gaps in others.  Second, more than one factor might contribute to the creation 
gender gaps.  Third, the factors are not completely independent from one another.  This makes 
disentangling these explanations from one another may be difficult.   
Gender gaps emerge in a variety of different issues areas.  Any of the factors outlined 
above may contribute to the development of gender gaps in one issue area.  Yet it is entirely 
plausible that a factor important in on issue area may be less important in another.  For example, 
gender role socialization may contribute to the development in social policy preferences, but not 
in foreign policy preferences.  It may also be that gender role socialization contributes to the 
development of social policy preferences on one type of question, i.e, social policy spending, but 
not on other types of social policy questions.  Chapters Four and Five are designed to reflect the 
possibility that different factors may affect gender gaps in different policy areas and different 
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factors may affect gender gaps within the same policy areas.   However, the results presented in 
these chapters do not extend to other issue areas, even if they may provide a template for how to 
study gender gaps in other issue areas.    
Studying the causes of gender gaps discussed above is further complicated by the 
interconnectedness of these different factors.  I present the explanations of gender gaps advanced 
above as distinct constructs.  Many scholars conceptualize these constructs as distinct.  Consider 
biology and socialization.  For centuries, individuals explained social, legal, and political 
inequality between men and women using biological models (Hubbard, 1990; Fausto-Sterling, 
1992; Fausto-Sterling, 2005).  Second wave feminist, argued that these inequalities emerged 
from social institutions (Rubin, 1975).  Most dismissed the biological models, and proceeded to 
separate sex as a biological construct and gender as a social construct (Fausto-Sterling, 2005).  
Yet new scientific research suggests that this well-intentioned separation ignores the complex 
interplay between an individual’s biology and his or her environment. 
For example, neurobiologists possess an increasing awareness about how gender 
socialization shapes the brain.  The human brain possesses the capacity to reorganize itself, 
forming new neural connections.  Scholars call this process ―neuroplasticity.‖  Neuroplasticity 
means that gender, a creation of society, ―comes into the brain‖ and ―becomes part of our 
cerebral biology‖ (Kaiser et al., 2009: 9).  Our environment, experiences, and activities affect our 
brains, creating neural activity that may alter the brain directly or through gene expression 
(Draganski et al., 2004; Maguire et al., 2000; for a review of this literature, see Fine, 2010).  
Other biological phenomena, including bone development (Fausto-Sterling, 2005) and genetics 
(Kaplan and Rogers, 2003) indicate the complex interaction between human biology and our 
environment.  The malleability of our biological characteristics means that ―components of our 
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political, social, and moral struggles become, quite literally, embodied, incorporated into our 
very physiological being‖ (Fausto-Sterling, 2000: 5). 
The same complex interplay emerges between political values and political knowledge.  
An individual’s awareness of the social and political environment around themselves influences 
the values he or she possesses and preferences he or she expresses (Rawls, 1971).  Many scholars 
studying gender gaps in political preferences acknowledge the importance of such knowledge 
(Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Conover, 1988; Eagly et al., 2004).  They assert that these gender 
gaps emerged when women gained the political knowledge necessary to connect the social 
inequalities they experienced with the political values and policy preferences that offered to 
alleviate these inequalities (Conover and Sapiro, 1993; Conover, 1988; Eagly et al., 2004).  For 
such scholars, the development of one’s feminists consciousness remains intertwined with 
political knowledge.   
The research design in subsequent chapters attempts to mitigate the effects of the 
interconnectedness of various explanations of gender gaps.  First, the variables representing these 
explanations stay as close as possible to the theories from which they emerge.  For example, the 
measure of feminist consciousness includes questions about feminism and social or political 
equality.  On this measure, I do my best to replicate the measure used by Conover (1988) and 
Conover and Sapiro (1993) in their studies of feminist consciousness.  The measure of political 
knowledge includes questions gauging an individual’s knowledge of political actors, positions of 
actors and parties on issues, and general knowledge about the political system.  On this measure, 
I define knowledge as recall of facts.  This operationalize has been widely used within the 
political science literature (Althaus, 1998; 2003; Bartels, 1996; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996).  
The measure of biology taps an individual’s sense of threat and the resources available to him or 
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her.  This measure, while not used by political scientists before, attempts to reflect the 
primatology theories it emerges from as closely as possible, even when modifying what 
resources and threat might mean to members of different species (Boesch, 2009; de Waal, 2005).  
Finally, the measure of socialization, gauges an individual’s support for the traditional gender 
roles scholars argue underlie many gender differences in behavior (Anderson and Hamilton, 
2005: 145; Johns, 1981; Narahara, 1998; Trepanier-Street, 1999).  Though I acknowledge the 
impossibility of separating completely the various mechanisms underlying gender gaps, these 
operationalizations allow me to distinguish between and test these mechanisms as clearly as 
possible with the data available. 
I also mitigate the effects of the interconnectedness of these various explanations by 
including regressions and data simulations in the empirical chapters that measure the effects of 
each explanation, while holding the effects of other explanations and their interactions with other 
political relevant factors constant.  This modeling strategy allows me to ascertain the effects of 
each factor relative to others on the individual and collective opinions expressed by women.  It 
also minimizes the possibility that any effects found for one explanation result from the omission 
of another.   
The following chapters include more empirical details on the aspects of my research 
design that minimize the empirical biases caused by the close relationship between various 
explanations of gender gaps.  However, I cannot claim to disentangle these explanations 
completely from one another.  Given the complicated nature of human behavior, it remains 
unlikely that anyone can.  This dissertation represents my best attempt to identify the origins of 
gender gaps, while acknowledging the complexity inherent in any such study.   
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Conclusions 
 The previous chapter measured gender gaps in political preferences.  This chapter 
identifies various theories that may explain these gaps.  The theories outlined above draw from 
the biological sciences, sociology, feminist theory, political science, and economics.  Each of the 
four theories suggests a different mechanism underlying the emergence of gender gaps.  
According to the biological explanation, gender gaps emerge when specific biological conditions 
make aggression toward outsiders and social cooperation toward group members evolutionarily 
disadvantageous.  Women living under conditions of economic scarcity and threat express 
opinions systematically different from those who do not, these environmental changes create 
gender gaps.  The sociological explanation explains gender gaps through gender role 
socialization.  Women who internalize traditional gender roles learn to be conciliatory and 
compassionate.  These characteristics influence the political preferences women express, creating 
gender gaps.  Another explanation roots gender gaps in feminist values.  Women hold these 
values at a greater rate than do men.  The translation of these values into political preferences 
then creates gender gaps.  Finally, a resource-based explanation roots gender gaps in systematic 
differences in a politically important resource, knowledge.  Women tend to be less politically 
knowledgeable.  This characteristic distorts their preferences, a distortion that creates gender 
gaps.   
The next two chapters of this dissertation will examine the how much our threat and 
resource environment, gender role socialization, feminist values, and political knowledge 
contribute to the creation of gender gaps in the two issue areas where scholars most often find 
these gaps: foreign and social policy.  I use the theories outlined above to draw hypotheses about 
the factors that increase or decrease the size of gender gaps in foreign and social policy.  I will 
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then provide estimates of the significance of each factor and identify how much each contributes 
to the formation of gender gaps in political preferences while holding the others constant.   
The following chapters examine an enduring and consequential facet of public opinion 
research, gender gaps in political preferences.  They also make two important contributions.  The 
first contribution centers on the number of explanations tested.  This dissertation provides the 
most comprehensive test of various explanations of gender gaps in political preferences.  
Scholars tend to focus on testing one or two explanations for gender gaps, a natural strategy 
given the complexity of the topic and the fact that studies of gender gaps remain scattered across 
a wide array of scholarly fields.  I extend previous gender gap research by drawing from multiple 
disciplines, by outlining four theories explaining the emergence of gender gaps, and by testing 
these theories against one another.   
The second contribution centers on the use of multiple issue areas.  Scholars tend to focus 
on explaining gender gaps in one issue area.  This approach makes sense because theories can 
yield different hypotheses across or within issue areas.  For instance, the biological explanation 
of gender gaps advanced in this chapter predicts that high-resource women feeling a great sense 
of threat would support more militaristic foreign policy options, yet more liberal social welfare 
policies. Theories resting on gender role socialization or feminist consciousness do not yield 
such divergent predictions.  Nevertheless, I separate these issue areas to preserve the nuanced 
understanding of gender gaps each theory offers, providing a more comprehensive theoretical 
framework for the emergence of gender gaps across issue areas.   
The approach taken by scholars studying gender gaps appears understandable given the 
complexity of the topic and the difficulty disentangling multiple explanations for gender gaps 
from one another.  This chapter works to move the research on gender gaps in political 
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preferences forward by drawing on research in a wide array of fields into competing theories 
which explain the emergence of gender gaps.  In chapters four and five, I use these theories to 
identify the origins of these gaps across multiple issue areas.  This research design recognizes the 
complications inherent in political preference, the possibility that more than one factor causes 
gender gaps, and the potential that these causes vary across issues areas.  The empirical work in 
these chapters provides political scientists with a better understanding of gender gaps in political 
preferences, a factor that scholars argue helps to shape American politics.   
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Chapter Four:  Gender Gaps in Foreign Policy Preferences 
Public opinion data provide numerous examples of gender gaps in foreign policy 
preferences.  Across fourteen months in 2003 and 2004, public opinion polling revealed that 
Americans disapproved of President George W. Bush’s handling of the situation in Iraq (NAES 
2004).  Not once did aggregate approval levels reach the 51% mark (see Figure 4.1). In an 
election that many political pundits believed to be a referendum on President Bush’s war in Iraq 
(Curry, 2004), the president’s performance on this issue garnered more censure from Americans 
than support.    
However, this measure of aggregate approval masked an important difference.  A 
majority of men in every month from October 2003 through November 2004 approved of the 
president’s handling of Iraq.  At no time did more than 45% of women support the president’s 
handling of Iraq.  These low levels of female support ensured that surveyed opinion showed a 
majority of Americans at odds with the president on this issue.
39
  
The underlying gender dynamics evident here demonstrate an enduring phenomena 
observed by many public opinion scholars studying foreign policy preferences. Women tend 
more than men to oppose militaristic foreign policies, such as armed interventions and defense 
spending.  These differences between the sexes create a ―gender gap‖ in foreign policy 
preferences, which appears in empirical analyses of wars from WWII through Operation Iraqi 
Freedom.  Over this seventy year period, women have been more likely than their male 
counterparts to express opposition to military interventions and defense spending (Eichenberg, 
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 Our inclination may be to explain this difference in terms of party identification. More men than women are 
Republican. In 2004 the difference between men and women identifying with the Democratic Party was 9.5%, with 
women more likely to identify as Democrats than men (Kaufmann, 2006). Yet the differences between men and 
women in their support for President Bush’s handling of Iraq are not entirely an artifact of varying rates of party 
identification. Men who identify themselves as Democrats are still more likely than women to express approval for 
Bush’s handling of Iraq (see Figure C-1 in Appendix C).  
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2003; Kaufmann, 2006).  They tend to oppose armed interventions, favoring less aggressive 
means of resolving international conflicts (Chaney et al., 1998; Eichenberg, 2003; Fite, Genest, 
et al., 1990; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; Nincic and Nincic, 2000; Shapiro 
and Mahajan, 1986).
40
  The gender gap narrows on humanitarian interventions (Eichenberg, 
2003).  It also narrowed briefly following the terrorists attacks on 9/11 (Pew, 2002).  Still gender 
gaps in foreign policy preferences remain a stable characteristic of American public opinion 
(Nincic and Nincic, 2002) and one whose size appears to be increasing over time (see Chapter 
Two; Baxter and Lansing, 1980; Klein, 1984; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).   
Political scientists have made a considerable effort to study gender gaps, documenting the 
trends outlined in the previous paragraph.  Foreign policy remains one of the most common areas 
to conduct longitudinal studies of gender gaps.  Yet the continued existence of these gaps 
remains puzzling.  Substantial changes in the social and political lives of women occurred over 
the past sixty years, but gender gaps in policy preferences persist.   These gaps may vary in size, 
but they continue to be an enduring reality of political life (Kaufmann, 2006; Nincic and Nincic, 
2002; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).   
As the research outlined in previous chapters indicates, gender gaps in policy preferences 
may underlie gender gaps in party identification and vote choice (Chaney et al., 1998; Kaufmann 
and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986), which then affect which 
candidates are given political power (Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006).  During 
times of war, including the presidential elections of 2004 and 2008, foreign policy concerns 
become significant forces in presidential elections (Kaufmann, 2006).  The political significance 
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 Interestingly, women also express greater disapproval for the internal use of force by the state, such as the death 
penalty for criminals and violent responses by police officers (Halim and Stiles, 2001; Stack, 2000; Whitehead and 
Blankenship, 2000). 
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of gender gaps in foreign policy suggests that identifying the sources of gender gaps will 
increase our understanding of American political behavior.   
Literatures examining female behavior provide many possible explanations for gender 
gaps in foreign policy preferences: biological predispositions activated by a woman’s material 
environment (resources and threat), gender role socialization, feminist consciousness, and 
political knowledge.  These explanations may affect the development of gender gaps at the 
individual or aggregate level.  At the individual level, gender differences in the preference 
structures of men and women may result in gender gaps.  For instance, biological considerations 
may influence the preferences expressed by a woman, but not those expressed by a man.  These 
different structures could result in the gender gaps in aggressive policy stances.  Such differences 
in aggression may contribute to the gender gaps foreign policy preferences noted by scholars.  At 
the aggregate level, gender differences in the extent to which individuals possess certain 
characteristics may result in gender gaps.  Gender gaps may emerge, for example, because 
women tend to exhibit higher levels of feminist consciousness than do men.  These value 
differences may then translate into different preferences for men and women.   
Those interested in gender gaps face significant obstacles in the search for the causes of 
these gaps.  Survey data limits our ability to test these explanations.  Few surveys include 
measures of the mechanisms identified in Chapter Three, making tests of competing explanations 
impossible.  Even if the works of these scholars provide compelling evidence that these gender 
gaps exist over time, these data limitations ensure that political scientists still possess a limited 
understanding of the factors that contribute to gender gaps,  
This chapter analyzes the factors contributing to the development of gender gaps in 
foreign policy preferences.  The chapter begins with descriptions of the measures and data used 
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in this analysis.  After a brief summary of the gender gaps emerging in the datasets used, I will 
test whether differences in the attitude structures of men and women exist.  After providing 
evidence that the preference structures of men and women appear comparable, I will explore the 
impact of the factors introduced in Chapter Three at the aggregate level.  This analysis suggests 
that political knowledge and biological considerations do more than the remaining factors to 
create gender gaps in foreign policy preferences.   
 
Evaluating Potential Causes of Gender Gaps 
To determine which factors contribute to the creation of these gender gaps, I construct 
measures of the four factors hypothesized to be at their root: biology, gender role socialization, 
feminist consciousness, and political knowledge.  The following section outlines the 
construction, validity, and reliability of each of these measures in detail.   
 
Biological Considerations 
 Primatologists argue that the conditions of an individual’s material environment, 
resources and external threat, affect the aggression levels of females.  To test whether such an 
explanation may explain gender gaps in the foreign policy preferences expressed by men and 
women, I create an index incorporating an individual’s resources and sense of external threat. 
When scholars write about the resource availability of chimpanzees, they conceptualize 
resources as the food available within the immediate environment of these animals.  Few 
Americans hunt for food as chimpanzees do.  We obtain the food that provides nourishment for 
ourselves and our dependents using currency (Locke, 1690).  So to capture resource availability 
among Americans, I use household income.   I then divide respondents into four quartiles based 
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on their resource level: high resource, high to moderate resource, moderate to low resource, and 
low resource.   
External threat for chimpanzees reflects the likelihood of attacks from predators within 
the immediate environment of their groups, particularly leopards.
41
  The external threats to 
human beings, particularly those in the industrialized world come from other individuals, both 
within our society and outside of that society.  To capture perceptions of external threat, I create 
an eight-item index measuring an individual’s sense of threat from other individuals, ordinary 
criminals and terrorists.  Seven of the eight items tap individuals’ personal sense of external 
threat through questions ascertaining their beliefs about the likelihood of various types of attacks 
on Americans occurring within the next year (α = 0.90).   The final question asks individuals 
about their sense of the crime level within their own city. This index is collapsed into quartiles: 
high threat, high to moderate threat, moderate to low threat, and low threat.   
The question measuring fear of crime within the community does not co-vary with the 
seven questions measuring fear of terrorism (r = 0.07).  I, nevertheless, include both in this 
analysis because they capture different dimensions of external threat.  One captures feelings of 
external threat from outsiders.  The other captures feelings of external threat from other, more 
proximate, group members.  The measures used, however, do not capture both dimensions 
equally well.  As we shall see, this difference may explain why this measure emerges as 
significant in some policy areas but not others.   
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 As discussed in Chapter Three, bonobos studied in the wild live in resource rich environments and spend more 
time with members of their group than do chimpanzees in environments without leopards.  However, it is difficult to 
determine how much the morphological difference between bonobos and chimpanzees influence female behavior.  It 
is also difficult to determine how much the difference in the social organization of bonobo and chimpanzee groups 
affect female behavior.  These intervening factors make drawing inferences from bonobos about the conditions that 
affect women’s behavior even more difficult than drawing such inferences from chimpanzees.  For this reason, I 
refer to chimpanzee behavior when discussing biological arguments. 
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 Primate research suggests that females behave differently when their environment 
includes abundant resources and a high level of threat.  To capture the impact of these two 
characteristics, I sum the measures of resource availability and external threat perceptions.  
Interacting resource availability and threat provides another way of forming this variable.  I sum 
the measures, because I believe that this approach better reflects the theory, which anticipates 
resources and threat to have effects on female behavior individually and in conjunction with one 
another.  Primatologists argue that increased resources make females less reliant on males for 
meat, increasing their independence from males (Boesch, 2009; de Waal, 2005).  Increased threat 
leads females to spend more time together to decrease the vulnerability of female chimpanzees to 
external predators (Boesch, 2009; de Waal, 2005).  Greater amounts of time spent together also 
increase the power of females within their own group via female coalitions (Boesch, 2009; de 
Waal, 2005).  This primatology literature suggests independent effects of resource availability 
and increased threat.  Neither of these characteristics should impact the behavior of females only 
in the presence of the other.   
The resulting resource-threat index creates a measure varying from zero to six, with half 
the index capturing the resources available to an individual and half capturing the level of threat 
they perceive in their environment.  Those scoring lowest on this measure experience extreme 
vulnerability, because they lack the resources to alleviate uncertainty about survival, i.e., they 
have less money to provide for themselves and their families.  They also perceive the lowest 
level of threat about the danger of external enemies.
42
  For chimpanzees, this particular 
combination of resources and predation increases isolation and decreases aggression (Boesch, 
2009; de Waal, 2005).  Higher values indicate more resources and greater threat. 
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 It would seem that the absence of external threat would decrease vulnerability.  In the absence of predators, 
female chimpanzees spend most of their time alone with their offspring (Boesch, 2009; de Waal, 2005).  This 
increases their vulnerability to attack from other animals.   
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I divide individuals into terciles based on this measure, creating three groups: high level 
of resource and threat, moderate level resource and threat, and low level resource and threat.  
Those highest on this three item measure possess a high level of resources and perceive a high 
level of threat.  These respondents receive a two on the resource-threat scale.  Those who possess 
a low level of resources and perceive a low level of threat receive a zero on the resource-threat 
scale.   Women’s mean score on this resource-threat index is 0.98, with a standard deviation of 
0.86.  Men’s mean score on this resource-threat index is 1.05, with a standard deviation of 0.87.  
This is a statistically significant difference (t = -2.15, p = 0.03). 
This measure impedes isolating the effects of those conditions between high resource-
high threat and low resource-low threat.  The primatology theories outlined above do not make 
particular hypotheses about behavior under these conditions.  Moreover, any interactive measure 
of these values would be difficult to interpret.  So despite the deficiencies of this index, it 
provides a good measure of the theory advanced. 
 
Gender Role Socialization 
  I measure gender role socialization using a question asking individuals how much they 
agree with the statement that ―it is much better for everyone involved if the man is the achiever 
outside the home and the woman takes care of the home and the family.‖  Responses to this 
question range between strongly agree and strongly disagree, with a value of one assigned to the 
former and zero to the latter.  Stronger levels of agreement with this statement signify stronger 
acceptance or internalization of traditional gender roles.  The average respondent score on this 
measure is 0.40, with a standard deviation of 0.44.  Men’s average is significantly higher than 
women’s, 0.42 and 0.37 (t = -1.76, p = 0.08).   
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 This measure only includes one item, making it difficult to assess the measure’s 
reliability.  More questions gauging gender role socialization would increase confidence in the 
reliability of this measure.  Questions gauging whether respondents believe women behave less 
aggressively than men or whether women seek to resolve conflicts through verbal resolution 
would capture other aspects of gender role socialization outlined by scholars.  Unfortunately, the 
survey used includes no other measure of gender role socialization.   
Despite questions about reliability, a number of factors indicate that the validity of this 
measure is sound.  First, the question directly asks respondents about their agreement with the 
most basic aspect of gender role socialization—the extent to which men and women are better 
suited to serve different roles within society.  This suggests the face validity of this measure.  
Second, this measure of socialization emerges as a statistically significant predictor of whether 
an individual agrees with the statement ―a working mother can establish just as warm and secure 
a relationship with her children as a mother who does not work‖ (see Table B.1 in Appendix B) 
and whether a women identifies her occupation as ―homemaker‖ (see Table B.2 in Appendix B).  
When a woman more strongly identifies with traditional gender roles, she is less likely to agree 
that working mothers can establish strong relationships with their children.  When a woman 
more strongly identifies with traditional gender roles, she is slightly more likely to identify their 
occupation on ―homemaker.‖43  The relationships between the measure of gender role 
socialization used here and occupations and beliefs about motherhood provide evidence of the 
predictive validity of this measure, which is particularly important since questions about 
controversial topics may spur respondents to offer socially desirable responses.    
 
                                                 
43
 Men are omitted from this logistic regression due to insignificant variation on the dependent variables.  Only one 
man in the sample identifies his occupation as ―homemaker.‖ 
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Feminist Consciousness 
Feminist consciousness is measured using an index based on respondent answers to ten 
questions about feminism and equality.  These questions capture the cognitive and affective 
elements that underlie a feminist consciousness and provide a reliable measure of a feminist 
consciousness.   
Two distinct cognitive elements underlie a feminist consciousness (Conover, 1988; 
Conover and Sapiro, 1993).  The first involves awareness of women’s unequal position in society 
and of the gendered nature of society.  Five questions create the portion of the index measuring 
this component.  These questions prompt respondents about their support for the statements that 
women ―seeking out equality…are actually seeking special favors,‖ women ―miss out on good 
jobs because of discrimination,‖ and ―women’s harassment complaints cause more problems 
than they solve.‖  Two additional questions measure respondent agreement with the statements 
that not giving ―everyone an equal chance‖ and that some having ―more of a chance in life‖ 
create big problems within American society. 
The second component of the feminist consciousness measure involves an individual’s 
commitment to alleviating those inequalities and changing the social structures that create 
inequalities between individuals.   Four questions create this portion of the index.  The first 
question gauges respondent support for the statement ―society should do whatever is necessary to 
make sure that everyone has an equal opportunity to succeed.‖  The second question gauges 
whether respondents agree that ―we have gone too far in pushing equal rights in this country,‖ 
the third whether the country would be better off if Americans worried less about ―how equal 
people are,‖ and the final question whether ―if people were treated more equally in this country‖ 
there would be fewer problems.  
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The last component of the feminist consciousness measure involves emotional 
attachment, using responses to a feeling thermometer about feminists to determine each 
respondent’s sympathy or indifference toward that group.    
The strength of agreement with each question varies between zero and one, giving each 
question equal weight within the scale.  This operationalization places more weight on attitudes, 
for which this data provides more reliable measures, than on feelings toward feminists/feminism.  
Only one measure of feelings about feminists or feminism exists, and its reliability cannot be 
established.  This poses a particular problem for political actors or attitudes that may have a 
negative connotation, as many scholars argue feminists/feminism do.
44
  The responses for this 
question range from agree strongly to disagree strongly.  Those rejecting feminist values receive 
the lowest scores.  Those expressing agreement with feminist values receive the highest scores.  
Among all respondents in this sample, the minimum value is zero and the maximum ten.  Factor 
analysis shows that these variables do not comprise a single factor.  Nevertheless, these variables 
capture the theoretical components of feminist consciousness, as outlined by previous scholars 
(Conover, 1988; Conover and Sapiro, 1993).  As a single factor, this index has an eigenvalue of 
1.98.  The Cronbach’s alpha of this index is 0.67.45  While this reliability is not high, it is an 
acceptable reliability coefficient.   
Most individuals seem to possess values indicative of a feminist consciousness.  The 
average score is 5.96 with a standard deviation of 1.38.  As the literature predicts, men possess 
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 This measure may underestimate the level of feminist consciousness among respondents.  The majority of 
individuals possess a feminist consciousness to some extent.  Many hold the same values as feminists, such as 
support for equality of opportunity and policies advancing equality (Conover and Sapiro, 1993).  Yet popular culture 
and political rhetoric present negative stereotypes of feminism and feminists.  This negative connotation makes 
many men and women hesitant to claim to be feminists, or to recognize that they values they hold accord with those 
of feminism (Cowan et al., 1992; Renzetti, 1987; Williams and Wittig, 1997).   
45
 The Cronbach’s alpha would not be improved by taking out any of the component questions.  
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lower levels of feminist consciousness (5.81; 1.39) than women (6.8; 1.36). This gender 
difference is statistically significant (t = -4.0243, p = 0.0000). 
To ensure a sufficient amount of variation within the feminist consciousness measure, 
respondents are divided into three groups based on their responses to these questions: low, 
moderate, and high. The average respondent score on this measure is 1.020, with a standard 
deviation of 0.831.   This compressed measure exhibits the same statistically significant gender 
difference between men and women (t = 2.56, p = 0.01).   
 
Political Knowledge Variable  
The political knowledge variable includes responses to factual knowledge questions and 
the interviewer’s rating of the respondent’s knowledge.  The 2008 NES includes many such 
questions, producing a battery that yields a knowledge index of 15 questions (α = 0.7702).  The 
factual questions provide measures of respondent’s knowledge about the political environment, 
the relative positions of parties/candidates, and the identities of political actors.
46
  Respondents 
were asked to identify which party controls the House of Representatives, which party controls 
the Senate, and which party is more conservative on national issues.  Other questions about the 
political environment ask respondents to identify the rate of unemployment, inflation, and the 
size of the income gap relative to the size of that gap in previous years.  
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 There are inherent problems involved in including identification of political actors in political knowledge 
measures.  The primary problem is an underestimation of political knowledge, because what is coded as ―correct‖ 
may be not fully capture the range of correct answers (Gibson and Caldiera, 2007).  For example, the correct answer 
for the job held by William Rehnquist is ―Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States.‖  Those 
individuals who offer answers, including ―judge‖ or ―Supreme Court Justice,‖ are considered to have given incorrect 
answers.   
 To alleviate some of the bias involved in the NES coding of these identification questions, I coded 
―correct‖ or ―incorrect‖ answers myself.  This allowed me to identify correct answers more broadly than traditional 
done.  For instance, I counted ―British leader‖ as correct for identification of Tony Blair.    
 The NES coding for these variables has not yet been released, so I cannot check the reliability of my coding 
against that of the survey administers.   
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Correct answers to the above questions were assigned a one and incorrect and ―don’t 
know‖ responses were assigned a zero.47  I reverse coded interviewers assessments of respondent 
knowledge, with those interviewers identify as most knowledgeable being assigned a one and the 
least a zero.   
 Answers to the factual questions and the interview assessments are summed, yielding a 
political information measure with a maximum value of 15 and a minimum value of zero.  The 
average political knowledge score within this sample was 7.54, with a standard deviation of 2.97.  
As the literature on political knowledge would predict, men received higher scores than women.  
The average political knowledge score for men was 7.94 with a standard deviation of 3.05.  The 
average political knowledge score for women was 7.21, with a standard deviation of 2.86.  This 
difference, while small, remains statistically significant (t = -3.71, p = 0.00).   
 
Data Transformations 
I create indexes that divide component measures into terciles or quartiles based on their 
resources, perceptions of threat, and feminist consciousness.
48
  This approach serves a 
methodological purpose, correcting for skewed distributions within each index.  For instance, a 
feeling thermometer toward feminists comprises part of the feminist consciousness index.  
Approximately 25% of Americans rate feminists at forty degrees or below, but 35% rate 
feminists between forty-one and fifty degrees.  Breaking the indexes and the measures that 
comprise them based on quartiles or terciles provides a way of standardizing measures with such 
skewed distributions.   
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 The NES and NAES prompt individuals who initial response ―I don’t know‖ to a question to offer an answer.  If 
they refuse to offer an answer, I consider their response incorrect.   
48
 I choose to divide these variables based on their distribution.  If respondents could be cleanly divided into high, 
moderate, and low groups, I did so.  If they could not, I divided individuals into four groups: high, moderate-high, 
moderate-low, and low.   
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This method admittedly involves information loss on the key explanatory variables.  
Since the skewed distributions would violate the central assumptions of the statistical techniques 
used in subsequent analysis, I used the division of these indexes to correct for skewness.  While 
information loss is never desirable, this approach strengthens confidence in the results presented 
here by making it more difficult to find statistically significant results by truncating the 
distribution of variables.  
 
Possible Correlations between Explanatory Factors 
There are no strong correlations exist among the measures of biology, socialization, 
feminist consciousness, and political knowledge outlined above (Table 4.1).  The highest 
correlation occurs between feminist consciousness and gender role socialization (p = -0.13).  
This correlation suggests a weak relationship between these two variables.  The correlation 
coefficients in Table 4.1 provide little evidence that one factor’s statistical effects will be 
captured by another.
49
   
 
Data  
 The data used in this analysis comes from the 2008 American National Elections Studies 
(NES) and the 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Surveys (NAES).  The NES and 
NAES include information about Americans opinions about politics during election years.  Yet 
the survey designs and content of both differ.  These differences make certain datasets more 
appropriate for certain portions of subsequent analyses.  I use the 2008 NES to provide the best 
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 This does not imply that these factors are theoretically unrelated, a probability that is discussed in greater depth in 
Chapter Three.   
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test of theories explaining gender gaps.  I use the 2000 and 2004 NAES to extend this analysis to 
more questions in different election years.   
The 2008 NES Time Series is the only existing data set that includes measures for all four 
factors central to this analysis, providing information about 2,322 respondents over three months 
in 2008.  Neither the 2000 or 2004 NES included measures of all these factors, meaning that the 
2008 NES provides a unique opportunity to scholars studying gender gaps.  The 2008 NES does 
have limitations.  Since the design of the NES seeks to maximize comparability across time, 
respondents do not answer many questions about issues emerging during the 2008 presidential 
campaign.  The NES also includes few questions within various issue domains.  For instance, 
NES respondents were only asked three questions about the war in Iraq, whereas the 2004 NAES 
respondents were asked a total of 27.   
 The NAES includes a much larger battery of questions.  The 2000 and 2004 NAES were 
rolling cross-sectional surveys.  These surveys provide information on 79,458 and 98,711 
respondents across a thirteen month period, respectively.  The 2000 and 2004 NAES were also 
designed to allow for greater variation in questions than the NES and to change as the 
presidential campaigns unfolded.  The inclusion of questions about Abu Ghraib provides an 
example of the flexibility of the NAES.  In October 2003, few Americans knew that Abu Ghraib 
was a prison in Iraq.  By November of 2004, the prison had received a significant amount of 
media attention due to evidence of prisoner abuse.  The NAES asked respondents multiple 
questions about this scandal.   
The NAES provides less precise instruments to create measures of the explanatory factors 
advanced in Chapter Three. Only the 2004 NAES included a measure of external threat.  Neither 
the 2000 NAES nor the 2004 NAES includes a political knowledge battery asked of all 
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respondents.  These surveys also lack a battery of questions gauging the extent to which 
individuals possess the cognitive components underlying a feminist consciousness.  Neither 
survey provides any measure of gender role socialization. 
The resource-threat measure created from the 2004 NAES, like that used for the 2008 
NES, summed an individual’s income and their sense of external threat.  To create the resource-
threat index in 2004, I use income to divide respondents into groups as a proxy measure of 
resource availability.  Only one question on the 2004 NAES gauged an individual’s sense of 
threat.  This question asked the likelihood of a terrorist attack on American soil within the next 
year.  While broader in scope, this measure captures the sense of group vulnerability that 
multiple NES questions captured.  I divided the responses to the question about the likelihood of 
a terrorist attack into terciles, separating individuals based on the score relative to the scores of 
the population: high threat, moderate threat, and low threat.  High threat captures approximately 
the highest third, moderate the middle third, and low the bottom third.  This measure of an 
individual’s perception of threat is summed with their score on the resource measure to create the 
resource-threat index.   
The political knowledge measure created from the 2008 NES data also required 
modification.  The NAES asks respondents many political knowledge questions.  Since these 
questions vary during different waves of the survey, interviewer ratings provide the best measure 
of political knowledge for the 2000 and 2004 NAES.  Interviewers assigned each respondent a 
knowledge score ranging from one to five, five indicating the least knowledgeable respondents 
and one the most.  I reverse coded this measure to create a five point measure ranging from zero 
to one, zero representing the least knowledgeable respondent and one the most.   
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In 2000, a statistically significant difference exists between men and women on political 
knowledge (t = 6.6, p = 0.000).  The average score for men on the political knowledge measure 
is 0.70 (standard deviation = .0.24).  The average political knowledge score for women is 0.61 
(standard deviation = 0.26).  In 2004, a statistically significant difference also exists between 
men and women on this measure of political knowledge (t = -6.69, p = .0000).  Men score an 
average of .76 (standard deviation = .24), while women score an average of .69 (standard 
deviation = 0.26). 
The use of interviewer ratings as a proxy for knowledge involves significant drawbacks.  
It is impossible to establish the reliability of these measures.  With a knowledge measuring using 
only one question, factor analysis or other methods of reliability testing cannot be used.  Yet 
some empirical work suggests that interviewer ratings provide estimates similar to those of 
political knowledge scales comprised of answers to fact based questions.  John Zaller found 
reliabilities for multiple item scales between 0.80 and 0.85, and for interviewer rating at 
approximately 0.78 (Zaller, 1985).  Interviewer ratings appear as strongly related, if not more, to 
relevant criterion variable including political interest, education, and turnout (Zaller 1985).  No 
biases appear in interviewer ratings based on race, income, education, or gender (Zaller 1985).  
Given differences in the types and degree of difficulty inherent in political knowledge questions 
from year to year, interviewer ratings remain reasonable proxy for more complicated measures of 
political knowledge (Bartels, 1996).   
The NAES has a further limitation: it lacks questions gauging beliefs about women’s 
position in society, equality, and support for government interventions to achieve equality.  
These measures, together with an affective measure, comprise the feminist consciousness index.  
A feeling thermometer toward feminists provides the best measure of feminist consciousness 
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possible in the NAES.  Responses to this question about approval for feminists are divided into 
three groups—low, moderate, and high support.  As with the feminist consciousness measure 
created from items in the NES, a statistically significant difference exists between men and 
women in 2000 (t = 5.39, p = 0.00).   
This measures results in variables ranging from a minimum of zero and a maximum of 
two.  Women average 0.55, with a standard deviation of 0.79.  Mean average 0.45, with a 
standard deviation of 0.74.  In 2004, individuals express greater support for feminists.  Women 
average 1.33 on this two point scale, with a standard deviation of 1.20.  Men average 1.11, with a 
standard deviation of 1.13 (t = 4.55, p = 0.00).    
These group evaluations comprise only one part of feminist consciousness.  However, a 
moderate correlation exists between evaluations of feminists and the measure of feminist 
consciousness created using the 2008 NES (p = 0.47).  Given this moderate correlation, this 
measure of feminist consciousness seems a reasonable substitution.  However, this measure does 
only capture one aspect of the feminist consciousness as discussed in Chapter Three.  It is also 
susceptible to reliability problems, since it is comprised of only one question.  This reliability 
problem is further exacerbated by the fact that the word ―feminist‖ has a negative connotation to 
most individuals.  This connotation results in a number of individuals who hold feminist values, 
but reject the idea they hold these values.  This particular problem makes results more difficult to 
find.   
Finally, the NAES lacks any measure of gender role socialization, making it impossible 
to test the effect of this variable on attitudes in either year.  Results presented later in this chapter 
suggest that gender role socialization may not be an important contributor to the development of 
gender gaps in foreign policy preferences.  If gender role is not central to the development of 
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gender gaps in these preferences, proceeding without a measure of it in analyses of opinions in 
2004 and 2008 may appear less problematic.  Yet without the ability to establish the reliability of 
this measure from the 2008 data, the results suggesting the limited role of gender role 
socialization must be viewed with skepticism.   
The above discussion indicates problems inherent in the NAES.  The measures of the 
resource-threat interaction, feminist values, and political knowledge created from NAES 
questions lack the precision of those created from the 2008 NES.  Nevertheless, the 2004 NAES 
provides acceptable operationalizations of three measures, even though it lacks the fourth.
50
   
Given the drawbacks inherent in using the NAES to study the explanations of gender 
gaps advanced in this study, the 2008 NES provides the best test of the theories advanced in this 
dissertation.  The 2008 NES provides the best measures of the explanatory variables.  The 2000 
and 2004 NAES provide more questions with which to extend the analysis, albeit with 
explanatory variables less precise than those found in the 2008 NES.   
The remainder of this chapter examines the size of gender gaps in foreign policy 
preferences during the 2000, 2004, and 2008 presidential elections.  I then use logistic 
regressions to explore the whether the resource-threat, gender role socialization, feminist 
consciousness, and political knowledge indexes influence the development of women’s 
preferences on questions where gender gaps emerge.  Finally, I use data simulations to estimate 
how much factor contributes to the development of gender gaps. 
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 I do not use the 2008 NAES, because it lacks measures of threat, gender role socialization, and feminism.     
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Gender Gaps in 2000, 2004, and 2008 
The 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Surveys and the 2008 American 
National Elections Studies included a total of 38 foreign policy questions.
51
  These questions 
covered three major aspects of foreign policy: military spending, foreign policy goals, and 
preferences about foreign policy conduct.
52
   
Of the 38 foreign policy questions, gender gaps exist for twenty-seven questions, or 71% 
(Table 4.2).  In the remaining 29%, there were no gender gaps above three percentage points.  As 
in Chapter Two, I use three percentage points as a conservative measure of gender gaps, given 
the substantial differences in sample size between the surveys used in this analysis.  These 
gender gaps that do emerge vary in size from four to 17 percentage points, with an average size 
of approximately 8.5 percentage points.   
Many of these gender gaps appear large, but the magnitude of gender gaps provides only 
one indicator of their practical importance for American politics.  Even if one acknowledges the 
existence of large and predictable gender gaps on foreign policy opinions, we may still question 
their political significance.  A five percentage point shift in collective preferences that moves 
opinion from 46% to 51% percent could mean more than a 20 percentage point shift that moves 
opinion from 70% to 90%.  The former suggests the policy or policies favored by the public 
would be different if men and women responded in this same way to policy questions, while the 
latter merely reflects a more strongly held preference.   One could logically ask whether gender 
gaps that do not change the direction of collective preferences matter at all. 
In one-third of the questions asked about foreign policy, the collective preferences of 
women differ from those of men. Many of these directional shifts concern evaluations of 
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 This number reflects the number of policy questions for which I have measure of at least two of the explanatory 
factors identified in Chapter Three. 
52
 These questions solicit preferences about different politicians, policies, programs, and tactics.   
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political actors.  For example, a majority of women believed the Democratic Presidential 
Candidate, Vice President Al Gore, would better conduct American foreign policy in the Middle 
East than would the Republican Candidate, George W. Bush (Figure 4-2) (48% of men, 61% of 
women).  In short, gender gaps matter for interpreting the substantive meaning of collective 
preferences.   
The different collective preferences of men and women go beyond their evaluations of 
political candidates.  These collective differences also manifest themselves on questions about 
foreign policy spending and conduct.  For instance, while women tended to oppose increasing 
military spending (48%), men tended to approve of such spending (58%).  In 2008, women 
supported a deadline for withdrawing troops from Iraq (58%), while men remained evenly 
divided on this issue (50%).  These gender gaps provide evidence that the collective preferences 
of each group differ on a number of foreign policy issues.   
Gender gaps also emerged on foreign policy questions about military spending, foreign 
policy goals, and preferences about foreign policy conduct.  On questions about military 
spending, gender gaps appear on three questions and average seven percentage points.  On 
questions about foreign policy goals, gender gaps also appear on three questions and average 6.7 
percentage points.  On questions about the conduct of foreign policy, gender gaps appear on 
twenty-seven questions and average 9.1 percentage points.
53
  
 A number of questions about the conduct of foreign policy include information about 
political actors or actions associated with specific parties.  These source cues provide an 
accessible heuristic for individuals who lack the motivation or ability to employ more difficult 
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 Thirteen of these questions ask respondents about specific political actors.  On these questions, we may expect 
individuals to respond based on different considerations, including party identification (Mondak, 1993a; 1993b).  I 
separate these out later in the analysis, providing evidence that gender gaps on these questions emerge for different 
reasons than gender gaps in other aspects of foreign policy. 
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cognitive processes to make political evaluations (Mondak, 1993).  The availability of source 
cues in some foreign policy conduct questions makes them easier for respondents to answer 
using simple heuristics. The availability of heuristics for certain foreign policy questions makes 
it reasonable that on these questions, the factors contributing to gender gaps may differ from 
those in other areas of foreign policy.  Since questions providing individuals source cues involve 
different decision-making process, the subsequent data analysis considers these as separate from 
questions about foreign policy conduct that do not include such source cues.   
In line with previous research, the gender gaps that appear in 2000, 2004, and 2008 
indicate that women hold less hawkish foreign policy opinions than men.  Female collective 
opinion provides less support for military spending, for individualistic foreign policy goals, for 
war and aggressive tactics, and for Republican candidates’ ability to handle foreign policy.   
The gender gaps in foreign policy presented in this chapter follow trends noted by 
scholars for decades.  Women express less support for war, military spending, and militaristic 
foreign policy actions.  In the next section, I begin to explore what factors contribute to the 
creation of these gender gaps.  Using logistic regressions predicting women’s foreign policy 
preferences, I provide evidence that men and women have similar attitude structures on foreign 
policy preferences.  This evidence suggests that gender differences in the level that men and 
women possess each explanatory factor may have a greater effect on the size of gender gaps than 
differences in preference structures.   
 
An Individual-Level Explanation of Gender Gaps 
Women and men may use different considerations in forming individual preferences.  For 
instance, gender role socialization may prove a statistically significant predictor of gender gaps 
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in foreign policy for women, but have no significant effect on those of men.  Or biological 
considerations may be a statistically significant predictor of gender gaps for women, but not for 
men.  These different preference structures could then contribute to the development of gender 
gaps in foreign policy preferences.   
I use the 2008 American National Election Survey (NES) to determine whether such 
differences in preference structures exist.
54
  I model each foreign policy preference on which a 
gender gap emerges.  These results indicate that threat, feminist consciousness, and knowledge 
appear to affect the preferences of both men and women on foreign policy questions.  While 
slight differences emerge, these factors seem to structure the preferences of both sexes in the 
same way.   
The 2008 NES included 23 questions about foreign policy.  These questions covered a 
variety of foreign policy areas, ranging from evaluations of political actors conduct of foreign 
policy to support for particular foreign policy goals.  Of these 23 questions, gender gaps emerge 
on eleven questions (48%).   
Table 4.3 shows the foreign policy preferences of women modeled by logistic regression 
using the explanatory variables introduced in this work and control variables political scientists 
traditionally use in studies of political preferences.  These control variables include age, 
education, income, union membership, homeownership, marital status, parental status, religion, 
census region, race, and party identification.  Table 4.4 shows the foreign policy preferences of 
men modeled using the same technique.   
The results of the logistic regressions indicate the explanatory factors all contribute to the 
development of men’s and women’s foreign policy preferences in similar ways.  When one of 
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 I limit this portion of the analysis to the 2008 NES, since this is the only survey in my analysis that includes 
measures for all four explanatory variables.   
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these factors acts as a significant predictor of opinion for men and women, that factor tends to 
move in the same direction and to have an effect of approximately the same magnitude.    
The results presented in Table 4.3 confirm that each factor, when it appears as significant, 
moves in the direction predicted by the theories outlined in Chapter Three.  For example, 
consider opposition to a deadline for withdrawing American troops from Iraq.  Two explanatory 
variables, feminist consciousness and political knowledge, emerge as significant predictors of a 
woman’s preference on this issue, when controlling for the other variables discussed above.  
Increasing a women’s feminist consciousness decreases her propensity to oppose setting a 
deadline for troop withdraw from Iraq, while increasing her level of knowledge increases her 
opposition.  This follows theoretical expectations, with increasing levels of feminist 
consciousness increasing opposition to militaristic foreign policy options.  Increasing levels of 
political knowledge increasing female support for the more militaristic foreign policy options 
originally expressed by men, who expressed higher levels of opposition toward setting a deadline 
to withdraw troops.   
On other questions, significant variables also move in the expected direction.  Increasing 
women’s level of threat increases their support for using torture during interrogations of 
suspected terrorists and decreases their support for the United Nations.  Increasing a women’s 
feminist consciousness decreases her support for war and military spending, while increasing her 
support for the United Nations.  Increasing a women’s level of political knowledge increases her 
support for war.  The only exception to these variables moving in the expected direction 
concerns the resource-threat index and the War on Terror.  Increases in this index diminish 
support for the War on Terror.   
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Models of male opinion also suggest that the explanatory factors, when significant, move 
in the expected direction (Table 4.4).  Increasing a man’s level of feminist consciousness 
decreases his support for war and increases his support for the United Nations.  Increasing 
knowledge increases his support for war.  As discussed in Chapter Three, we can make no 
predictions about how biological considerations will affect male levels of aggression.  However, 
when the resource-threat index emerges as significant, it moves male opinion toward more 
militaristic or interventionist policy preferences.   
When a factor significantly affects male and female opinion on the same question, that 
effect is generally of a similar direction and magnitude.  Support for reducing the federal budget 
deficit by cutting defense spending provides an example of this pattern.  For instance, Tables 4.3 
and 4 indicate that feminist consciousness affects the opinions of men and women in similar 
ways on this question.  Tables 4.3 and 4.4 do provide evidence of instances where a factor 
significantly affects the foreign policy preferences of one sex but has no significant effect on the 
preferences of the other.   Gender role socialization emerges as a significant predictor of men’s 
approval for the Afghan War, but not women’s.  Feminist consciousness emerges as a significant 
predictor of women’s opinions on the War in Iraq, but not men’s.  Despite these exceptions, the 
explanatory factors considered in this analysis appear to affect the opinions of men and women 
in similar ways. 
 The results of these logistic regressions indicate slight differences in the preferences 
structures of men and women, which may play a role in the development of gender gaps.  
Generally, the preference structures of men and women appear similar.  This finding suggests 
that individual-level explanations may play a smaller role in the development of gender gaps 
than aggregate-level explanations.  Rather than gender differences in preference structures, 
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gender differences in characteristics at the aggregate level may provide a better explanation for 
the development of gender gaps in foreign policy preferences.   
 
An Aggregate-Level Explanation of Gender Gaps 
 Men and women appear to have similar preference structures in the realm of foreign 
policy, suggesting that this individual level explanation provides a weak explanation of the 
emergence of gender gaps.  It remains possible that an aggregate level explanation provides a 
stronger explanation for gender gaps in foreign policy preferences. 
 Chapter Three provides a theoretical framework explaining why gender differences in 
responses to the material environment, gender role socialization, feminist consciousness, and 
political knowledge may alter the foreign policy preferences of women on the aggregate level.  
The descriptive statistics in the methodological portion of this chapter suggest support for such 
gender differences.  Gender differences exist on levels of feminist consciousness and knowledge.  
Women are more likely to possess stronger feminist consciousness than men, and men are more 
likely to possess more political knowledge than women.   
 In this section of the chapter, I examine whether such an aggregate level explanation may 
provide a better explanation of gender gaps than the individual level explanation examined in the 
previous section.  I use data simulations to determine how much each factor contributes to the 
development of men’s and women’s foreign policy opinions in 2000, 2004, and 2008.  I use two 
metrics to determine how important each explanatory factor appears in the development of 
gender gaps: the average number of percentage points by which each factor reduces gender gaps 
in foreign policy preferences and how often simulations of each factor reduce the size of these 
gender gaps.  Results suggest that correcting gender differences in values of the resource-threat 
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index and political knowledge do the most to reduce the size of gender gaps on all facets of 
foreign policy preferences except those involving source cues.  However, correcting for uneven 
levels of feminist consciousness between men and women matters most on questions that involve 
such source cues.   
 
Data Simulation Method 
In order to measure the impact that various factors have on political preferences, I use a 
data simulation method first used by Bartels (1996) and later used, and modified, by Althaus 
(1998; 2003).  Following this method, a logistic regression is run on the entire sample of women 
for each policy question using a number of independent variables.  These include demographic 
characteristics, each factor, and interaction terms between each demographic characteristic and 
each factor.  The demographic variables included in the simulation models are age, education, 
income, religion, race, union membership, homeownership, marital status, parental status, and 
party identification.
55
  These variables represent a combination of those that previous researchers 
used in analyses of information effects (Bartels, 1996; Althaus, 1998).
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The equation for each logistic regression is as follows, 
     (    )                                                
                         + ∑        ∑  (     )   ∑  (     )   ∑   (     )  
∑  (     )    , 
where    is respondent i’s policy preference.     reflects that respondent’s score on the resource-
threat index,    the gender-role socialization index,    the feminist consciousness index, and    
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 Party identification may be better characterized as a cognitive shortcut than a demographic factor.  However, its 
inclusion here minimizes the possibility that the effect of political knowledge on policy preferences will be 
artificially inflated, and its relative stability overtime makes it comparable to other demographic variables (Althaus, 
1998). 
56
 For more details on variables and coding, see Appendix B-2.   
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on the political information index.     represents the respondent’s score on the kth demographic 
characteristic.       ,      ,      , and       are the interactions between the demographic 
characteristic and each index score.     is the error term for the ith observation.     through     
capture the coefficient for each factor,    , the coefficient for the kth demographic characteristic, 
and    , the coefficient for the kth interaction term.   
Table 4.5 provides the coefficients for this logit model.  The dependent variable for this 
model is approval for the President Bush’s handling of the War in Iraq in 2008.   The mean of 
the predicted probabilities provides an aggregate measure of the political opinions expressed by 
women.  Only 22% of women approved of Bush’s handling of the conflict, while 28% of men 
expressed support.  Men’s greater levels of support for the president’s handling of Iraq created a 
gender gap of six percentage points on this question.   
Results in Table 4.5 indicate that few of the independent variables reach conventional 
level of statistical significance.  Political knowledge and the interaction between feminist 
consciousness and political knowledge emerge as the only explanatory factors that achieve 
statistical significance. The coefficients suggest that increasing political knowledge increases an 
individual’s propensity to approve of Bush’s handling of the war.  Increasing knowledge and 
feminist consciousness at the same time decreases their propensity to approve of Bush’s handling 
of the war.   
As other scholars have noted, collinearity among predictors in such simulation models 
create large standard errors without biasing the coefficients themselves (Althaus, 1998; Bartels, 
1996; Gilens, 2001).  The collinearity stems less from the explanatory variables themselves than 
from their multiple uses in interaction terms with the various controls in the model. These 
statistically insignificant terms can nonetheless capture forces considered theoretically important 
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in preference formation (Gilens, 2001).  Due to the high collinearity among terms in this 
simulation model, statistical significance is a poor indicator of a term’s potential importance.  
Following Gilen’s (2001) formative analysis that demonstrated how the impact of multiple 
explanatory factors could be simulated at the same time in spite of excessive collinearity among 
predictors, this potential importance provides a strong reason to include these insignificant 
predictors of opinion in the logistic regressions that provide a foundation for these data 
simulations, which is done in the following empirical analyses.   
 The next step in this data simulation method involves estimating the effect of an 
explanatory factor on gender gaps, the variable capturing an explanatory factor is changed to 
reflect the score that the literature suggests should diminish gender gaps.  For tests of the effects 
of women’s material environment, every female respondent’s value on the threat-resource index 
is changed to two.  For tests of the effects of gender role socialization, values on the gender role 
socialization measure are changed to zero.  For tests of the effects of feminist consciousness, 
values on the feminist consciousness index are changed to zero.  For tests of the effects of 
political knowledge, values on the political knowledge index are changed to fifteen.  These new 
scores replace the actual scores used in the original logistic regression model and the values of 
interaction terms are also updated to reflect the changed values of the explanatory variables.   
These new values are run through the coefficients from the original model, yielding 
estimated opinion for each person based on the modified values of each factor.  The mean of the 
resulting predicted probabilities from this second equation serves as a measure of simulated 
collective preference.  For instance, changing the scores of all women on the resource-threat 
index to the highest possible value increases their aggregate level of approval for Bush’s conduct 
of the Iraq War to 25%.  This result suggests what women’s preferences might be if they shared 
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the same resources and perceived the same amount of threat as those possessing the highest 
levels of both characteristics. 
The difference between the mean of the simulated preferences of respondents and the 
mean of the preferences actually expressed by respondents during the survey captures the effect 
of an explanatory factor.  Men expressed greater levels of approval for the president than did 
women, 28% and 22% respectively.  Simulations indicate that women possessing higher levels 
of resources and perceiving higher levels of threat would express greater approval for the 
president, 25% rather than 22%.  This is a three percentage point increase in approval compared 
to the opinions actually expressed by women.  The gender gap between this simulated population 
of women and the actual population of men decreases to three percentage points from the six 
percentage point gap in actual opinion.  This three percentage point difference reflects the effect 
of biological considerations on the size of gender gaps in evaluations of President Bush’s 
handling of Iraq.   
Unlike other studies that have used this simulation method (Althaus, 1998; 2003; Bartels, 
1996; Gilens, 2001), I only run simulations predicting the opinions of women and not those of 
men.  These simulated opinions are compared with the actual opinions expressed by men to 
determine how much changing each factor would alter female opinion on questions where 
gender gaps emerge the surveys used in this analysis.  Altering male opinions moves away from 
explaining the gender gaps that actually emerged in these surveys, and away from an analysis of 
how much each factor's appears to contribute to actual gaps, toward explaining what gender gaps 
would be under conditions of abundant resources and high threat, the absence of gender role 
socialization, the absence of feminist consciousness, or conditions of fully information.  These 
are considerably different questions.   
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This method has two advantages for the purposes of this analysis.  First, this data 
simulation technique ensures that the simulation of fully informed preference accounts for the 
effects of relevant demographic variables, in addition to the interaction between these variables 
and political information.  Women with certain characteristics, like political knowledge or high 
levels of feminist values, tend to come from particular demographic groups.  Accounting for 
these demographic characteristics help to ensure that the simulation captures the effect of each 
explanatory factor, rather than the effect of a shared demographic characteristic underlying that 
factor.   
Finally, this method examines aggregate opinions on the aggregate level.  Scholars define 
gender gaps as the difference between the opinions of men and women, rather than the difference 
between the opinion of a man and a woman.  Given this definition, analyses of the effects of 
gender gaps done at the aggregate level seem most appropriate.   
The following section outlines the results of these data simulations on foreign policy 
questions in 2000, 2004, and 2008.  These results suggest that biological considerations and 
political knowledge affect the size of gender gaps on most aspects of foreign policy.   
 
Explaining Gender Gaps in Foreign Policy 
To determine which factors have the greatest impact on the size of gender gaps in foreign 
policy, the remainder of this chapter will examine how much each factor reduces the average size 
of gender gaps in foreign policy preferences and how many times each reduces the size of gender 
gaps on foreign policy questions.  This examination uses foreign policy questions asked in the 
2000 NAES, 2004 NAES, and 2008 NES.  The questions asked of respondents in 2000, 2004, 
and 2008 concerned various aspects of foreign policy.  Respondents gave opinions about foreign 
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policy spending, the goals of American foreign policy, and how foreign policy had been or 
should be conducted.  The subsequent analysis will examine the effects of each factor within 
different facets of foreign policy, an approach that suggests the complexity underlying the 
development of gender gaps in foreign policy preferences.  
 
What Factor Reduces the Average Size of Gender Gaps Most 
 Political knowledge and the biological considerations captured by the resource-threat 
index contribute to the development of gender gaps more than other variables on most aspects of 
foreign policy preferences.  Only on questions about the conduct of foreign policy that include 
source cues does any other factor contribute more to the average size of gender gaps than the 
resource-threat and political knowledge indexes.    
 Foreign policy spending provides an example of the importance of biological 
considerations and political knowledge.  Across the thirty-eight questions used in this analysis, 
the size of gender gaps averages seven percentage points.  Knowledge reduces gender 
differences in policy preferences by an average of 4.7 percentage points, almost eight times as 
much as feminist consciousness (Figure 4.3).  The resource-threat index reduces this gap by an 
average of 3.5 percentage points, while gender role socialization reduces this gap by three 
percentage points.   
 Simulation results on a question gauging support for reducing the deficit by cutting 
defense spending provide an example of the importance of political knowledge and biological 
considerations on questions of foreign policy spending (Figure 4.4).  Men expressed less support 
for making defense related cuts than did women, creating a four percentage point gender gap.  
Data simulations suggest that if all women possessed the same level of knowledge as the most 
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knowledgeable, this gap would disappear.  If all women possessed the same level of resources 
and perceived the same level of threat as their most resource-rich and fearful peers, this gender 
gap would decrease by three percentage points.  Simulations suggest that if women did not 
possess a feminist consciousness, this gap would also decrease by three percentage points.   If 
women rejected traditional gender roles, this gap would decrease by only a percentage point.   
Political knowledge and biological considerations also have a similar impact on questions 
about foreign policy goals (Figure 4.5).  The gender gap between men and women on questions 
examining foreign policy goals average 6.7 percentage points.  Political knowledge reduces the 
size of this gap by 3.7 percentage points, while the resource-threat index reduces this gap by 
three percentage points.  Gender role socialization and feminist consciousness reduce this gap by 
less than a percentage point.   
For example, support for capitalism as a foreign policy goal suggests the importance of 
women’s material environment on the development of gender gaps on questions about foreign 
policy goals (Figure 4.6).  Women expressed less support than men for promoting capitalism as a 
foreign policy goal, creating a six percentage point gender gap.  If all women possessed high 
levels of resources and felt high levels of fear, this gap would decrease by two percentage points.  
Simulations indicate that if women possessed high levels of political knowledge or rejected 
traditional gender roles and all other factors stayed the same, this gap would decrease by a 
percentage point.  If women possessed low levels of feminist consciousness, this gap would 
actually increase by one percentage point.   
More evidence of the importance of political knowledge and the resource-threat index is 
evident on questions about foreign policy conduct that do not provide source cues (Figure 4.7).  
Gender gaps within this area of foreign policy average 10.3 percentage points.  Simulations 
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indicate that political knowledge reduces the average size of this gap by 3.9 percentage points, 
while altering women’s material environment reduces the average size by 3.4 percentage points.  
If women possessed low levels of feminist consciousness, this gap would reduce by 3.2 
percentage points.  Simulations indicate little decrease would occur if women rejected traditional 
gender roles. 
Men expressed more support for the War in Iraq than women, resulting in a 10 
percentage point gender gap (Figure 4.8).  If all women were highly knowledgeable, simulations 
suggest that this gap would decrease by six percentage points.  This gap would be reduced by 
five percentage points if women possessed low levels of feminist consciousness and by four 
percentage points if all women possessed high amounts of resources and perceived high levels of 
external threat.  Rejecting traditional gender roles would decrease the size of this gap by only 
one percentage point.  
On questions of foreign policy conduct that provide source cues, feminist consciousness 
begins to play a greater role in the size of gender gaps.  Political knowledge matters less that 
feminist consciousness.  The average size of gender gaps on these questions is 8.4 percentage 
points.  If all women possessed low levels of feminist consciousness, this gap would be reduced 
by three percentage points (Figure 4.9).  Material environment still makes a sizable contribution 
to the size of gender gaps on these questions, reducing the size of gender gaps by 2.1 percentage 
points.  Simulations indicate that having a fully knowledgeable female population would 
increase the size of this gap by about half a percentage point.  Since only one foreign policy 
conduct question with a source cue includes information on gender role socialization, I present 
no averages for that variable. 
113 
 
Simulations of approval for President Bush’s handling of Iraq in 2004 demonstrate the 
importance of feminist consciousness on foreign policy questions with conduct cues (Figure 
4.10).  Men expressed more approval for the president, creating a 10 percentage point gender 
gap.  If all women shared a low level of feminist consciousness, this gap would decrease 4 
percentage points.  If all women possessed high levels of resources and perceived high levels of 
threat, this gap would decrease by a percentage point.  If all women possessed high levels of 
political information, this gap would increase by a percentage point.   
These data simulations indicate that political knowledge and biological considerations 
most increase the size of gender gaps on all foreign policy questions, except those including 
source cues.  On questions with these cues, feminist consciousness matters more.  Analysis of 
how many times each factor reduces the size of gender gaps reveals the same patterns. 
 
What Factor Reduces the Size of Gender Gaps Most Often 
 The averages presented above indicate that political knowledge and biological 
considerations contribute most to the average size of gender gaps in foreign policy preferences, 
although feminist consciousness does most on questions involving source cues.  The number of 
times each factor reduces the size of gender gaps on foreign policy questions provides another 
metric to examine the factors contribute to gender gaps.
57
  This metric provides further evidence 
of the importance of knowledge and biological considerations on gender gaps in most areas of 
foreign policy. 
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 Not all questions included measures of each factor.  The remainder of this section discusses results as the percent 
of the time when simulations suggest that gender gaps would decrease.  These percentages divide the number of 
questions on which simulations suggest that altering a factor would decrease a gender gap by the number of 
questions for which measures for factors within this issue area exist.   
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 Political knowledge most often reduces gender gaps on questions about foreign policy 
spending.  Four questions on this topic result in gender gaps.  Simulations indicate that 
increasing women’s level of political knowledge would reduce the size of these gaps on all 
questions (Figure 4.11).  Increasing the amount of resources they possess and the extent to which 
they perceive external threat would decrease the size of the gaps on 67% of questions.  
Decreasing their levels of feminist consciousness would also reduce these gaps on 50% of 
questions.  Reducing the extent to which they subscribe to traditional gender roles would only 
decrease the size of gender gaps on foreign policy spending on 50% of questions.   
 When it comes to the three questions on foreign policy goals, political knowledge and 
biological considerations reduce the size of gender gaps most often (Figure 4.12).  Simulations 
indicate that altering these factors would reduce the size of gender gaps 100% of the time.  
Simulating what women’s opinions would be if they did not accept traditional gender roles 
would decrease gender gaps 67% of the time.  Simulating what women’s opinions would be if 
they possessed low levels of feminist consciousness would decrease gender gaps 33% of the 
time.   
 Among the seven questions involving foreign policy conduct, political knowledge, 
biological considerations, and feminist consciousness all reduce the size of gender gaps (Figure 
4.13).  Gender role socialization never reduces the size of gaps on these questions.  For the 13 
foreign policy conduct questions involving source cues, feminist consciousness and biological 
considerations reduce the size of gender gaps most often (Figure 4.14).  Simulations of women 
with low levels of feminist consciousness indicate that altering this factor would decrease the 
size of gender gaps 85% of the time.  Altering their levels of resources and perceptions of threat 
would reduce these gaps 64% of the time.  Simulations suggest that a highly knowledgeable 
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female electorate would exhibit smaller gender gaps on questions involving source cues 31% of 
the time.  Women rejecting traditional gender stereotypes would not reduce the size of gender 
gaps on these questions.   
  The data simulations presented in this chapter indicate that political knowledge and 
biological considerations play a larger role in the size of gender gaps in foreign policy questions 
than gender role socialization.  However, feminist consciousness plays a greater role than the 
three other variables on questions involving source cues.  These findings hold for both metrics 
used to interpret the data simulations: how much each factor reduces the average size of gender 
gaps and how often each factors reduces the size of gender gaps on foreign policy questions.   
 
Conclusions 
Gender gaps on foreign policy preferences remain a stable characteristic of American 
politics (Nincic and Nincic, 2000).  Scholars argue that these gaps influence party identification 
and vote choice (Chaney et al., 1998; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; Shapiro 
and Mahajan, 1986).  While gender gaps in foreign policy preferences appear persistent and 
important, scholars still have many questions about their causes.   
Recent surveys provide scholars better data to explore the factors contributing the 
development of gender gaps.  The empirical analyses undertaken in this chapter begin to address 
the origins of gender gaps in foreign policy preferences using these new data.   These analyses 
suggest that the causes of gender gaps may rest on aggregate differences in the dispersion of 
particular characteristics, rather than gender differences in preference structures.  Data 
simulations, which correct for the gender differences in the explanatory factors, suggest that 
political knowledge and biological considerations contribute to the formation of women’s 
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foreign policy opinions, particularly on questions of foreign policy spending, goals, and general 
conduct.   
Data simulations suggest that if all women were as knowledgeable as the most 
knowledgeable individuals surveyed, they would express more support for militaristic foreign 
policy options.  This change would decrease the size of gender gaps.  The apparent relationship 
between knowledge and the size of gender gaps indicates gaps may result, at least in part, from 
distortions of preferences.  Political scientists argue that knowledgeable citizens have more 
stable opinions (Feldman, 1988; Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996), hold opinions that correspond 
with their underlying political predispositions (Zaller, 1992; Bartels, 1996; Sniderman et al., 
2001), update those opinions when new and relevant information becomes available (McGraw 
and Pinney, 1991; Zaller, 1992), and use those opinions to select candidates that reflect their 
political predispositions (Delli Carpini and Keeter, 1996; Lau and Redlawsk, 1992).  Even the 
cognitive shortcuts and heuristics political scientists believe can stand in for political knowledge 
require some political knowledge to be properly employed (Kuklinski and Quirk, 2000; Lau and 
Redlawsk, 2001; 2006).  These simulations indicate that gender differences in political 
knowledge may contribute to the emergence of gender gaps in foreign policy preferences.   
Simulations also suggest that increasing women’s resource level and increasing their 
perceptions of external threat, would lead women to express more militaristic foreign policy 
preferences.  This change reduces gender gaps on foreign policy preferences.  This change also 
suggests that gender gaps may result from biological predispositions activated under conditions 
of scarcity and fear.  These simulations indicate that when women’s material environment 
consists of abundant resources and a high level of external threat, they express preferences that 
look more like those of men.  This finding might provide a reason why many women, when 
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reaching positions of political power, do not behave much differently than their male 
counterparts.  Indira Gandi, Margaret Thatcher, and Golda Meir could hardly be classified as 
leaders focused on conciliation and loath to engage in aggression.   
While political knowledge and biological considerations affect gender gaps on political 
preferences, this effect seems stronger on questions of foreign policy conduct that do not provide 
source cues.  Feminist consciousness plays a much larger role on questions about the conduct of 
foreign policy that provide these cues.  On such questions, the political values comprising a 
feminist consciousness reduce gender gaps by the largest amount, decrease the size of gender 
gaps on individual questions most often, and decrease the size of these gaps more than any other 
variable most often.   
Why feminist consciousness matters more than the other factors on questions involving 
source cues remains unclear.  This finding may reflect the use of party identification as a 
heuristic for individuals concerned with inequality and government programs aimed at 
alleviating social inequalities.  Yet the descriptive statistics presented earlier in this chapter 
indicate a weak correlation between feminist consciousness and party identification.  This 
finding may also indicate that citizens did not associate President Bush or the Republican Party 
with the concerns of disadvantaged groups, particularly in 2004 when respondents offered 
opinions on foreign policy questions involving source cues.   
One of the most interesting findings from this chapter concerns gender role socialization.  
This factor does not appear to contribute to the creation of gender gaps in foreign policy 
preferences.  However, the measure of gender role socialization used in this analysis remains 
suboptimal.  The measure of gender role socialization used in this analysis includes one survey 
question and its reliability cannot be established.  Gender role socialization describes a complex 
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and inescapable phenomenon.  As discussed in detail in Chapter Three, all individuals are subject 
to gender role socialization.  The null results for gender role socialization presented here may 
occur because of error in the measure of gender role socializing used here.  In addition, only the 
2008 NES included a measure of gender role socialization.  These methodological limitations 
suggest that dismissing this factor’s importance would be premature.  Socialization may play a 
greater role in other years or in other issue areas, possibilities that should be revisited when 
better data become available.   
The following chapter extends this analysis to another area of public opinion where 
scholars find evidence of enduring gender gaps: social policy. Women express greater support 
than men for social welfare programs and spending on such programs.  They also express greater 
support for laws protecting the rights of minorities and historically disadvantaged groups.  
Biology, gender role socialization, feminist values, or political knowledge may contribute to 
these gender gaps.  The next chapter tests these competing explanations, providing greater 
insight into the causes of these gaps.  The results indicate that the sources of gender gaps in 
social policy differ from the sources of gender gaps in foreign policy, providing further evidence 
of the complexity of gender gaps in political preferences.   
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Chapter Five:  Gender Gaps in Social Policy Preferences 
 
 In March of 2012, the United States Supreme Court heard arguments about the 
constitutionality of the individual mandate provision found in the 2010 federal health care reform 
law, a law some conservatives and political pundits have labeled ―ObamaCare.‖  On the second 
day of arguments, CNN/ORC released a poll that indicated a majority of Americans opposed the 
individual mandate central to the federal health care reform law (47% in favor and 51% 
opposed).
58
  A closer look at this poll suggested a substantial gender gap existed on this issue.  
58% of men opposed the individual mandate while 53% of women supported it.   
 Few scholars studying gender gaps would express surprise at this pattern.  Decades of 
political science research provides evidence of gender gaps on ―compassion issues,‖ such as 
healthcare.  These issues, aimed at alleviating suffering among American society’s most 
vulnerable individuals, tend to receive much greater support from women than from men.  For 
example, women tend to express more support for an expansive government that provides for its 
citizens (Chaney et al., 1998; Clark and Clark, 1993; Gilens, 1988; Howell and Day, 2000; 
Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  Women appear more likely than 
men to support government provision of healthcare, childcare, housing, and education.  Women 
also express a greater willingness than men to increase spending on them.   
Gender gaps in social policy preferences reach beyond ―compassion issues.‖  Women 
also tend to express more support for gay rights (Herek, 2002; LaMar and Kite, 1998).  This 
liberal tendency in the political preferences of women does not, however, indicate gender gaps 
always emerge because women possess more liberal political preferences than men.  On other 
social issues related to traditional morality, women hold more socially conservative opinions.  
For instance, women are more likely to support school prayer and restricting access to 
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 http://www.cnn.com/2012/03/27/justice/scotus-health-care/index.html?iref=allsearch 
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pornographic materials (Clark and Clark, 1993).  They are less likely than men to support non-
conventional behaviors including drug use, and are less likely to support legalizing these 
behaviors (Eagly et al., 2004).   
Scholars have made great inroads describing patterns in gender gaps among the American 
population.  Yet data limitations have prevented rigorous study of the factors contributing to the 
development of these gaps.  Chapter Three advanced four potential causes of gender gaps: 
biological considerations, gender role socialization, feminist consciousness, and political 
knowledge.  The theories advanced in Chapter Three suggest that alterations of the values of 
gender role socialization, feminist consciousness and political knowledge will affect the size of 
gender gaps in social policy in the same way that they affected gender gaps in foreign policy.  
However, the resource-threat index will have distinct effects in the area of social policy.  Primate 
research suggests that increasing levels of resource and threat among females increases their 
aggression toward outsiders.  In the realm of foreign policy, this change would lead to women 
expressing preferences closer to these held by men.  The same primate research suggests that 
decreasing levels of resource and threat should lead to females to be more concerned with 
survival and therefore less willing to provide assistance to others.  In the realm of social policy, 
this change should decrease women’s willingness to provide assistance to others.   
As discussed in Chapter Four, these factors may influence preferences at two different 
levels.  At the individual level, gender differences in the preference structures exhibited by men 
and women may contribute to the development of gender gaps.  For instance, political 
knowledge may influence the preferences of men, but have no effect on women.  At the 
aggregate level, gender differences in the extent to which each sex tends to possess the 
characteristics captured by these factors may also contribute to the development of gender gaps.  
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For instance, both men and women may use political knowledge when forming social policy 
preferences.  Since men tend to possess higher knowledge levels than women, this difference 
may increase the size of gender gaps.  
In this chapter, I examine the size of gender gaps in social issues during the 2000, 2004, 
and 2008 election campaigns.
59
  I then explore the factors that contribute to these gender gaps.  I 
use logistic regression to examine whether these factors affect female preferences differently 
than they affect male preferences.  I also use data simulations to estimate how much each factor 
contributes to the development of gender gaps in social policy preferences.   
The first hypothesis holds that the combination of increased resources and increased 
perceptions of threat among women leads them to express policy preferences favoring 
government actions to improve the well-being of citizens.  The second holds that traditional 
gender roles, which present women as more compassionate, lead women to express such 
preferences on social issues.  The third holds that gender differences in feminist values create 
gender differences in political preferences, leading women to favor policies involving 
government social services and legislation to ensure the well-being of citizens.  Finally, the 
fourth holds that gender differences in the possession of political knowledge alter the shape of 
women’s opinions, leading them to express opinions that differ systematically from those of 
men.   
The findings presented in this chapter indicate that men and women share similar 
preference structures.   As with foreign policy, the different levels that these factors are 
possessed by men and women at the aggregate level strongly influence the magnitude of gender 
gaps in social policy preferences.  Within the area of social policy, feminist consciousness and 
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 I consider a wide range of issues social issues.  These include traditional social welfare programs, questions of 
minority rights and citizenship, and government spending and interventions related to the aforementioned issues.   
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gender role socialization appear to be the most powerful forces underlying the development of 
gender gaps.   
 
  Gender Gaps in 2000, 2004, and 2008 
 Surveys during the presidential election years of 2000, 2004, and 2008 reveal the 
presence of gender gaps on a large number of social policy questions (Table 5.1).  The 
preferences for which gender gaps emerge span various issues dimensions related to social 
policy, including opinions about government programs and responsibilities (33 questions), 
opinions on social spending (nine questions), opinions on minority rights (17 questions), and 
opinions on moral issues (11 questions).  The three surveys used in this chapter allow for 
analysis of gender gaps on 100 social policy questions.  Of these 100 questions, gender gaps 
outside the margin of error exist in 70% of social policy questions asked during these election 
years.  When gender gaps over three percentage points emerge, they range up to 21 percentage 
points in size.  The average size of these gender gaps is approximately 7.4 percentage points.  
The opinions of women during these election years differed in predictable ways from those of 
men.   
 In 2000, 2004, and 2008, women expressed more support for an expansive government 
providing services for citizens than did men.  Women expressed greater support for programs 
aimed at helping vulnerable groups in American society, including Social Security.  For instance, 
73% of women opposed decreasing spending on Social Security, while 67% of men expressed 
the same opposition.  Women expressed greater support for federal government’s involvement in 
improving healthcare and education.  Women also exhibited greater levels of support for 
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government programs alleviating income inequality and for government regulation, including 
purchasing firearms. 
 Women were also more likely to support minority rights and government interventions to 
ensure minority rights than were men.  Women favored laws preventing job discrimination at a 
greater rate than did men.  Women also expressed less opposition than men to the statement that 
African-Americans had gotten less than they deserved in the United States, 65% and 59%, 
respectively.  They also expressed a greater willingness to support preferential hiring or 
promotion of African-Americans and expressed support for legislation allowing homosexuals to 
serve openly in the military, to marry, and to adopt children.  While 54% of men opposed 
allowing gay individuals to serve openly in the military, only 33% of women expressed such 
opposition.    
 Gender gaps on preferences concerning government programs and responsibilities, 
spending, and minority rights indicate that women express opinions more closely associated with 
liberal political values than conservative ones.
60
  For instance, women were more likely to 
oppose the use of the death penalty to punish criminals (see Table 5.1).  Yet on questions of 
morality, women appeared more socially conservative than men.  Women were more likely to 
reject the idea that Americans should adjust their moral standards to changes in society and to 
accept the idea that new lifestyles have contributed to the breakdown of society.  Evidence of 
these ideals emerged in various aspects of female opinion.  Women expressed less support for 
abortions in a number of instances, including when a pregnancy poses a non-fatal risk to the 
mother.  They were also less likely to support embryonic stem cell research and more likely to 
consider unpunished criminals, illegal immigration, and drug use serious problems.   
                                                 
60
 Liberal is being used as it is in the American context, to denote preference traditional associated with the 
Democratic Party. 
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On a number of issues, gender gaps indicate that men and women possess different 
political preferences.  In 2000, 66% of women expressed support for allowing gay individuals to 
serve openly in the military, while 46% of men opposed this change to the current military 
policy.  In 2004, women expressed disapproval for the use of federal tax credits to help parents 
send children to private school, a policy for which men approved.  In 2008, women expressed 
less support for restricting abortions when there were no fatal risks to the life of the mother and 
for the investment of social security funds into private accounts.  Men expressed the opposite 
preferences.  In the same year, women expressed support for allowing homosexual couples to 
adopt children.  A majority of men disapproved of allowing these couples to adopt.   
The gender gaps outlined above demonstrate trends long noted by scholars studying 
gender gaps in social welfare policy.  Women expressed greater levels of approval than men for 
government interventions and spending to ensure the well-being of citizens.  Women expressed 
more tolerance for minority rights, particularly those of African-Americans.  At the same time, 
women expressed less support for Americans engaging in non-traditional behaviors, including 
illegal drug use, illegal immigration, and abortion.  Gender gaps remain an important factor in 
shaping American politics, affecting which candidates are given political power (Kaufmann and 
Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006).  The next section of this chapter examines whether these 
gender gaps emerge from gender differences between the preference structures of men and 
women.   
Factors Shaping Female Opinions on Social Policy Preferences 
 Men and women may use different preference structures to form social policy 
preferences.  If so, this difference could contribute to the development of gender gaps at the 
aggregate level.  Using logistic regression on data from the 2008 American National Election 
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Study, I explore the preference structures of men and women.  These analyses suggest that all 
four factors tend to structure the social policy preferences of men and women in similar ways. 
 Table 5.2 and Table 5.3 display coefficients from logistic regressions predicting social 
policy questions asked during the 2008 NES.  These models also include controls for race, 
education, age, income, homeownership, parental status, union membership, region, religion, and 
party identification, although these coefficients are not shown.    The results from these models 
suggest that when explanatory factors emerge as significant, their effect is similar in direction 
and magnitude for both men and women.   
 Table 5.2 indicates that all four explanatory factors move female opinion in the expected 
directions.  Increasing a woman’s resources and perceptions of threat increases her support for 
expansive government and aid to poor.  Increasing feminist consciousness increases women’s 
support for social welfare spending and minority rights.  Increasing a woman’s level of 
knowledge increases her support for a variety of civil rights issues, such as allowing homosexual 
couples to adopt children.   
  The regression results presented in Table 5.3 also indicate that the effects of the four 
explanatory factors move male preferences in the expected directions.  Increasing male political 
knowledge increases support for social welfare spending and decreases support for government 
interventions.  Increasing levels of political knowledge among males also decreases opposition to 
minority rights.  Increasing feminist consciousness, on the other hand, increases support for 
social welfare spending, for minority rights, and for a more expansive government.  Increasing 
gender role socialization decreases support for abortion and increases opposition to minority 
rights.
61
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 Again, we have no expectation based about how biology will affect men.   
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In summary, Tables 5.2 and 5.3 indicate all four factors move the opinions of men and 
women in similar directions.   Although slight differences exist in the preferences structures of 
men and women, these preference structures exhibit more similarity than differences.  This 
suggests that, while gender differences in preference structures may play a small role in the 
development of gender gaps, aggregate level explanations may provide better explanations of 
gender gaps on social policy preferences.    
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
An Aggregate-Level Explanation of Gender Gaps 
 The previous section provides evidence that gender differences at the aggregate level may 
underlie gender gaps in social policy preferences.  Men and women respond differently to their 
material conditions and to gender role socialization.
62
  The sexes also tend to possess different 
levels of feminist consciousness and political knowledge.  In this chapter, I explore the 
aggregate-level effects of the four factors introduced in Chapter Three using data simulations.
63
  
I measure the effects of each factor in two ways.  I examine the extent to which simulations that 
raise and equalize levels of each factor reduce the average size of gender gaps.
64
  I also count the 
number of times data simulations indicate that each factor reduces the size of gender gaps on a 
social policy question by any amount.
65
  The results of the data simulations suggest that differing 
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 As discussed in previous chapters, material environment encompasses resource availability and perceptions of 
external threat.   
63
 Detailed information on this empirical method can be found in Chapter Four. 
64
 If original gender gaps emerged because men were more conservative than women, I consider gender gaps to have 
closed if data simulations suggest altering the value of a factor would make women’s opinions more conservative 
than men’s or vice versa.  This happens infrequently.   
Data simulations that do not move women’s opinions to the extreme, but alter the values of each 
explanatory variable to match the average values of men may make this particular practice unnecessary and would 
be an interesting extension of this analysis.   
65
 Since some of the surveys do not include the variables necessary to create a measure of gender role socialization 
or of the resource-threat index, I compute preferences as by dividing the number of times each factor reduces gender 
gaps by the number of questions including measures for that factor.  Sixty-nine questions include measures for 
feminist consciousness or political knowledge.  Thirty-nine questions include a measure of the resource-threat index.  
Twenty-seven questions include a measure of gender role socialization. 
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levels of feminist consciousness among men and women tend to increase the size of gender gaps 
on most questions of social policy.  On questions of social morality, gender role socialization and 
political knowledge also play a role and on questions of government function, biological 
considerations and gender role socialization play a role.   
 
Reducing the Size of Gender Gaps  
 As noted earlier, when gender gaps emerged on social policy questions within the 2000 
NAES, the 2004 NAES, and the 2008 ANES, they averaged 7.3 percentage points with a 
maximum gap of 21 points.  Data simulations indicate that if all respondents possessed as much 
knowledge as the most knowledgeable individuals, the average size of these gender gaps would 
fall hardly at all to seven percentage points (Figure 5.1).  If all survey respondents possessed a 
high level of resources and perceived a high level of threat, the average size of these gaps would 
fall slightly lower from 7.3 points to 6.9 points.  If all respondents rejected traditional gender 
roles, the average size of these gaps would fall as far as 5.9 percentage points.  If no respondents 
possessed a feminist consciousness, the average size of these gaps would fall to 5.8 percentage 
points.  This suggests that each explanatory factor contributes at least somewhat to the 
development of gender gaps.  The analysis that follows shows that correcting uneven levels of 
feminist consciousness and acceptance of gender traditional gender roles reduces the size of 
gender gaps more than other variables (see Table C.1 in Appendix C).   
 The pattern suggested by the results of the data simulations indicate that feminist 
consciousness makes the largest average contribution to gender gaps on questions about 
government programs and responsibilities (Figure 5.2), social policy spending (Figure 5.3), and 
minority rights (Figure 5.4).  These simulations indicate that if women rejected all aspects of a 
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feminist consciousness, they would be less supportive of an expansive government, of social 
policy spending, and of minority rights.   
 A closer analysis of gender gaps on specific policy questions provides evidence of this 
pattern.   Women expressed less opposition than men to increases in government services (Figure 
5.5).  This difference created a 13 percentage point gender gap.  Data simulations suggest that if 
all women possessed high levels of knowledge or rejected feminist consciousness, this gender 
gap would decrease by 13 percentage points and nine percentage points, respectively.  If women 
possessed higher levels of resources and perceived high levels of threat, simulations suggest that 
women would express more opposition for increases in the size of government that would 
decrease gender gaps by 7 percentage points, respectively.  If all women rejected traditional 
gender roles, however, the simulations suggest that gender gaps would increase. 
    Opinions on preferential hiring of African-Americans provide further evidence of the 
centrality of feminist consciousness in the creation of gender gaps (Figure 5.6).  Women 
expressed less support than men for the statement that black Americans would be as well-off as 
white Americans if they tried harder.  This created a gender gap of nine percentage points.  
Simulations indicate that if all women rejected the values associated with feminist 
consciousness, they would express higher levels of support for this statement, decreasing the size 
of this gender gap to zero.  If all women possessed high levels of resources and perceived high 
levels of threat, the gender gap on this question would decrease by only one percentage point.  
Data simulations suggest that altering women’s acceptance of traditional gender roles would 
actually increase this gap by about two percentage points, while altering women’s level of 
political knowledge would triple the size of this gap.  
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A different trend emerges on social policy preferences on questions related to morality.  
Gender role socialization matters more than the other factors on these questions (Figure 5.7).  
For instance, women expressed less support than men for abortion in cases of incest, resulting in 
a five percentage point gender gap (Figure 5.8).  Data simulations indicate that if women rejected 
traditional gender roles, they would express less conservative preferences on this question and 
gender gaps would disappear.  Simulations indicate that increasing women’s level of political 
knowledge would have the same effect as decreasing their acceptance of traditional gender roles.  
On few other questions related to social morality does political knowledge have a relatively 
larger effect comparable to that of the other three factors. 
 
Frequency of Reducing Gender Gaps  
The results presented above indicate that differing levels of feminist consciousness play a 
considerable role in gender gaps on many facets of social policy.  These results also suggest that, 
on questions of social morality, gender role socialization increases the size of gender gaps more 
than other variables.  The number of times a factor reduces the size of gender gaps within various 
issue areas reveals similar trends to those presented above.  Feminist consciousness emerges as a 
powerful moderator of the size of gender gaps.  This metric also suggests that political 
knowledge plays a substantial role in the size of gender gaps on questions of social morality and 
that biological considerations play a role in the size of gender gaps on questions about 
government function. 
Feminist consciousness frequently reduces the size of gender gaps within two domains: 
social spending (Figure 5.9) and minority rights (Figure 5.10).  Reducing women’s levels of 
feminist consciousness reduces the size of gender gaps on 67% of spending questions and 82% 
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of minority rights questions where measures of feminist consciousness exist.
66
  On questions 
about social morality, political knowledge plays a greater role than any other variables (Figure 
5.11).  Simulations indicate that altering women’s levels of political knowledge would reduce the 
average size of gender gaps on 73% of questions.    If all women rejected traditional gender 
roles, gaps on questions about social morality would decrease 57% of the time.  Simulations 
suggest that altering women’s material environment would decrease gender gaps on 29% of 
questions and that altering their level of feminist consciousness would decrease gender gaps on 
only 18% of questions that have them.   
On questions about government function, biological considerations play a greater role 
than either feminist consciousness or political knowledge (Figure 5.12).  Simulations suggest that 
if all women possessed the same high levels of resources and perceived the same high level of 
threat, gender gaps would be reduced on 52% of questions about government function.  If all 
women rejected feminist values, gaps would be reduced on 30% of these questions.  If all women 
rejected gender role socialization, gaps would be reduced on 21% of these questions.  
While biological considerations and political knowledge exhibit the largest effects on 
questions of foreign policy, the results presented above suggest that feminist consciousness most 
frequently contributes to the development of social policy gaps on questions about social 
spending and minority rights.  On questions concerning social morality, political knowledge and 
gender role socialization have a greater influence on the development of gender gaps.  On 
questions about the function of government, biological considerations and gender role 
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 Because not all questions included measures of each factor, the remainder of this section discusses results as the 
percent of the time when simulations suggest that gender gaps would decrease.  These percentages divide the 
number of questions on which simulations suggest that altering a factor would decrease a gender gap by the number 
of questions for which measures for factors within this issue area exist.   
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socialization appears to be significant contributors to the development of gender gaps.  These 
findings suggest the complexity of gender gaps, both between domains and within domains.   
  
Conclusions 
 
Numerous studies of gender gaps and the trends noted in Chapter Two suggest that 
women express different policy preferences than men on questions about social policy.  Women 
express higher levels of support than men on compassion issues, such as government provision 
of healthcare, childcare, housing, and education (Chaney et al., 1998; Clark and Clark, 1993; 
Gilens, 1988; Howell and Day, 2000; Schlesinger and Heldman, 2001; Shapiro and Mahajan, 
1986).  Women also tend to express higher levels of support for minority rights (Herek, 2002; 
LaMar and Kite, 1998) and slightly more conservative opinions on questions involving 
traditional morality, such as school prayer (Clark and Clark, 1993).   
This chapter provides evidence for why these gender gaps emerge. The logistic 
regressions outlined earlier in this chapter suggest that men and women exhibit similar 
preference structures on social policy questions.  Yet data simulations suggest that gender 
differences in feminist consciousness and gender role socialization/political knowledge 
contribute a considerable amount to the size of gender gaps on social policy preferences.  These 
findings provide a strong contrast to those presented in the chapter on gender gaps in foreign 
policy.  Feminist consciousness plays a very limited role in foreign policy gender gaps, while 
biological considerations play a much larger role.  Gender gaps in social policy exhibit the 
opposite tendencies.   
 Feminist consciousness and gender role socialization may matter more on the 
development of gender gaps in social policy preferences than on foreign policy preferences 
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because different factors affect gender gaps in different issue areas.   That feminist consciousness 
and gender role socialization prove important on questions about providing assistance to the 
disadvantaged or about protecting the rights of minorities seems unsurprising.  Traditional 
gender roles emphasize characteristics like compassion (Williams and Best, 1982) and feminist 
values focus on improving the lives of the disadvantaged, often through government intervention 
(Dio et al., 1996; Eagly et al., 2004; Howell and Day, 2000; Jost and Thompson, 2000).  Yet this 
variation across issue domains may be a politically important observation.  Even if the 
preference structures of men and women appear similar, the factors that contribute to these 
gender gaps seem sensitive to different factors within different issue dimensions.  This 
complexity suggests the utility of analyzing influences on gender gaps across issue domains 
using multiple theories, something that has not been done using the theories outlined in Chapter 
Three until now.   
The analyses in Chapter Four and Five also raise the question of why biological 
considerations captured by a woman’s material environment play a larger role in the 
development of gender gaps on foreign policy preferences than on social policy preferences.
67
  In 
addition, they raise the question of why social policy preferences appear much more sensitive to 
women’s social environments, including their experiences of socialization and political values.  
Methodological and theoretical issues may help explain this difference.   
In the 2008 NES, the resource-threat index includes ten questions gauging an individual’s 
sense of threat from external enemies (in the form of terrorists).  The index contains only one 
question gauging threats closer at hand (in the form of criminals).  In the 2004 NAES, only one 
question captures threat.  This question centers on threat from terrorism.  Both measures capture 
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 The material environment is comprised of an individual’s feeding ecology and predators. 
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foreign threat better than domestic threat.  As a result, these measures may be better suited to 
study foreign policy preferences than social policy preferences.   
Another possibility rests on differences in who represents a threat in different realms.  
The concept of threat, as discussed by primatologists, largely rests on an in-group, out-group 
distinction.  On questions of foreign policy, external threat appears relatively easy to define.  As 
Americans, we share a nationality and enemies to the United States represent an external threat.  
For instance, terrorists pose a threat to all Americans.  On questions of social policy, identifying 
in-groups and out-groups proves more complicated.  An individual’s group may be those 
geographically proximate, those who share a racial/ethnic identification, or those who share 
specific demographic characteristics.  His or her out-group could be any combination of these.  
To determine whether women define in-groups and out-groups differently in these different 
policy realms, scholars need better measures of threat.  Nevertheless, various definitions of in-
groups and out-groups could help explain why different influences affect gender gaps in the 
foreign and social policy realms.   
This chapter provides evidence that gender differences at the aggregate level explain the 
emergence of gender gaps in social policy preferences.  Data simulations suggest that gender 
gaps increase because women possess higher levels of feminist consciousness and conform to 
distinct gender roles.   These results, coupled with those presented in Chapter Four, provide 
explanations for trends in public opinion long noted by scholars but little understood.  They also 
provide further evidence of the complexity of gender gaps in policy preferences.  These seem to 
emerge from different factors depending on issue domain.  The next chapter explores the 
implications of this complexity.   
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Chapter Six: Conclusion 
In the spring of 2012, the Pew Research Center for the People and the Press conducted a 
cross-sectional study about the size of gender gaps among Americans (Pew, 2012).  The study 
concluded that systematic differences in policy preferences between men and women remain ―as 
wide as ever‖ (Pew, 2012).  These gender gaps have important political and normative 
implications. 
Gender gaps create politically consequential gender differences in vote choice and party 
identification (Chaney et al., 1998; Kaufmann and Petrocik, 1999; Kaufmann, 2006; Shapiro and 
Mahajan, 1986).  Women have been more likely than men to identify as liberal and have voted 
for Democrats in every election since 1980 (Box-Steffensmeier et al., 2004; Chaney et al., 1998; 
Cook and Wilcox, 1995; Carroll, 2006).  In the spring of 2012, 58% of women supported 
President Obama in his re-election campaign, while only 49% of men expressed the same 
preference (Pew, 2012).  Journalists and political pundits claim that the 2012 Republican 
presidential nominee needs to ―narrow President Barack Obama's commanding lead among this 
critical constituency‖ to win the presidency (Kellman, 2012).  It seems that gender gaps shape 
American politics, but they also have implications for popular approaches to human development 
(Nussbaum, 1995; 1999; 2003; Sen 1990a; 1990b; 1993; 1997; 1999a; 1999b).   
The human capabilities approach holds that the best way of assessing human 
development is to measure the ability of an individual to exercise capabilities, such as the ability 
to participate effectively in political choices that govern one's life or to be able to hold property 
on an equal basis as others, rather than traditional economic indicators like GDP (Nussbaum, 
1995; 1999; 2003; Sen 1990a; 1990b; 1993; 1997; 1999a; 1999b).  Following this approach, 
governments must establish a minimum threshold for human functioning.  Resources hold no 
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value apart from their ability to facilitate human functioning (Nussbaum, 1999).  For instance, 
inequalities in material resources, like money, remain problematic only when they prevent the 
ability to exercise capabilities. 
Critics of the understanding of resources articulated by those advancing the human 
capabilities approach argue that such approaches, which rest on autonomy, move too quickly 
past resource differences (Phillips, 2001).  They maintain that inequalities in resource position, 
including money, create structural inequalities in society that place some at a political 
disadvantage relative to others (Phillips, 2001). They believe that governments must do more 
than create the conditions sufficient for an individual to choose to exercise certain capabilities, 
since distributional differences in economic, social, and political resources limit the capacities of 
individuals to fully develop these capabilities (Phillips, 2001).  Scholars like Nussbaum 
explicitly acknowledge some of the constraints placed by structural inequalities that affect an 
individual’s ability to reach a minimum threshold for exercising capabilities, including lack of 
education.  Nevertheless, their focus moves away from how an individual’s position within 
―social hierarchies shapes their choices in unequal ways‖ (Phillips, 2001: 264).  For critics like 
Anne Phillips and Susan Moller Okin, providing human beings with what is sufficient to make 
political choices is not the best way to advance human development (Okin, 1987; 1989; 1994; 
1995; 1998; Phillips, 2001).  As a result, these critics assert that developmental programs must 
address distributional differences in material resources or political power.   
This  disagreement over the human capabilities approach rests partly on the importance 
of resource distribution in shaping political behavior.  Studying gender gaps, and how resource 
distribution influences gender gaps, provides an opportunity to examine the extent to which 
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differences in resources shape the political preferences of women.  Such a study also provides 
empirical evidence for scholars engaged in this important theoretical debate.   
This dissertation extends on previous studies of gender gaps by examining patterns in 
gender gaps across a wide array of issue areas and constructing a theoretical framework to study 
the sources of these gaps.  Chapters Four and Five used this framework to explore the origins of 
gender gaps in two issue areas where gender gaps are increasing: foreign and social policy.  The 
remainder of this chapter summarizes the findings of this work, examines the implications of 
these findings, and suggests ways to extend these analyses in future work. 
 
The Nature and Causes of Gender Gaps 
 Gender gaps receive substantial attention from political scientists.  Their works have 
increased our understanding of how gender gaps have changed between the early twentieth 
century and the early 1980s.  They also draw attention to factors that may contribute to the 
development of gender gaps.  Yet many questions about gender gaps warrant further exploration.  
In one theoretical chapter and three empirical chapters, this dissertation has attempted to address 
these questions.   
Chapter Two provided evidence that, despite the social and political changes that have 
occurred over the past sixty years, gender gaps in policy preferences remain. Gender gaps in 
areas such as civil rights have been decreasing, whereas gender gaps in areas like morality, social 
policy, and foreign policy have been increasing.  For the latter two issue domains, these gender 
gaps are approximately 10 percentage points.  Using a survey containing more nuanced policy 
questions, the NAES, larger gender gaps in economic policy, social issues, and government 
function were found than those that appeared in the NES.  They also vary based on 
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socioeconomic characteristics.  Within most issues areas, these gender gaps tended to be largest 
among citizens of high socioeconomic status, a group political science research suggests is best 
able to form policy preferences that reflect their underlying political predispositions (Zaller, 
1992; Bartels, 1996; Sniderman et al., 2001).  
Chapter Three began exploring the factors that underlie gender gaps.  Studies of the 
causes of gender gaps have introduced a number of factors that might account for them.  
However, these studies created a rather fragmented body of literature in which competing 
theories are rarely tested against one another (except Bendyna et al., 1996; Conover, 1988; 
Conover and Sapiro, 1993, Eagly et al., 2004).  The theoretical discussion in Chapter Three 
brought together the four major theories of this piecemeal literature for the first time, drawing 
from research in economics, evolutionary biology and psychology, primatology, political 
science, psychology and sociology to identify four potential causes of gender gaps: biological 
considerations, gender role socialization, feminist values, and political knowledge.  The resulting 
theoretical framework provides a way to explore the causes of gender gaps in a way that better 
accommodates the likely causes of gender gaps and better facilitates cumulative theory-building. 
 Chapter Four examined the factors that influence the size of gender gaps in foreign 
policy, an issue area in which gender gaps remain sizable and have been increasing over time.  
Gender gaps in the election years 2000, 2004, and 2008 appeared on many questions about 
foreign policy.  These gaps were often quite large, some reaching almost 20 percentage points.  
Logistic regressions ruled out different attitude structures between men and women as the cause.  
Data simulations indicated that gender differences in levels of political knowledge and in 
biologically-motivated responses to the material environment appeared to be the most important 
contributors to the size of gender gaps within this issue area.   
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 Chapter Five extended this analysis to social policy.  As with foreign policy, in 2000, 
2004, and 2008 substantial gender gaps appeared on questions about social policy.  These gender 
gaps did not seem to emerge because men and women possess different attitude structures.  
Instead gender differences seemed to emerge because women possess different aggregate levels 
of certain explanatory factors.  For instance, women possess a higher level of feminist 
consciousness than do men.  These differences in feminist consciousness had important 
implications for gender gaps on questions about social policy.  Data simulations indicate that 
feminist consciousness is the largest contributor to the formation of gender gaps within this issue 
area.   
 These chapters explored the nature and causes of gender gaps.  Gender gaps have been 
increasing over time and appear sensitive to socioeconomic and ethnic differences.  I outlined a 
comprehensive theory of gender gaps, testing the hypotheses emerging from this theory to 
determine why gender gaps in foreign and social policy emerge.  The empirical tests of this 
theory demonstrated that different factors influence the development of gender gaps in different 
issue areas.  The contents of these chapters have important theoretical, empirical, and normative 
implications for scholars studying political behavior and human development.   
   
Implications for Theories Explaining the Emergence of Gender Gaps 
Scholars in various disciplines advance explanations for gender differences in behavior.  
These explanations locate these gender differences in biology, socialization, feminist values, and 
resource differences.  Yet no work has drawn all four of these explanations into a common 
framework, which would provide the basis for further theoretical development.  The literature 
that results from this approach makes it difficult to determine what causes gender gaps.  This 
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dissertation draws together these various explanations of gender gaps in policy preferences, 
providing a framework for studying gender gaps that facilitates cumulative theory building and 
better measures of biology as an explanatory factor than the unidimensional approaches used by 
some political scientists.   
 
Moving Toward a Cumulative Theory of Gender Gaps 
Scholars studying gender gaps present various explanations about what causes these gaps.  
However, these scholars often propose explanations without empirically testing their validity 
(e.g., Fukuyama, 1998; Shapiro and Mahajan, 1986).  When explanations are empirically tested, 
one or at most two explanations of gender gaps are evaluated within a single issue area 
(Conover, 1988; Conover and Sapiro, 1993).  This creates two problems for those seeking to 
understanding gender gaps.   
First, the factors that receive empirical support may not remain as important if other 
factors were also tested.  For instance, Pamela Johnston Conover finds that feminist 
consciousness contributes to the development gender gaps (1988; 1993).  Yet she does not test 
biological explanations beyond the inclusion of variables accounting for an individual’s sex in 
her statistical models.  If biological explanations were included in her analyses, different results 
may emerge.   
Second, factors that receive empirical support in one issue area may not have the same 
effects in other issue areas.  For instance, the Conover’s 1993 study examines gender gaps in 
foreign policy preferences, particularly on war support.
68
  Yet feminist consciousness  may not 
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 In her 1988 work, Conover does look at the relationship between feminist values and gender gaps on 13 questions 
about social policy.  Eight of these examine spending on groups, three on affirmative action for women and African-
Americans, and two moral issues.  The work in which Conover examines feminist consciousness against other 
potential causes of gender gaps, however, examines only foreign policy.   
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have the same effects on gender gaps in other issue areas, such as economic or environmental 
policy.  While studies like those discussed above provide potential explanations of gender gaps, 
they rarely build on or speak to the works of others studying the same thing.  This piecemeal 
approach impedes cumulative theory-building.   
Chapter Three outlined an approach that facilitates such theory-building by considering 
gender differences in biology, socialization, feminist values, and resources.  These explanations 
draw together research in a wide array of fields, ranging from primatology to economics.  
Chapter Four then suggested how these explanations may be operationalized, in order to test how 
much each contributes to the development of gender gaps in policy preferences.   
Studies of gender gaps using the explanations and operationalizations advanced in this 
dissertation would help to construct a literature on gender gaps that offers a more comprehensive 
theory of their causes.  Even if scholars studied gender gaps in only one issue area, testing the 
four explanations advanced in Chapter Three using similar operationalizations would make it 
possible to compare their studies with those examining gender gaps within other issue areas.  
This facilitates the growth of a cumulative theory of gender gaps, which is essential for scholars 
seeking to understand their causes.  
 
Conceptualizing and Operationalizing Biology 
The theoretical framework outlined in Chapter Three also represents a new approach to 
the conceptualization and operationalization of biology in political behavior research.  Over the 
last two decades, political scientists have begun using biological factors to explain political 
behaviors.  These studies provide evidence that our DNA may influence political characteristics, 
such as party identification (Hatemi, 2007; Hatemi et al., 2009; Settle et al., 2009).  Yet the 
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methodological approaches used by these political scientists rest heavily on twin studies, which 
underestimate the influence of environment on biological characteristics, including DNA.  In this 
study of gender gaps, biology is operationalized in a way that better accommodates the influence 
of environment on biology.   
Twin studies make two important assumptions about the static nature of biological 
characteristics; assumptions undermined by emerging biological research..  The first of these 
assumptions maintains that monozygotic twins (MZ) share 100% of their genetic material, while 
dizygotic twins (DZ) share, on average, 50% of their genetic material (Hatemi, 2007; Alford et 
al., 2008).  The second assumption maintains that an individual’s genetic material remains fixed 
from the moment of conception.  This assumes that the genetic material of the twins used in twin 
studies does not change over time (Alford et al., 2008; Hatemi, 2007; Hatemi et al., 2009; Settle 
et al., 2009).   
Those studying genetics and neurobiology have discovered problems with these 
assumptions, causing a paradigm shift for those studying genetics and its influences on human 
behavior (Charney, 2011; Kaplan and Rogers, 2003).  Recent work indicates that DNA is 
dynamic, changing as an embryo forms and develops (Beraldi et al., 2006).  During this time, 
DNA elements may ―copy and paste‖ themselves at various points in the individual’s DNA 
sequence, a process known as ―retrotransposition‖ (Gibbs, 2003; Goodier and Kazazian, 2008).  
Retrotranspotion may continue throughout an organism’s life, triggered by environmental 
conditions, including activity, stress, and aging (Zhao et al., 2008; Kuzumaki et al., 2010, Lista 
and Sorrention, 2009).   
At the same time, the biochemical system that regulates DNA expression, the epigenome, 
also demonstrates environmental sensitivity.  Genes can be activated or deactivated depending 
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on an individual’s environment (Jirtle and Skinner, 2007).  Aspects of the epigenome may be 
passed on from parent to offspring, without changes in an organism’s DNA sequence (Anway et 
al., 2008; Crews et al., 2007; Cuzin et al., 2008; Jablonka and Raz, 2009; Pentinat et al., 2010; 
Skinner et al., 2008; Stouder and Paoloni-Giacobino, 2010; Walker and Gore, 2011).   
This biological research suggests a complex interaction between human biology and our 
environment that dynamically shapes the biological characteristics twin studies assume to be 
unyielding and unchanging.
69
  Chapter Three offered a different way of conceptualizing and 
operationalizing biology.  This approach examined biological effects by considering how 
changes in the material environment alter the behaviors that improve an organism’s probability 
of surviving and reproducing.  This approach incorporates the environmental factors that alter 
female behaviors, and subsequently gender gaps, into a measure of biology.   
The biological theory for female behavior outlined in Chapter Three and tested in 
Chapters Four and Five is a sociobiological approach, which contends that behaviors evolve to 
increase the relative percentage of genes passed on to future generations, maximizing 
reproductive fitness (Sperling, 1991).   This approach does not assume ―sameness‖ among males 
and females.  Both actively seek out genetic advantage.  Yet different behaviors may yield 
advantages for males and females.   
This approach has been taken with great caution, since evolutionary-biological theories of 
animal behavior are no less susceptible to human interpretation influenced by social and cultural 
understandings than those from the ―softer sciences‖ (Sperling, 1991).70  Scholars should 
proceed with caution when applying the behavior of non-human primates to humans.  Human 
                                                 
69
 Some prominent scholars using twin studies have begun to explore the interaction between environment and 
biology (Hatemi and McDermott 2011).    
70
 Appendix D outlines the changes in the past 50 years for the sociobiological approach used here, examining how 
social and cultural changes have shaped how scientists think about female primate behavior. 
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beings are not merely chimpanzees who walk upright.  Nor are they simply bonobos with an 
increased physical capacity for complex speech who share the same goals and processes of 
reasoning with their closest primate ancestors.  ―Human gendered behavior involves uniquely 
human cultural, cognitive, and linguistic characteristics that appear to be recent developments in 
hominid evolution and that are not shared by other primates‖ (Sperling, 1991: 27).  Nevertheless, 
this sociobiological approach provides a promising new way to examine the effects of biology on 
political behavior; an approach that better accommodates recent findings about genetics than do 
twin studies. 
The explanations of gender gaps outlined in Chapter Three, and their operationalizations 
allow scholars to study gender gaps in a way that improves theoretical development and better 
measures the influence of ―biology‖ than other approaches.  The results presented in Chapters 
Two, Four, and Five also have additional implications for how scholars understand and study 
gender gaps, particularly for the importance they should assign to future studies of gender gaps 
and to how differences in the aggregate distribution of explanatory factors may play a role in 
creating them.   
 
Implications for the Empirical Study of Gender Gaps 
Despite significant economic, political, and social changes in the lives of women, gender 
gaps remain an enduring reality of American political life.  While gender gaps in some areas, like 
civil rights, appear to be diminishing, gender gaps in other areas have grown.  These areas 
encompass some of the most prominent issues in politics today.  The continued existence of 
these gender gaps indicates that a better understanding of what causes them may improve our 
understanding of a variety of aspects of American political behavior. 
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Understanding the causes of gender gaps remains important for scholars trying to explain 
many facets of American politics.  For those seeking to understand American public opinion, 
gender gaps prove important in shaping collective preferences.  Chapters Two, Four, and Five 
provided evidence that men and women often express different collective preferences.  Even 
when gender gaps do not indicate that men and women have different collective preferences, 
underlying gender gaps in common preferences suggest that the preferences of women differ 
systematically from the preferences of men.   
For those seeking to understand elections, the growth of gender gaps in policy 
preferences may have important implications for how the electorate behaves.  Gender gaps in 
foreign and social policy have been increasing.  These two issue areas have been central to larger 
debates in American politics, particularly during election years.  American conflicts abroad 
emerged as the most important problem during the 2004 and 2006 election years.  In 2008 and 
2010, the economy and the role of the government in providing for its citizens through social 
programs became a primary issue.  That gender gaps emerge in issue areas that Americans 
identify as important suggests that these gaps will continue to be an important influence on 
American politics.  Gender gaps in policy preferences underlie gender gaps in party 
identification and vote choice.  As long as gender gaps continue to widen, scholars may be wise 
to expect changes in the partisan composition of the electorate and in aggregate levels of support 
for candidates of the two main parties.   
For those seeking to understand public opinion, the analyses in Chapters Four and Five 
provide interesting implications for our understanding of gender differences in political 
preferences.  Men and women exhibit similar attitude structures.  These attitude structures cannot 
be the cause of gender gaps in political preferences.  Instead, aggregate differences in the 
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resources and values individuals possess seem a more likely cause of gender gaps.  As such, 
scholars studying gender gaps must pay close attention to differences in resources and values.   
The continued existence of gender gaps also has implications for how scholars view the 
relationship between resource distribution and political preferences.  Gender gaps have not 
decreased as women have advanced in areas like education or income.  The reality appears quite 
the opposite.  Chapter Two provides evidence that gender gaps have been increasing since the 
late 1940s, even as women made substantial advances in education, income, and political 
involvement. Today, women continue to express greater levels of support than men for social 
welfare programs and lower levels of support than men for militaristic foreign policy options.     
That the economic, social, and political advances made by women have not decreased 
gender gaps suggests that these gaps are an enduring reality of American political life.  There is 
little reason to expect that as women continue to advance, these gaps will close.  In fact, this 
study’s more nuanced analyses of gender gaps across  different socioeconomic and ethnic groups 
shows for the first time that increasing resources may actually increase the size of gender gaps in 
many issues areas. 
Chapter Two provided evidence that gender gaps vary depending on the resources of 
individuals, measured by their socioeconomic status.  These results indicate the importance of 
resources in the development of gender gaps.  These results also hold across ethnic groups.  
Gender gaps among those with high socioeconomic status appear consistently larger than gender 
gaps among those of lower socioeconomic status.   Easing gender differences in socioeconomic 
status does not seem to be associated with smaller gender gaps, a finding supported by the data 
simulations presented in Chapter Five, but not in Chapter Four 
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The simulation results in Chapter Five suggest that increasing a politically relevant 
resource, knowledge, among women would not do as much to decrease gender gaps on questions 
about social policy as decreasing their levels of feminist consciousness.  Neither would altering 
the material environment of women, by increasing the resources they possess, do as much to 
decrease gender gaps as decreasing their levels of feminist consciousness.  Yet the results in the 
empirical chapters show that increasing resource parity between men and women sometimes 
does diminish gender gaps.  In Chapter Four, simulations indicate that increasing political 
knowledge diminishes the size of gender gaps on questions of foreign policy.  Increasing the 
resources women possess, as measured by income, also decreases the size of these gaps when 
coupled with increases in their perceptions of threat.   
The relationship between resources, policy preferences, and gender gaps is a complex 
one.  Nevertheless, resources appear to be an important factor in the study of gender gaps.  
Scholars should be attentive to the relationship between resources and the political preferences 
expressed by individuals, especially given the normative implications involved in the 
relationship between resource distribution and the size of gender gaps.  
  
Normative Implications about the Causes of Gender Gaps 
 The theoretical and empirical analyses in this dissertation have normative implications 
for autonomy-based theories of human development, like the human capabilities approach.  
Those advancing this approach argue that fostering human freedom and individual autonomy 
will prove the best way to alleviate poverty, ensure social justice, and cultivate human 
development (Nussbaum, 1995; 1999; 2003; Sen 1990a; 1990b; 1993; 1997; 1999a; 1999b).  The 
human capabilities approach transformed how many scholars and policymakers conceptualize 
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human development.  For example, the United Nations now uses a Human Development Index 
(HDI), which measures development using capabilities like health and education.  Yet while this 
approach has proved transformative for many studying and promoting human development, it 
remains controversial.   
The human capabilities approach makes the assumption that sufficiency, rather than 
equality, should be the goal of human development programs.  Accordingly, the approach’s 
proponents rely on having enough resources to exercise capabilities, rather than achieving parity 
in the possession of these resources.  Critics argue that policymakers must go beyond merely 
creating the conditions sufficient for an individual to choose to exercise certain capabilities 
(Phillips, 2001).  They contend that distributional differences in economic, social, and political 
resources limit the ability of some individuals to fully develop and exercise these human 
capabilities.  An emphasis on choice obscures the fundamental importance of resource 
distribution and the structural inequalities that place some at a political disadvantage in 
developing or exercising capabilities.   
 The analysis of gender gaps across individuals of different socioeconomic status and 
ethnicities suggest that gender gaps do vary based on resource distribution, in line with the 
arguments made by critics of the human capabilities approach, such as Susun Moller Okin and 
Anne Phillips. Those possessing different levels of political resources do express different 
preferences.  Contrary to the contrasting logic of both the human capabilities approach and that 
of its critics, gender gaps are often largest among those with the highest socioeconomic status.  
Chapter Four also suggested that the uneven distribution of political knowledge affects the 
foreign policy preferences expressed by women.  These findings confirm that the uneven 
distribution of resources may distort the preferences expressed by women, and may provide 
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empirical support for critics of the human capabilities approach.  It seems that resources play an 
important role in the development of women’s preferences and in the development of gender 
gaps.   
 At the same time, Chapters Four and Five indicate that other characteristics of individuals 
and their environments also affect political preferences.  For instance, an individual’s perceptions 
of threat may also, together with resource availability, influence women’s preferences about 
foreign policy.  This may indicate that those using political preferences to measure human 
development must pay particular attention to the environmental context in which individuals 
reside.  The preferences of individuals in areas where armed conflicts or terrorism are common 
may vary systematically from those in more secure environments.  This observation may explain 
why some studies suggest that foreign policy gender gaps do not exist among those living in the 
Middle East (Tessler et al., 1999).  It may also suggest the difficulties in relying on the human 
capabilities approach to advance human development in countries where violent conflict remain 
more common than in the West.    
Feminist consciousness and gender role socialization also seem to influence women’s 
preferences about social policy.  These findings suggest that environmental characteristics and 
political values may shape the types of preferences individuals express.  One of the strengths of 
the human capabilities approach, which rests on autonomy, is its respect for the beliefs and 
practices of individuals in all cultures.  However, aspects of the social or cultural environment 
may shape choices in profound ways.  In many countries, support for feminism and feminist 
values remains low.  One consequence of this lower level of feminist consciousness may be 
lower levels of support for social programs aimed at human development, including programs 
ensuring education for girls.  Opposition to such programs may impede the kind of human 
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development Sen and others advancing the human capabilities approach hope to achieve by 
relying on the abilities of individuals to exercise positive freedoms.   
The theoretical and empirical analyses undertaken in this dissertation suggest that 
resources and environmental conditions affect the preferences expressed by women.  While this 
observation does not undermine the value of the human capabilities approach, it does suggest 
that policy preferences emerge through a complex process influenced by biological 
considerations, environmental conditions, values, and resources.  Any human development 
program relying on political preferences to ensure human development will be affected by 
biological considerations, environmental conditions, values, and resources.  These factors may 
need to be more clearly addressed by those attempting to articulate what fundamental human 
capabilities are.   
 
Opportunities for Future Work 
 I have argued that the theory and results outlined in this work have theoretical, empirical, 
and normative implications.  Gender gaps appear to be a continuing reality of American political 
life and their development appears to be influenced by different factors in different issue areas.  
The theoretical framework used here provides a way of studying gender gaps that facilitates the 
development of a cumulative theory of gender gaps.  This framework also provides a way of 
studying gender gaps that incorporates recent biological findings into the study of human 
behavior.  Finally, the results presented here suggest that those advancing autonomy-based 
approaches to human development may need to more carefully consider the influence of 
environment and resources on political preferences.  This study also leaves scholars a number of 
important areas for further analysis.   
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 The data simulation method used in Chapters Four and Five alter (1) a single factor to (2) 
an extreme value among (3) female respondents.  Changing any one of these aspects of the 
simulations may yield different results than those outlined above.  For instance, two factors could 
change together.  If women’s scores on the resource-threat index increased along with their 
scores on the feminist consciousness index, different results would likely emerge.  One factor 
could moderate the effect of the other.  The factors used in this analysis are uncorrelated with 
one another.  However, it certainly seems possible that in different datasets some factors could 
move together.  For instance, significant correlation between rejecting gender role socialization 
and possessing high levels of feminist consciousness seems plausible.   
It seems unlikely that gender gaps in policy preferences can be fully explained by a single 
factor.  Biology, socialization, values, and politically relevant resources may all influence the 
development of gender gaps.  Changing these factors together in the simulations could erase 
gender gaps, something that changing one factor’s value did not do on most questions.  
Exploring the interactions between these factors could offer scholars new information about the 
extent to which each factor contributes to the development of gender gaps in combination with 
others.   
 At the same time, the method used here simulated extreme values of each factor.  A better 
approach may be to change these values to the average score among men where possible, rather 
than the highest or lowest possible score.  Most men possess some level of feminist 
consciousness.  Most men also possess a less than perfect level of political knowledge.  This 
means that the simulations undertaken in Chapters Four and Five estimated what the opinions of 
women would be under different conditions by moving them beyond the normal distribution of 
these factors in males.  Changing women’s scores to the average male score on each factor may 
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provide a better measure of how much each factor contributes to the development of gender gap 
in each policy area.  It may also reveal that gender gaps are more deeply entrenched and 
enduring than the results presented in Chapters Four and Five suggest.  For instance, it’s 
certainly possible that changing simulation values by a smaller amount would result in smaller 
reductions of gender gaps than presented in Chapters Four and Five.   Such results would 
indicate that biological considerations, gender role socialization, feminist consciousness, and 
political knowledge may play a more limited role in the development of gender gaps.   
More work is needed to explore what factors create gender gaps among different 
demographic groups.  The 2008 NES remains the best dataset to measure all four of these 
measures at once.  It is not large enough to disaggregate by groups as I did with the NAES in the 
second half of Chapter Two.  Nevertheless, with approximately 800 men and 800 women 
responding to the survey questions, it should be possible explore the influence of different 
factors among those of high and low socioeconomic status for most questions.  Analyzing the 
attitude structures and running data simulations predicting how changes in each explanatory 
factor would alter the size of gender gaps among individuals in these different groups may shed 
further light on how factors influence gender gaps.     
Finally, our confidence in these results would be strengthened if they could be 
reproduced using data from outside the United States.  Using data from European or Latin 
American countries that includes questions about feelings of group threat from other citizens 
may provide a better measure of the biological considerations than available in the U.S. data 
used here.  Using data from countries with more traditional cultures may also provide a better 
way to test gender role socialization.  In European countries, gender gaps appear to follow 
similar patterns noted in the United States (Frankovic 1982; Norris 1985; 1988).  Given the 
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existence of surveys like the Eurobarometer, studying gender gaps in a Europe might be an 
interesting extension of the analysis done here and a useful test of the generalizability of the 
theoretical framework I outline in Chapter Three outside of the U.S.  
While many questions remain, this dissertation provides a theoretical framework for 
studying gender gaps and examining how various factors influence the development of gender 
gaps.  Studying gender gaps remains difficult.  Explaining their causes requires drawing from a 
wide array of fields, ranging from biology to economics.  Nevertheless, gender gaps have 
substantial political and normative implications for women in the United States and throughout 
the world, understanding their origins and consequences would do much to further empirical 
research in public opinion and mass behavior, as well as normative theories of justice and 
political representation.   
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Appendix A:  Gender Gaps Over Time  
 
Table A-1 
Gender Gaps, 1948 - 2008 
     
Questions First, Last Year 
Asked 
Gender Gap, 
First Year 
Gender Gap, Last 
Year 
Last - First Year 
 
Civil/Minority Rights 
    
Gays in the military 
(Oppose) 
 
1992, 2008 21% 11% -10% 
Concerned about rights of 
accused (Not concerned) 
 
1970, 1978 1% 9% 8% 
School integration 
(Oppose) 
1962, 2000 2% 10% 8% 
Guaranteed Jobs II 
(Oppose) 
 
1972, 2008 6% 14% 8% 
Urban Unrest a problem 
(Agree) 
 
1968, 1992 18% 10% -8% 
Affirmative action in 
hiring/promotion 
(Oppose) 
 
1986, 2008 8% 1% -7% 
Government should 
ensure fair jobs for blacks 
(Disagree) 
 
1964, 2008 7% 1% -6% 
Gay adoption (Oppose) 1992, 2008 5% 11% 6% 
Law protecting 
homosexuals against 
discrimination (Oppose) 
 
1988, 2008 11% 7% -4% 
Blacks must  try harder to 
succeed (Disagree) 
 
1986, 2008 2% 6% 4% 
Conditions make it 
difficult for blacks to 
succeed (Disagree) 
 
1986, 2008 5% 1% -4% 
Equal rights amendment 
(Oppose) 
 
1976, 1980 0% 3% 3% 
Guaranteed Jobs 1956, 2002 4% 7% 3% 
Women should have an 
equal role in society 
(Disagree) 
 
1972, 2008 3% 0% -3% 
We have gone too far 
pushing equal rights 
(Agree) 
 
1984, 2008 3% 5% 2% 
Big problem that not 
everyone has an equal 
chance (Agree) 
 
1984, 2008 6% 8% 2% 
Federal Spending--
Assistance to blacks 
(Oppose) 
 
1984, 2002 2% 4% 2% 
Segregation (Support) 1964, 1978 3% 1% -2% 
 
 
154 
 
  Table A-1, cont. 
 
  
US fewer problems if 
everyone treated equally 
(Disagree) 
 
1984, 2008 3% 4% 1% 
Government ensuring 
fairness in workplace and 
housing for blacks 
(Oppose) 
1956, 1960 6% 5% -1% 
Blacks should not get 
special favors (Agree) 
 
1986, 2008 3% 2% -1% 
Blacks gotten less than 
they deserve over the past 
few years (Disagree) 
 
1986, 2008 1% 2% 1% 
Open housing for blacks 
(Oppose) 
1964, 1976 2% 2% 0% 
Aid to minorities 
(Oppose) 
1970, 2008 5% 5% 0% 
Increasing immigration 
(Oppose) 
1992, 2008 1% 1% 0% 
Society ensuring everyone 
an equal opportunity to 
succeed (Oppose) 
1984, 2008 2% 2% 0% 
Not big problem if some 
have more chance in life 
(Agree) 
1984, 2008 8% 8% 0% 
Guaranteeing equal 
opportunity not 
government's job (Agree) 
1986, 1988 2% 2% 0% 
Bussing to integrate 
schools (Oppose) 
 
1972, 1984 1% 1% 0% 
Social Issues     
Government Assistance 
with Medical Care 
(Oppose) 
 
1964, 2008 0% 7% 7% 
Increasing spending on 
food Stamps (Oppose) 
 
1984, 2000 7% 3% -4% 
Increasing spending on 
homeless (Oppose) 
 
1988, 1996 3% 7% 4% 
Increasing spending on 
child care (Oppose) 
 
1988, 2008 5% 2% -3% 
Government Assistance 
with Medical Care 
(Oppose) 
 
1956, 1964 0% 3% 3% 
Government 
services/spending 
(Oppose) 
1982, 2008 15% 12% -3% 
Increasing spending on 
welfare (Oppose) 
 
1992, 2008 8% 6% -2% 
Increasing spending on 
financial aid for college 
students (Oppose) 
1986, 1996 3% 5% 2% 
     
Increasing spending on 
public schools (Oppose) 
 
1984, 2008 4% 2% -2% 
Increasing spending on 
the poor (Oppose) 
1992, 2008 4% 3% -1% 
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  Table A-1, cont.   
Increasing spending on 
crime (Oppose) 
1984, 2008 2% 2% 0% 
Increasing spending on 
AIDS (Oppose) 
1988, 2002 1% 1% 0% 
Increasing spending on 
Social Security (Oppose) 
1984, 2008 2% 2% 0% 
     
Defense/Foreign 
Policy 
    
Concerned about chances 
of nuclear war (Not at all) 
 
1984, 2002 10% 27% 17% 
US do the right thing 
getting involved in Korea, 
Vietnam, or Iraq (Agree) 
1952, 2008 15% 5% -10% 
Hawk/Dove (Hawk) 1968, 1972 19% 9% -10% 
Increasing defense 
spending (Favor) 
 
1980, 2008 5% 14% 9% 
Position of the U.S. 
weaker/stronger 
(Stronger) 
 
1958, 2008 8% 3% -5% 
Concerned about chances 
of conventional war (Not 
at all) 
 
1956, 2002 9% 13% 4% 
US involvement in war/in 
bigger war (Not likely) 
 
1966, 1972 5% 8% 3% 
How Should US proceed 
in Current War (Escalate) 
 
1952, 1970 12% 14% 2% 
Federal spending on 
foreign aid (Oppose) 
 
1990, 2008 5% 3% -2% 
Better off if U.S. 
Unconcerned with Rest of 
World (Agree) 
 
1956, 2008 3% 5% 2% 
Cutting Military Spending 
(Oppose) 
1970, 1972 0% 1% 1% 
Cooperation with USSR 
(Oppose) 
1980, 1988 2% 2% 1% 
U.S. should be willing to 
use military force (Agree) 
1992, 1998 1% 2% 0% 
     
Government      
Environmental regulation 
(Oppose)  
 
1996, 2000 18% 12% -6% 
Term Limits (Oppose) 1992, 1998 3% 8% 5% 
Government is too strong 
(Agree) 
 
1964, 2000 5% 1% -4% 
Federal spending on 
improve/protect 
environment (Oppose) 
 
1984, 2008 0% 4% 3% 
Federal spending on 
space/science/technology 
(Oppose) 
 
1984, 2008 4% 0% -3% 
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  Table A-1, cont.   
Are things in U.S. going 
well or not 
1984, 1988 3% 5% 2% 
 
 
Moral Issues 
    
Should adjust view of 
moral behavior to changes 
(Disagree) 
 
1986, 2008 0% 9% 9% 
New lifestyles contribute 
to society breakdown 
(Agree) 
 
1986, 2008 8% 0% -8% 
Should be more emphasis 
on traditional values 
(Agree) 
 
1986, 2008 0% 3% 3% 
School prayer be allowed-
Wording II (Favor) 
1986, 1998 2% 5% 3% 
School prayer be allowed-
Wording I (Favor) 
 
1964, 1984 6% 7% 1% 
Tolerance of different 
moral standards (Oppose) 
1986, 2008 0% 1% 1% 
When should abortion be 
allowed--Wording I 
(Never) 
1972, 1980 1% 1% 0% 
When should abortion be 
allowed--Wording II 
(Never) 
1980, 2008 1% 1% 0% 
Economy     
Government's handling of 
the economy  (Poor job) 
1972, 1976 3% 1% -3% 
Effects of economic 
policies of federal 
government (Improved 
Economy) 
1984, 1996 2% 4% 2% 
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Appendix B:  Variables and Coding  
 
Appendix B-1: Predictive Validity of Gender Role Socialization 
 
Figure B-1 
Agreement with the statement ―A working mother can establish just as warm and secure a 
relationship with her children as a mother who does not work.‖ 
(Agreement = 1; Disagreement = 0) 
 
R²  = 0.07   N = 917 
    
Gender Role Socialization   -1.394*** 
Income   0.012*** 
Marital Status   -0.541*** 
Education    -0.050 
Children Under 18   0.225 
Gender   -0.222 
    
Significance Codes:  ^ p < .01, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005    
  
Figure B-2 
Identification of Occupational Status as ―homemaker‖ among women71 
(Homemaker = 1; Not Homemaker = 0) 
 
R²  = 0.14   N = 1006 
    
Gender Role Socialization   .424^ 
Income   -0.010* 
Marital Status   1.584*** 
Education    -0.440*** 
Children Under 18   1.079*** 
    
Significance Codes:  ^ p < .01, * p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .005    
  
 
Appendix B-2: Variables and Coding 
 
Demographic Variables 
 
The demographic variables included in the logit models used to estimate information 
effects include democrat and republican.  These party identification variables are dichotomous, 
coded as 1 if the respondent identifies with or leans toward either the Democratic or Republican 
Party, and 0 otherwise, and created from a general party identification question asked of 
respondents.  Independents are the reference category for the party identification measures.   
                                                 
71
 I omit men from this analysis due to insufficient variation in the dependent variable among men.  Only one man in 
the entire sample identified his occupation as homemaker.   
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 Sex is a dichotomous variable coded 1 for men and 0 for women.   Age is a continuous 
variable.  Education is transformed into categorical variable that ranges from 1 to 5.  
Respondents who did not finish high school are coded as 1, those who have a high school 
diploma or the equivalent are coded as 2, those who have some college or vocational training but 
no college degree are coded as 3, those who have either a two- or four-year college degree are 
coded as 4, and those who attended or completed graduate or professional school are coded as 5.   
Income is coded as a percentile.  Union membership is a dichotomous variable coded as 1 if the 
respondent or any member of their household is in a labor union and 0 otherwise.  Homeowner is 
coded as 0 if the respondent owns their home, 0 if they do not.  The variable parent is a 
continuous measure of the number of children under 18 living in the household of the 
respondent, while married is coded as 1 if the respondent identifies their marital status as 
married and 0 if they do not.  Respondent’s classification of their race is used to create a variable 
to identify African-Americans.  Black is again a dichotomous measure, coded as 1 if a 
respondent is African-American and 0 if they are of any other race.   
Variables are also created to identify Protestant or Catholic respondents from respondent 
classification of their religious beliefs.  Protestant is coded as 1 if a respondent identifies as 
protestant and 0 if they do not.  Catholic is coded as 1 if a respondent identifies as catholic, and 0 
if they do not.  Other is coded as 1 for respondents who identify with any other organized 
religion and 0 otherwise.  Respondents who identify as atheist, agnostic, or non-denominational 
serve as the reference category for these religious variables.   
 Finally, dummy variables are also included for a respondent’s location.  These include 
east, Midwest, and south, with respondents living in western states serving as the reference 
category.   
 The 2000 and 2004 NAES include additional control variables tapping a respondent's 
type of employment and urban/rural location.  Classification of respondents’ type of employment 
is used to create a series of dichotomous measures identifying retired, homemaker, executive, 
clerical, and technical. The variables retired and homemaker are coded as 1 if respondents give 
their employment status as retired or homemaker and 0 for all others.  Executive and clerical are 
coded as 1 if a respondent identifies their occupation with either category and 0 otherwise.  
Technical is coded as 1 if a respondent identified themselves as skilled tradesperson or service 
worker, both requiring technical training or certification, and 0 otherwise.  Dichotomous 
variables are also created classifying respondents as urban or rural, with suburban respondents 
acting as a reference category.  
 
Appendix B-3: Stata Code for Dependent Variables 2008 NES 
 
****Resource-Threat Index**** 
generate howmuchviolentcrimecit = . 
replace howmuchviolentcrimecit = V085214x  
replace howmuchviolentcrimecit = 1 if V085214x == 1 
replace howmuchviolentcrimecit = .66 if V085214x == 2 
replace howmuchviolentcrimecit = .33 if V085214x == 3 
replace howmuchviolentcrimecit = 0 if V085214x == 4 
replace howmuchviolentcrimecit = 0 if V085214x == 5 
replace howmuchviolentcrimecit = 0 if V085214x == 6 
replace howmuchviolentcrimecit = 0 if V085214x == 7 
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replace howmuchviolentcrimecit = . if V085214x == -8 
replace howmuchviolentcrimecit = . if V085214x == -9 
replace howmuchviolentcrimecit = 0 if howmuchviolentcrimecit == . 
 
generate howmuchchanceattack = . 
replace howmuchchanceattack = V085216x  
replace howmuchchanceattack = 1 if V085216x == 1 
replace howmuchchanceattack = .66 if V085216x == 2 
replace howmuchchanceattack = .33 if V085216x == 3 
replace howmuchchanceattack = 0 if V085216x == 4 
replace howmuchchanceattack = 0 if V085216x == 5 
replace howmuchchanceattack = 0 if V085216x == 6 
replace howmuchchanceattack = 0 if V085216x == 7 
replace howmuchchanceattack = . if V085216x == -8 
replace howmuchchanceattack = . if V085216x == -9 
 
*************likelihood of************** 
generate liksuicidebomber = . 
replace liksuicidebomber = V085231a  
replace liksuicidebomber = 1 if V085231a == 1 
replace liksuicidebomber = .75 if V085231a == 2 
replace liksuicidebomber = .50 if V085231a == 3 
replace liksuicidebomber = .25 if V085231a == 4 
replace liksuicidebomber = 0 if V085231a == 5 
replace liksuicidebomber = . if V085231a == -8 
replace liksuicidebomber = . if V085231a == -9 
 
generate liknonsuicidebomber = . 
replace liknonsuicidebomber = V085231b  
replace liknonsuicidebomber = 1 if V085231b == 1 
replace liknonsuicidebomber = .75 if V085231b == 2 
replace liknonsuicidebomber = .50 if V085231b == 3 
replace liknonsuicidebomber = .25 if V085231b == 4 
replace liknonsuicidebomber = 0 if V085231b == 5 
replace liknonsuicidebomber = . if V085231b == -8 
replace liknonsuicidebomber = . if V085231b == -9 
 
generate likradioactivemat = . 
replace likradioactivemat = V085231c  
replace likradioactivemat = 1 if V085231c == 1 
replace likradioactivemat = .75 if V085231c == 2 
replace likradioactivemat = .50 if V085231c == 3 
replace likradioactivemat = .25 if V085231c == 4 
replace likradioactivemat = 0 if V085231c == 5 
replace likradioactivemat = . if V085231c == -8 
replace likradioactivemat = . if V085231c == -9 
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generate liknuclearbomb = . 
replace liknuclearbomb = V085231d  
replace liknuclearbomb = 1 if V085231d == 1 
replace liknuclearbomb = .75 if V085231d == 2 
replace liknuclearbomb = .50 if V085231d == 3 
replace liknuclearbomb = .25 if V085231d == 4 
replace liknuclearbomb = 0 if V085231d == 5 
replace liknuclearbomb = . if V085231d == -8 
replace liknuclearbomb = . if V085231d == -9 
 
generate liksniper = . 
replace liksniper = V085231e  
replace liksniper = 1 if V085231e == 1 
replace liksniper = .75 if V085231e == 2 
replace liksniper = .50 if V085231e == 3 
replace liksniper = .25 if V085231e == 4 
replace liksniper = 0 if V085231e == 5 
replace liksniper = . if V085231e == -8 
replace liksniper = . if V085231e == -9 
 
generate likbiologicalweapon = . 
replace likbiologicalweapon = V085231f  
replace likbiologicalweapon = 1 if V085231f == 1 
replace likbiologicalweapon = .75 if V085231f == 2 
replace likbiologicalweapon = .50 if V085231f == 3 
replace likbiologicalweapon = .25 if V085231f == 4 
replace likbiologicalweapon = 0 if V085231f == 5 
replace likbiologicalweapon = . if V085231f == -8 
replace likbiologicalweapon = . if V085231f == -9 
 
generate likchemattack = . 
replace likchemattack = V085231g  
replace likchemattack = 1 if V085231g == 1 
replace likchemattack = .75 if V085231g == 2 
replace likchemattack = .50 if V085231g == 3 
replace likchemattack = .25 if V085231g == 4 
replace likchemattack = 0 if V085231g == 5 
replace likchemattack = . if V085231g == -8 
replace likchemattack = . if V085231g == -9 
 
generate likother = . 
replace likother = V085231h  
replace likother = 1 if V085231h == 1 
replace likother = .75 if V085231h == 2 
replace likother = .50 if V085231h == 3 
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replace likother = .25 if V085231h == 4 
replace likother = 0 if V085231h == 5 
replace likother = . if V085231h == -8 
replace likother = . if V085231h == -9 
 
generate inc = . 
replace inc = 0 if income <=25.90  
replace inc = 1 if income > 25.90 & income <= 51.19  
replace inc = 2 if income > 51.19 & income <=77.56 
replace inc = 3 if income > 77.56 & income <= 100.00  
drop if inc == . 
 
generate threat2 = 
howmuchviolentcrimecit+howmuchchanceattack+liksuicidebomber+liknonsuicidebomber+likra
dioactivemat+liknuclearbomb+liksniper+likbiologicalweapon+likchemattack+likother 
drop if threat2 == . 
 
generate threat1 = . 
replace threat1 = 0 if threat2 <= 2 
replace threat1 = 1 if threat2 > 2 & threat2 <= 3.16 
replace threat1 = 2 if threat2 > 3.16 & threat2 <= 4.5 
replace threat1 = 3 if threat2 > 4.5 & threat2 <= 10 
drop if threat1 == . 
 
generate threat3 = inc+threat1 
 
generate threat = . 
replace threat = 0 if threat3 <= 2 
replace threat = 1 if threat3 > 2 & threat3 <= 3 
replace threat = 2 if threat3 > 3 
 
****Socialization**** 
generate workingmom = . 
replace workingmom = V085155 
replace workingmom = 1 if V085155 == 1 
replace workingmom = .50 if V085155 == 3 
replace workingmom = 0 if V085155 == 5 
replace workingmom = . if V085155 == -8 
replace workingmom = . if V085155 == -9 
 
generate genderroles = . 
replace genderroles = V085156  
replace genderroles = 1 if V085156 == 1 
replace genderroles = .5 if V085156 == 3 
replace genderroles = 0 if V085156 == 5 
replace genderroles = . if V085156 == -8 
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replace genderroles = . if V085156 == -9 
 
generate socialization=genderroles 
drop if genderroles == . 
 
****Feminist Consciousness**** 
generate specialfavors = . 
replace specialfavors = V085136  
replace specialfavors = 1 if V085136 == 1 
replace specialfavors = .75 if V085136 == 2 
replace specialfavors = .5 if V085136 == 3 
replace specialfavors = .25 if V085136 == 4 
replace specialfavors = 0 if V085136 == 5 
replace specialfavors = . if V085136 == -8 
replace specialfavors = . if V085136 == -9 
 
generate harassment = . 
replace harassment = V085138 
replace harassment = 0 if V085138 == 1 
replace harassment = .25 if V085138 == 2 
replace harassment = .5 if V085138 == 3 
replace harassment = .75 if V085138 == 4 
replace harassment = 1 if V085138 == 5 
replace harassment = . if V085138 == -8 
replace harassment = . if V085138 == -9 
 
generate discrimination = . 
replace discrimination = V085137  
replace discrimination = 1 if V085137 == 1 
replace discrimination = .75 if V085137 == 2 
replace discrimination = .5 if V085137 == 3 
replace discrimination = .25 if V085137 == 4 
replace discrimination = 0 if V085137 == 5 
replace discrimination = . if V085137 == -8 
replace discrimination = . if V085137 == -9 
 
generate equalopp = . 
replace equalopp = V085162 
replace equalopp = 1 if V085162 == 1 
replace equalopp = .75 if V085162 == 2 
replace equalopp = .5 if V085162 == 3 
replace equalopp = .25 if V085162 == 4 
replace equalopp = 0 if V085162 == 5 
replace equalopp = . if V085162 == -8 
replace equalopp = . if V085162 == -9 
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generate equalrights = . 
replace equalrights = V085163  
replace equalrights = 1 if V085163 == 5 
replace equalrights = .75 if V085163 == 4 
replace equalrights = .5 if V085163 == 3 
replace equalrights = .25 if V085163 == 2 
replace equalrights = 0 if V085163 == 1 
replace equalrights = . if V085163 == -8 
replace equalrights = . if V085163 == -9 
 
generate probequalchance = . 
replace probequalchance = V085164  
replace probequalchance = 1 if V085164 == 1 
replace probequalchance = .75 if V085164 == 2 
replace probequalchance = .5 if V085164 == 3 
replace probequalchance = .25 if V085164 == 4 
replace probequalchance = 0 if V085164 == 5 
replace probequalchance = . if V085164 == -8 
replace probequalchance = . if V085164 == -9 
 
generate betteroffequality = . 
replace betteroffequality = V085165  
replace betteroffequality = 1 if V085165 == 5 
replace betteroffequality = .75 if V085165 == 4 
replace betteroffequality = .5 if V085165 == 3 
replace betteroffequality = .25 if V085165 == 2 
replace betteroffequality = 0 if V085165 == 1 
replace betteroffequality = . if V085165 == -8 
replace betteroffequality = . if V085165 == -9 
 
generate probmorechances = . 
replace probmorechances = V085166  
replace probmorechances = 1 if V085166 == 5 
replace probmorechances = .75 if V085166 == 4 
replace probmorechances = .5 if V085166 == 3 
replace probmorechances = .25 if V085166 == 2 
replace probmorechances = 0 if V085166 == 1 
replace probmorechances = . if V085166 == -8 
replace probmorechances = . if V085166 == -9 
 
generate probfairtreatment = . 
replace probfairtreatment = V085167 
replace probfairtreatment = 1 if V085167 == 1 
replace probfairtreatment = .75 if V085167 == 2 
replace probfairtreatment = .5 if V085167 == 3 
replace probfairtreatment = .25 if V085167 == 4 
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replace probfairtreatment = 0 if V085167 == 5 
replace probfairtreatment = . if V085167 == -8 
replace probfairtreatment = . if V085167 == -9 
 
generate feminists = . 
replace feminists = V085064d/10 
replace feminists = . if V085064d == -6 
replace feminists = . if V085064d == -8 
replace feminists = . if V085064d == -9 
replace feminists = 0 if feminists <= 4.5  
replace feminists = .25 if feminists > 4.5 & feminists <= 5 
replace feminists = .5 if feminists > 5 & feminists <= 7 
replace feminists = 1 if feminists > 7 
 
generate feminism1 = 
specialfavors+harassment+discrimination+equalopp+equalrights+probequalchance+betteroffequ
ality+probmorechances+probfairtreatment+feminists 
 
generate feminism = . 
replace feminism = 0 if feminism1 <= 5.25 
replace feminism = 1 if feminism1 > 5.25 & feminism1 <= 6.25 
replace feminism = 2 if feminism1 > 6.25 
drop if feminism ==. 
 
****Knowledge**** 
generate interviewer = . 
replace interviewer = 0 if V083303 == 5 
replace interviewer = .25 if V083303 == 4 
replace interviewer = .50 if V083303 == 3 
replace interviewer = .75 if V083303 == 2 
replace interviewer = 1 if V083303 == 1 
replace interviewer = . if V083303 == -4 
 
generate interviewer2 = . 
replace interviewer2 = 0 if V083303 == 5 
replace interviewer2 = 1 if V083303 == 4 
replace interviewer2 = 2 if V083303 == 3 
replace interviewer2 = 3 if V083303 == 2 
replace interviewer2 = 4 if V083303 == 1 
replace interviewer2 = . if V083303 == -4 
 
generate partyinhouse = . 
replace partyinhouse = V085066  
replace partyinhouse = . if V085066 == -8 
replace partyinhouse = . if V085066 == -9 
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generate know1 = . 
replace know1 = 1 if partyinhouse == 1 
replace know1 = 0 if partyinhouse ~= 1 
replace know1 = 0 if partyinhouse == . 
 
generate partyinsenate = . 
replace partyinsenate = V085067  
replace partyinsenate = . if V085067 == -8 
replace partyinsenate = . if V085067 == -9 
 
generate know2 = . 
replace know2 = 1 if partyinsenate == 1 
replace know2 = 0 if partyinsenate ~= 1 
replace know2 = 0 if partyinsenate == . 
 
generate partymorecons = . 
replace partymorecons = V085119a 
replace partymorecons = . if V085119a == -1 
replace partymorecons = . if V085119a == -8 
replace partymorecons = . if V085119a == -9 
 
generate know3 = . 
replace know3 = 1 if partymorecons == 5 
replace know3 = 0 if partymorecons ~= 5 
replace know3 = 0 if V085119 ~= 1 
replace know3 = 0 if know3 == . 
 
generate posdem = . 
replace posdem = V083071a 
replace posdem = . if V083071a == -8 
replace posdem = . if V083071a == -9 
 
generate posrep = . 
replace posrep = V083071b 
replace posrep = . if V083071b == -8 
replace posrep = . if V083071b == -9 
 
gen partypos = . 
replace partypos = 1 if posdem < posrep 
replace partypos = 0 if partypos == . 
 
generate know4 = . 
replace know4 = 1 if partypos == 1 
replace know4 = 0 if partypos == 0 
replace know4 = 0 if know4 == . 
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generate posmccain = . 
replace posmccain = V083070b 
replace posmccain = . if V083070b == -8 
replace posmccain = . if V083070b == -9 
 
generate posobama = . 
replace posobama = V083070a 
replace posobama = . if V083070a == -8 
replace posobama = . if V083070a == -9 
 
gen partypospres = . 
replace partypospres = 1 if posobama < posmccain 
replace partypospres = 0 if partypospres == . 
 
generate know5 = . 
replace know5 = 1 if partypospres == 1 
replace know5 = 0 if partypospres == 0 
replace know5 = 0 if know5 == . 
 
generate unemployment = . 
replace unemployment = 0 if V083087x == 1 
replace unemployment = 0 if V083087x == 2 
replace unemployment = 1 if V083087x == 4 
replace unemployment = 1 if V083087x == 5 
replace unemployment = 0 if V083087x == -8 
replace unemployment = 0 if V083087x == -9 
 
generate know6 = . 
replace know6 = 1 if unemployment == 1 
replace know6 = 0 if unemployment == 0 
replace know6 = 0 if know6 == . 
 
generate inflation = . 
replace inflation = 0 if V083089x == 1 
replace inflation = 0 if V083089x == 2 
replace inflation = 0 if V083089x == 5 
replace inflation = 1 if V083089x == 4 
replace inflation = 1 if V083089x == 3 
replace inflation = 0 if V083089x == -8 
replace inflation = 0 if V083089x == -9 
 
generate know7 = . 
replace know7 = 1 if inflation == 1 
replace know7 = 0 if inflation == 0 
replace know7 = 0 if inflation == . 
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generate incomegap = . 
replace incomegap = V085080x 
replace incomegap = 0 if V085080x == -8 
replace incomegap = 0 if V085080x == -9 
replace incomegap = 1 if V085080x == 1 
replace incomegap = 1 if V085080x == 2 
replace incomegap = 0 if V085080x == 3 
replace incomegap = 0 if V085080x == 4 
replace incomegap = 0 if V085080x == 5 
 
generate know8 = . 
replace know8 = 1 if incomegap == 1 
replace know8 = 0 if incomegap == 0 
replace know8 = 0 if incomegap == . 
 
generate defspendtodem = . 
replace defspendtodem = V083117x 
replace defspendtodem = . if V083117x == -1 
replace defspendtodem = . if V083117x == -8 
replace defspendtodem = . if V083117x == -9 
 
generate defspendtorep = . 
replace defspendtorep = V083118x 
replace defspendtorep = . if V083118x == -1 
replace defspendtorep = . if V083118x == -8 
replace defspendtorep = . if V083118x == -9 
 
gen partyposdefspend = . 
replace partyposdefspend = 1 if defspendtodem > defspendtorep 
replace partyposdefspend = 0 if partyposdefspend == . 
 
generate know9 = . 
replace know9 = 1 if partyposdefspend == 1 
replace know9 = 0 if partyposdefspend == 0 
replace know9 = 0 if partyposdefspend == . 
 
generate healthinstodem = . 
replace healthinstodem = V083126x 
replace healthinstodem = . if V083126x == -1 
replace healthinstodem = . if V083126x == -8 
replace healthinstodem = . if V083126x == -9 
 
generate healthinstorep = . 
replace healthinstorep = V083127x 
replace healthinstorep = . if V083127x == -1 
replace healthinstorep = . if V083127x == -8 
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replace healthinstorep = . if V083127x == -9 
 
gen partyposhealthins = . 
replace partyposhealthins = 1 if healthinstodem < healthinstorep 
replace partyposhealthins = 0 if partyposhealthins == . 
 
generate know10 = . 
replace know10 = 1 if partyposhealthins == 1 
replace know10 = 0 if partyposhealthins == 0 
replace know10 = 0 if partyposhealthins == . 
 
generate knowledge = . 
replace knowledge = 
know1+know2+know3+know4+know5+know6+know7+know8+know9+know10+interviewer+ 
pelosi+cheney+brown+roberts 
 
****Demographics**** 
generate gender = . 
replace gender = V081101  
replace gender = 1 if V081101 == 1 
**female**  
replace gender = 0 if V081101 == 2  
drop if gender == . 
 
****race***** 
rename V081102 race  
generate white = . 
replace white = 1 if race == 1  
replace white = 0 if race > 1 
replace white = 0 if white == . 
 
generate black = . 
replace black = 1 if race == 2 
replace black = 0 if race == 1 
replace black = 0 if race > 2 
replace black = 0 if black == . 
 
generate otherrace = . 
replace otherrace = 1 if race > 2 
replace otherrace = 0 if race == 1 
replace otherrace = 0 if race == 2 
replace otherrace = 0 if otherrace == . 
 
generate latino = . 
replace latino = 1 if V081103 == 1 
replace latino = 0 if V081103 ~= 1 
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replace latino = . if V081103 == -4 
replace latino = . if V081103 == -9 
replace latino = 0 if latino == . 
 
generate age = V083215x 
drop if age == . 
 
generate marital = . 
replace marital = 1 if V083216x == 1 
replace marital = 0 if V083216x > 1 
replace marital = . if V083216x == -8 
replace marital = . if V083216x == -9 
replace marital = 0 if marital == . 
 
generate education = . 
replace education = 1 if V083218x <= 2 
replace education = 2 if V083218x == 3 
replace education = 3 if V083218x == 4 
replace education = 3 if V083218x == 5 
replace education = 4 if V083218x == 6 
replace education = 5 if V083218x == 7 
replace education = 3 if V083218x == -8 
replace education = 3 if V083218x == -9 
replace education = 0 if education == . 
 
generate children18 = . 
replace children18 = 1 if V081109 > 0 
replace children18 = 0 if V081109 == 0 
replace children18 = . if V081109 == -4 
replace children18 = . if V081109 == -9 
replace children18 = 0 if children18 == . 
 
generate children17 = .  
replace children17 = 1 if V081109a > 0 
replace children17 = 0 if V081109a == 0 
replace children17 = . if V081109a == -4 
replace children17 = . if V081109a == -9 
replace children17 = 0 if children17 == . 
 
generate children10 = . 
replace children10 = 1 if V083265a > 0 
replace children10 = 1 if V083265a == -8 
replace children10 = 1 if V083265a == -9 
replace children10 = 0 if children10 == . 
 
generate children1117 = . 
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replace children1117 = 1 if V083265b > 0 
replace children1117 = 1 if V083265b == -8 
replace children1117 = 1 if V083265b == -9 
replace children1117 = 0 if children1117 == . 
 
generate retired = . 
replace retired = 1 if V083222 == 5 
replace retired = 0 if V083222 ~= 5  
replace retired = 0 if retired == . 
 
generate homemaker = . 
replace homemaker = 1 if V083222 == 7 
replace homemaker = 0 if V083222 ~= 7 
replace homemaker = 0 if homemaker == . 
 
generate union = . 
replace union = 1 if V083246 == 1 
replace union = 0 if V083246 == 5 
replace union = . if V083246 == -8 
replace union = . if V083246 == -9 
replace union = 0 if V083246 == . 
 
generate income = V083248x 
replace income = . if V083248x == -8 
replace income = . if V083248x == -9 
replace income = 3.41 if V083248x == 1 
replace income = 5.05 if V083248x == 2 
replace income = 7.99 if V083248x == 3  
replace income = 11.50 if V083248x == 4   
replace income = 13.46 if V083248x == 5  
replace income = 15.71 if V083248x == 6   
replace income = 19.82 if V083248x == 7 
replace income = 22.53 if V083248x == 8 
replace income = 25.90 if V083248x == 9 
replace income = 29.41 if V083248x == 10 
replace income = 33.38 if V083248x == 11 
replace income = 39.18 if V083248x == 12 
replace income = 45.44 if V083248x == 13 
replace income = 51.19 if V083248x == 14 
replace income = 56.43 if V083248x == 15 
replace income = 60.54 if V083248x == 16 
replace income = 68.86 if V083248x == 17 
replace income = 77.56 if V083248x == 18 
replace income = 84.01 if V083248x == 19 
replace income = 87.05 if V083248x == 20 
replace income = 89.95 if V083248x == 21 
171 
 
replace income = 92.19 if V083248x == 22 
replace income = 93.88 if V083248x == 23 
replace income = 95.51 if V083248x == 24 
replace income = 100.00 if V083248x == 25 
drop if income == . 
 
generate ownhome = . 
replace ownhome = 1 if V083281 == 1 
replace ownhome = 0 if V083281 > 1 
replace ownhome = . if V083281 == -8 
replace ownhome = . if V083281 == -9 
replace ownhome = 0 if ownhome == . 
 
generate party = V083098x 
replace party = . if V083098x == -1 
 
generate dem = . 
replace dem = 1 if V083098x == 0 
replace dem = 1 if V083098x == 1 
replace dem = 0 if V083098x == 2 
replace dem = 0 if V083098x == 4 
replace dem = 0 if V083098x == 5 
replace dem = 0 if V083098x == 6 
replace dem = . if V083098x == -1 
replace dem = 0 if dem == . 
 
generate ind = 1 if V083098x == 3 
replace ind = 0 if ind == . 
 
generate rep = . 
replace rep = 0 if V083098x == 4 
replace rep = 1 if V083098x == 5 
replace rep = 1 if V083098x == 6 
replace rep = 0 if V083098x == 0 
replace rep = 0 if V083098x == 1 
replace rep = 0 if V083098x == 2 
replace rep = . if V083098x == -1 
replace rep = 0 if V083098x == . 
replace rep = 0 if rep == . 
 
generate catholic = . 
replace catholic = 1 if V083185b == 2 
replace catholic = 0 if V083185b == 0 
replace catholic = 0 if V083185b == 1 
replace catholic = 0 if V083185b == 3 
replace catholic = 0 if V083185b == 4 
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replace catholic = 0 if V083185b == 8 
replace catholic = . if V083185b == -4 
replace catholic = . if V083185b == -8 
replace catholic = . if V083185b == -9 
replace catholic = . if V083185b == -1 
replace catholic = 0 if catholic == . 
 
generate protestant = . 
replace protestant = 1 if V083185b == 1 
replace protestant = 0 if V083185b == 0 
replace protestant = 0 if V083185b == 2 
replace protestant = 0 if V083185b == 3 
replace protestant = 0 if V083185b == 4 
replace protestant = 0 if V083185b == 8 
replace protestant = . if V083185b == -4 
replace protestant = . if V083185b == -8 
replace protestant = . if V083185b == -9 
replace protestant = . if V083185b == -1 
replace protestant = 0 if protestant == . 
 
*********other reference category******* 
 
generate northeast = . 
replace northeast = 1 if V081204 == 1 
replace northeast = 0 if V081204 == 3 
replace northeast = 0 if V081204 == 4 
replace northeast = 0 if V081204 == 2 
replace northeast = 0 if northeast == . 
 
generate south = . 
replace south = 1 if V081204 == 3 
replace south = 0 if V081204 == 1 
replace south = 0 if V081204 == 4 
replace south = 0 if V081204 == 2 
replace south = 0 if south == . 
 
generate west = . 
replace west = 1 if V081204 == 4 
replace west = 0 if V081204 == 1 
replace west = 0 if V081204 == 3 
replace west = 0 if V081204 == 2 
replace west = 0 if west == . 
****North Central reference category***** 
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Appendix B-4: Stata Code for Dependent Variables 2004 NAES 
****Feminist Consciousness**** 
gen fem = . 
replace fem = 0 if cae05 == 0 
replace fem = 1 if cae05 == 1 
replace fem = 2 if cae05 == 2 
replace fem = 3 if cae05 == 3 
replace fem = 4 if cae05 == 4 
replace fem = 5 if cae05 == 5 
replace fem = 6 if cae05 == 6 
replace fem = 7 if cae05 == 7 
replace fem = 8 if cae05 == 8 
replace fem = 9 if cae05 == 9 
replace fem = 10 if cae05 == 10 
replace fem = 0 if cae05 == 11 
replace fem = 0 if cae05 == 12 
replace fem = 0 if cae05 == 999 
 
****Knowledge**** 
gen interview = . 
replace interview = 1 if cya06==1 
replace interview = 0.75 if cya06==2 
replace interview = 0.50 if cya06==3 
replace interview = 0.25 if cya06==4 
replace interview = 0 if cya06==5 
replace interview = 0 if interview == . 
 
generate knowledge = interview  
 
****Resource-Threat Index**** 
gen threat1 = . 
replace threat1 = 0 if ccd60 <= 4 
replace threat1 = 1 if ccd60 == 5 
replace threat1 = 2 if ccd60 >= 6 
drop if threat1 == . 
 
generate inc = . 
replace inc = 0 if income <= 32.76 
replace inc = 1 if income > 32.76 & income <= 69.18 
replace inc = 2 if income > 69.18 
drop if inc == . 
 
generate threat = inc + threat1 
 
****Demographics**** 
gen gender = . 
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replace gender = 1 if cwa01 == 1 
replace gender = 0 if cwa01 == 2 
 
gen income = . 
replace income = 1.26 if cwa04 ==1 
replace income = 2.52 if cwa04 == 2 
replace income = 29.83 if cwa04 == 3 
replace income = 32.76 if cwa04 == 4 
replace income = 36.85 if cwa04 == 5 
replace income = 53.86 if cwa04 == 6 
replace income = 69.18 if cwa04 == 7 
replace income = 71.27 if cwa04 == 8 
replace income = 97.46 if cwa04 == 9 
 
generate age = cwa02 
replace age = . if  cwa02==998 
replace age = . if  cwa02==999 
 
gen black = 1 if cwc03==2 
replace black = 0 if black == . 
 
gen protestant = . 
replace protestant = 1 if  cwd03 == 1 
replace protestant = 0 if protestant ==. 
 
gen catholic = . 
replace catholic = 1 if cwd03 ==2 
replace catholic = 0 if catholic ==. 
 
generate other = . 
replace other = 1 if cwd03 ==3 
replace other = 1 if cwd03 ==4 
replace other = 1 if cwd03 ==5 
replace other = 1 if cwd03 ==6 
replace other = 1 if cwd03 ==7 
replace other = 0 if other ==. 
 
gen parent = cwf03 
replace parent = 1 if cwf03>0 
 
gen urban = . 
replace urban = 1 if  cwf13 ==1 
replace urban = 0 if urban ==. 
 
gen rural = . 
replace rural = 1 if  cwf13 ==3 
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replace rural = 0 if rural ==. 
 
gen labor = . 
replace labor = 1 if  cwb06 ==1 
replace labor = 1 if  cwb06 ==2 
replace labor = 1 if  cwb06 ==3 
replace labor = 0 if labor ==. 
 
gen retired = 1 if cwb01==4  
replace retired = 0 if retired == . 
 
gen homemaker = 1 if cwb01==6 
replace homemaker = 0 if homemaker == . 
 
gen executive = 1 if cwb02 ==1 
replace executive = 0 if executive == . 
 
gen clerical = 1 if cwb02 ==3 
replace clerical = 0 if clerical == . 
 
gen technical = . 
replace technical = 1 if cwb02 == 2 
replace technical = 1 if cwb02 == 4 
replace technical = 0 if technical == . 
 
gen east = . 
replace east = 1 if cwf08 ==1 
replace east = 1 if cwf08==2 
replace east = 0 if east == . 
 
gen midwest = . 
replace midwest = 1 if cwf08 ==3 
replace midwest = 1 if cwf08 ==4 
replace midwest = 0 if midwest == . 
 
gen south = . 
replace south = 1 if cwf08 == 5 
replace south = 1 if cwf08 == 6 
replace south = 1 if cwf08 == 7 
replace south = 0 if south == . 
 
gen married = . 
replace married = 1 if cwf07 == 1 
replace married = 0 if married == . 
 
generate rep = . 
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replace rep = 1 if  cma01 == 1 
replace rep = 1 if cma03 == 1 
replace rep = 0 if rep ==. 
 
generate dem = . 
replace dem = 1 if cma01 == 2 
replace dem = 1 if cma03 == 2 
replace dem = 0 if dem ==. 
 
gen education = . 
replace education = 1 if cwa03 == 1 
replace education = 1 if cwa03 == 2 
replace education = 2 if cwa03 == 3 
replace education = 3 if cwa03 == 4 
replace education = 3 if cwa03 == 5 
replace education = 4 if cwa03 == 6 
replace education = 4 if cwa03 == 7 
replace education = 5 if cwa03 == 8 
replace education = 5 if cwa03 == 9 
 
 
Appendix B-5: Stata Code for Dependent Variables 2000 NAES 
 
****Feminist Consciousness**** 
gen fem = . 
replace fem = 0 if cc04 < 5 
replace fem = 1 if cc04 >= 5 & cc04 <= 14 
replace fem = 2 if cc04 >= 15 & cc04 <= 24 
replace fem = 3 if cc04 >= 25 & cc04 <= 34 
replace fem = 4 if cc04 >= 35 & cc04 <= 44 
replace fem = 5 if cc04 >= 45 & cc04 <= 54 
replace fem = 6 if cc04 >= 55 & cc04 <= 64 
replace fem = 7 if cc04 >= 65 & cc04 <= 74 
replace fem = 8 if cc04 >= 75 & cc04 <= 84 
replace fem = 9 if cc04 >= 85 & cc04 <= 94 
replace fem = 10 if cc04 >= 95  
replace fem = 0 if cc04 == 11 
replace fem = 0 if cc04 == 12 
replace fem = 0 if cc04 == 999 
****Knowledge**** 
 
gen interview = . 
 
replace interview = 1 if cy06==1 
replace interview = 0.75 if cy06==2 
replace interview = 0.50 if cy06==3 
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replace interview = 0.25 if cy06==4 
replace interview = 0 if cy06==5 
replace interview = 0 if interview == . 
 
generate knowledge = interview 
 
****Demographics**** 
gen gender = . 
replace gender = 1 if cw01 == 1 
replace gender = 0 if cw01 == 2 
 
gen income = . 
replace income = 5.50 if cw28 ==1 
replace income = 11.70 if cw28 == 2 
replace income = 23.68 if cw28 == 3 
replace income = 38.09 if cw28 == 4 
replace income = 57.32 if cw28 == 5 
replace income = 78.26 if cw28 == 6 
replace income = 88.97 if cw28 == 7 
replace income = 95.81 if cw28 == 8 
replace income = 100.00 if cw28 == 9 
 
generate age = cw02 
replace age = . if  cw02==998 
replace age = . if  cw02==999 
 
gen black = 1 if cw03==2 
replace black = 0 if black == . 
 
gen protestant = . 
replace protestant = 1 if  cw16 == 1 
replace protestant = 0 if protestant == . 
 
gen catholic = . 
replace catholic = 1 if cw16 == 2 
replace catholic = 0 if catholic ==. 
 
generate other = . 
replace other = 1 if cw16 ==3 
replace other = 1 if cw16 ==4 
replace other = 1 if cw16 ==5 
replace other = 1 if cw16 ==6 
replace other = 1 if cw16 ==7 
replace other = 0 if other ==. 
 
gen parent = cw27 
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replace parent = 1 if cw27>0 
replace parent = . if parent ==998 
replace parent = . if parent ==999 
 
gen urban = . 
replace urban = 1 if  cw24 ==1 
replace urban = 0 if urban ==. 
 
gen rural = . 
replace rural = 1 if  cw24 ==3 
replace rural = 0 if rural ==. 
 
gen labor = . 
replace labor = 1 if  cw29 ==1 
replace labor = 0 if  cw29 ==2 
replace labor = 0 if labor ==. 
 
gen retired = 1 if cw09 ==4  
replace retired = 0 if retired == . 
 
gen homemaker = 1 if cw09 ==6 
replace homemaker = 0 if homemaker == . 
 
gen executive = 1 if cw11 ==1 
replace executive = 0 if executive == . 
 
gen clerical = 1 if cw11 ==3 
replace clerical = 0 if clerical == . 
 
gen technical = . 
replace technical = 1 if cw11 == 2 
replace technical = 1 if cw11 == 5 
replace technical = 0 if technical == . 
 
gen east = . 
replace east = 1 if cw21 ==1 
replace east = 1 if cw21==2 
replace east = 0 if east == . 
 
gen midwest = . 
replace midwest = 1 if cw21 ==3 
replace midwest = 1 if cw21 ==4 
replace midwest = 0 if midwest == . 
 
gen south = . 
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replace south = 1 if cw21 == 5 
replace south = 1 if cw21 == 6 
replace south = 1 if cw21 == 7 
replace south = 0 if south == . 
 
gen married = . 
replace married = 1 if cw08 == 1 
replace married = 0 if married == . 
 
generate rep = . 
replace rep = 1 if  cv01 == 1 
replace rep = 1 if cv03 == 1 
replace rep = 0 if rep ==. 
 
generate dem = . 
replace dem = 1 if cv01 == 2 
replace dem = 1 if cv03 == 2 
replace dem = 0 if dem ==. 
 
gen education = . 
replace education = 1 if cw06 == 1 
replace education = 1 if cw06 == 2 
replace education = 2 if cw06 == 3 
replace education = 3 if cw06 == 4 
replace education = 3 if cw06 == 5 
replace education = 4 if cw06 == 6 
replace education = 4 if cw06 == 7 
replace education = 5 if cw06 == 8 
replace education = 5 if cw06 == 9 
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Appendix C:  Foreign Policy Figures 
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Figure C-1  
Gender Gap on Support for Bush's Handling of Iraq, for Democrats 
Men
Women
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Table C-1 
Gender Gap Reductions, 2000-2008 
 
 
Source: 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey, 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey, 2008 American National Election Study 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Issue Area Question Gender Gap Resource-Threat Socialization Feminst Consciousness Knowledge
Spending
2008 Spending on Border Security 4 6 5 10 0
2008 Cutting Military Spending 4 1 3 1 0
2004 Favor spending on Iraq and Afghanistan 10 4 11 4
2000 Militiary Spending 10 3 5
AVERAGE 7.0 3.7 4.0 6.3 2.3
Goals
2008 Strengthening UN 8 4 8 10 7
2008 Promoting Capitalism 6 4 5 7 1
2008 Preventing International Terrorism 6 3 5 1 1
AVERAGE 6.7 3.7 6.0 6.0 3.0
Conduct
2008 War in Afghanistan 9 7 9 3 1
2008 War in Iraq 10 6 9 5 4
2008 War on Terror 9 15 11 7 8
2008 Torture as Interregation Method 11 0 12 14 13
2008 Deadline for Troop Withdraw 8 5 10 0 0
2004 Iraq War was worth it 8 4 4 8
2004 Favor keeping troops in Iraq until government stable 17 11 17 11
AVERAGE 10.3 6.9 10.2 7.1 6.4
Conduct-Source Cues
2008 Bush's Conduct of Iraq 6 3 6 1 0
2004 Trust Bush or Kerry to be Commander-in-Chief 4 4 0 7
2004 Approve of Bush handling Iraq 10 9 5 11
2004 Bush has plan for Iraq 6 5 1 6
2004 Kerry has plan for Iraq 17 18 10 27
2004 Pentagon acted property on Iraqi prisoner treatment 10 0 27 19
2004 Rumsfeld should resign over Iraqi prisoner treatment 4 8 0 0
2004 Approve of Bush handling terrorism 11 11 7 12
2004 Trust Bush or Kerry on terrorism 5 3 1 8
2004 Clinton or Bush took terrorism threat more seriously 5 0 1 0
2004 Bush did everything possible against Al Qaeda before 9/11 9 8 5 10
2000 Bush or Gore Better on Defense 9 12 13
2000 Bush or Gore Better on Middle East 13 0 0
AVERAGE 8.4 6.3 6.0 5.4 8.7
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Appendix D: Sociobiological Approaches 
Sociobiology itself has changed over the past forty years.  Early sociobiological studies 
viewed males and females as having different reproductive strategies.  Males benefit most from 
being ―aggressive, hasty, fickle and undiscriminating‖ about their mating partners, while females 
benefit most from rejecting potential mating partners until the male with the best genes can be 
identified (Wilson, 1978).  This logic was based on the idea of an uneven parental investment in 
offspring, where women bear most of the burden for the growth and care of offspring.  The logic 
was also extended to human behaviors, including the development of the particular manifestation 
of the nuclear family in which women care for the home and men provide resources (Wilson, 
1975: 553).  Many early sociobiologists believed that their work undermined the nascent feminist 
movement.  After all, ―neither the National Organization for Women nor the Equal Rights 
Amendment will change the biological bedrock of asymmetrical parental investment‖ (Van den 
Berghe, 1979, quoted in Sperling, 1991: 17).   
During the early 1980s, sociobiologists began ascribing a more active role to females, 
outlining a more ―feminist‖ primatology.  This understanding of sociobiology rests on increased 
acknowledgement of the variance that female primates exhibit in their reproductive strategies 
(Hrdy, 1981; Hrdy and Williams, 1983).  For instance, female primates exhibit different 
capacities in mothering (Goodall, 1970; 1986).  These differences influence the survival of their 
offspring and their reproductive success.  Females also exhibit different physical characteristics 
that affect reproductive success.  Among human beings, the lack of physical markers during 
periods of fertility, like the massive sexual swellings that chimpanzees exhibit, may have 
evolved as mechanism to manipulate male behavior (Hrdy, 1981).  Without these visual 
indicators of receptivity, animals mate throughout the female reproductive cycle, rather than only 
during the limited time of high fertility (Hrdy, 1981; de Waal, 2005).  As discussed in Chapter 
Three, this obscures paternity and diminishes the incentive for males to harm females or their 
offspring. 
As this brief discussion of the development of sociobiology suggests, the biological 
sciences are influenced by larger social and cultural contexts.  The changes in sociobiology 
reflect larger western social and cultural concerns, particularly concerning feminism.  Clearly, 
the biological sciences exhibit the same sensitivity to social and cultural issues apparent in other 
fields.   
 
 183 
 
Figures and Tables 
 
Table 2.1 
Average Gender Gaps across Issue Area, 1948 - 2008 
 
 
Issue Area 
Average 
Gender Gap 
Average Gender Gap, 
First Year Asked 
Average Gender Gap, 
Last Year Asked 
Last Year – 
First Year 
     
Civil/Minority Rights 6.9% 8.2% 7.2% -1.0% 
Social Policy 8.5% 7.5% 8.5% +1.0% 
Defense/Foreign Policy  9.8% 8.9% 10.6% +1.7% 
Government Function 6.7% 9.0% 7.1% -1.9% 
Morality 6.5% 7.2% 7.4% +0.2% 
Economic Policy 3.7% 3.4% 4.0% +0.6% 
     
     
Source: ANES 1948 - 2008 
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Figure 2.1 
Opposition to Afirmative Action, 1986 - 2008 
Men
Women
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Figure 2.2  
Support for  Gay Rights, 1992 - 2008 
Men
Women
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Figure 2.3 
Is Government Too Strong, 1964-2000 
 
Men
Women
Allowing Homosexuals to Serve Openly in the Military 
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Figure 2.4 
Allowing Prayer in Public Schools, 1986-2008 
Men
Women
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Figure 2.5 
Jobs Guaranteed by the Federal Government, 
1972-2008 
Men
Women
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Axis Title 
Figure 2.6 
Increased Defense Spending, 1980-2008 
Men
Women
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Figure 2.7 
Lack of Concern about the Possibility of 
Nuclear War, 1984-2002 
Men
Women
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Table 2.2 
Average Gender Gap across Issue Area for Those Not Identifying as African-American,  
2000 and 2004 
 
 Non-black 
Americans 
Less 
Educated  
More 
Educated  
Low 
Income  
High 
Income  
Low Education, 
Low Income  
High Education, 
High Income  
 
Economic 6.7% 5.1% 8.4% 5.4% 7.0% 5.5% 8.9% 
 
Social 9.6% 9.2% 8.7% 13.3% 9.0% 9.2% 8.9% 
 
Moral 5.6% 6.6% 7.6% 5.4% 6.5% 6.1% 8.1% 
 
Government 
Function 8.0% 3.6% 6.3% 7.8% 5.0% 6.6% 6.4% 
 
Foreign Policy 8.1% 8.9% 10.7% 9.5% 7.2% 6.7% 9.3% 
Source: 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey 
 
Table 2.3 
Average Gender Gap across Issue Area for African-Americans, 2000 and 2004 
 
 Black 
Americans 
Less 
Educated  
More 
Educated  
Low 
Income  
High 
Income  
Low Education, 
Low Income  
High Education, 
High Income  
 
Economic 8.6% 10.9% 8.8% 11.0% 11.4% 11.6% 13.9% 
 
Social 9.6% 9.0% 7.9% 8.8% 9.8% 8.1% 10.2% 
 
Moral 6.5% 8.8% 10.6% 8.2% 8.2% 9.3% 14.9% 
 
Government 
Function 10.0% 7.6% 15.1% 4.1% 13.2% 9.0% 17.0% 
 
Foreign Policy 9.7% 12.6% 10.6% 15.2% 11.4% 13.6% 12.3% 
Source: 2000 and 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey 
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Source: 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey 
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Figure 2.8 
Gender Gaps on Which Candidate Will Be Better For the 
Economy, Among Those Not Identifying As African-American 
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Figure 2.9 
Gender Gaps on Restrictions of Gun Purchases, 
Among Those Not Identifying as African-American  
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Source: 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey 
 
 
 
 
Source: 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey 
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Figure 2.10 
Gender Gaps on Repealing Tax Cuts for Wealthy Citizens, 
Among Those Identifying as African-American 
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Figure 2.11 
Gender Gaps on Belief that Iraq War Was Worth it, 
Among Those Identifying as African-American 
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Figure 3.1 
Evolutionary Timeline 
 
 
Source: De Waal, F. (2006). “Bonobo Sex and Society.” The Scientific American, 16: 14-21. 
 
 
 
  Source: 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey 
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Figure 4.1 
Gender Gap on Support for Bush's Handling of Iraq 
Men
Women
Collective Opinion
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Table 4.1 
Correlations between Explanatory Variables 
 
 
  Source: 2008 American National Election Study 
                                                
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Column1 Resource-Threat Gender Role Socialization Feminist Consciousness Political Knowledge
Resource-Threat 1 -0.06 0 0.21
Gender Role Socialization -0.06 1 -0.13 -0.11
Feminist Consciousness 0 -0.13 1 0
Political Knowledge 0.21 -0.06 0 1
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Table 4.2 
Gender Gaps on Foreign Policy Questions, 2000-2008             
  
 
Year Foreign Policy Question Gender Gaps
2004
How long do you think it  should be before there are only a few thousand American troops in Iraq--right away, three months, six 
months, a year, or more than a year? 19
2004
Based on what you've heard or read, do you believe that Saddam Hussein's government helped the Al Qaeda terrorists in the 
September 11 attacks, or don't  you think Saddam Hussein was involved? 17
2004
Do you think the U.S. should keep military troops in Iraq until a stable government is established there, or do you think the U.S. 
should bring its troops home as soon as possible? 15
2004
As you may know, on June 28 in Iraq, the United States transferred power to a new Iraqi government.  Do you think the official 
transfer of power in Baghdad means the new Iraq government will have more power than the United States has in Iraq, the 
United States will have more power, or they will have about equal power? 13
2000
Regardless of your choice for president, who do you think would do a better job of handling the situation in the Middle East, 
George W. Bush or Al Gore? 13
2004 The federal government spending $87 billion on Iraq and Afghanistan last fall--do you favor or oppose this? 12
2004
Dow long do you think it  will be before there are only a few thousand American troops in Iraq--three months, six months, a 
year, or more than a year? 12
2008
Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose the U.S. government torturing people, who are suspected of being terrorists, 
to try to get information? 11
2008
Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way the U.S. federal government has handled the war in 
Iraq during the last four years? 10
2004 Chance of terrorist attack in next year 10
2000
Maintaining a strong military defense--should the federal government spend more money on this, the same as now, less or no 
money at all? 10
2008
Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way the U.S. federal government has handled the war in 
Afghanistan during the last four years? 9
2008
Do you approve, disapprove, or neither approve nor disapprove of the way the U.S. federal government has handled the effort 
to reduce the risk of terrorist attacks in the United States during the last four years? 9
2004 Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the war on terrorism? 9
2000
Regardless of your choice for president, who do you think would do a better job of providing a strong military defense, George 
W. Bush or Al Gore? 9
2008 Would you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose lowering the budget deficit  by spending less on the military? 8
2008
Should promoting capitalism be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an 
important foreign policy goal? 8
2004
How much does that matter, that the United States is regarded as better/worse than before he come into office--a great deal, 
some, not too much, or not at all? 8
2004
Do you think the United States is too involved, not involved enough, or involved just about the right amount (trouble spots 
other than Iraq)? 8
2004 Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is currently handling the situation in Iraq? 8
2004 Has the war in Iraq reduced the risk of terrorism against the United States? 8
2004
Going after potential terrorists with measures like the USA Patriot Act--should the federal government do more about it , do the 
same as now, do less about it , or do nothing at all? 8
2004 Do you think John Kerry has a clear plan for bringing the situation in Iraq to a successful conclusion, or don't  you think so? 7
2004
Do you think the Pentagon acted properly in dealing with this matter, or do you think it  tried to cover up the abuse (Abu 
Ghraib)? 7
2004 Do you think Donald Rumsfeld should resign as secretary of defense because of this matter, or not (Abu Ghraib)? 7
2004 Who do you trust to do a better job handling the U.S. war on terrorism--George W. Bush or John Kerry? 7
2008 Do you approve or disapprove of the way George W. Bush is handling the war in Iraq? 6
2008
Should combating international terrorism be a very important foreign policy goal, a somewhat important foreign policy goal, or 
not an important foreign policy goal? 6
2004 Who do you trust more to handle the responsibilit ies of commander-in-chief of the military--George W. Bush or John Kerry? 6
2004 All in all, do you think the situation in Iraq was worth going to war over? 6
2004
Do you think the soldiers mistreated these prisoners on their own, or do you think they were following orders from their 
commanders (Abu Ghraib)? 6
2004 Do you approve or disapprove of the USA Patriot Act? 6
2004 Do you believe that George W. Bush did all that he could have done against Al Qaeda before the September 11 attacks, or no? 6
2008
Should federal spending on tightening border security to prevent illegal immigration be increased, decreased, or kept about the 
same? 5
2004
How safe have these efforts made you feel--much more safe, somewhat more safe, somewhat less safe, or much less safe 
(government efforts at home and abroad)? 5
2004
Before September 11, which administration took the terrorism threat against the United States more seriously--Bill Clinton's 
administration or George W. Bush's administration? 5
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Table 4.2, cont. 
 
Source: 2000 National Annenberg Election Survey, 2004 National Annenberg Election Survey, 2008 American National Election Study 
   
   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2008 Do you favor, oppose, or neither favor nor oppose setting a deadline for withdrawing all U.S. troops from Iraq? 4
2008
Should strengthening the United Nations (and other international organizations) be a very important foreign policy goal, a 
somewhat important foreign policy goal, or not an important foreign policy goal? 4
2004 Do you think George W. Bush has a clear plan for bringing the situation in Iraq to a successful conclusion, or don't  you think so? 4
2004 Which comes closer to your view--would you say the Patriot Act is a good thing for American or a bad thing for America? 4
2004
Based on what you know about the report (9/11 Commission Report), do you think the government should adopt all the 
commission's recommendations, most of them, just some of them, or none of them? 4
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Figure 4.2 
Republican Candidate Would Be Better at Conducting 
American Foreign Policy, 2000 
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Table 4.3 
Results from Logistic Regressions Predicting Women’s Foreign Policy Preferences 
 
 
 
Significance Codes: ^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p<. 001 
Note:  These tables present the results from logistic regressions predicting the foreign policy preference in the column titled “Foreign Policy 
Preference,” including all four factors and controls for age, education, income, religion, race, union membership, homeownership, marital status, 
parental status, and party identification.  Each question has a different N.  For ease of presentation, I do not include the N for each question in this 
table. 
Source: 2008 American National Election Study 
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign Policy Q uestion Resource-Threat Socialization Feminism Knowledge
Afghan War (approve) -0.02 0.31 -0.51* 0.01
Iraq War (approve) 0..06 0.16 -0.58*** 0.00
War on Terror (approve) -0.31* 0.20 -0.12 -0.06
Bush's Handling of Iraq (approve) -0.03 0.10 -0.62*** 0.04
Bush's Handling of Foreign Policy (approve) -0.09 -0.10 -0.57*** -0.03
U.S. Would Be Better Off Isolationist (agree) 0.24 -0.51* 0.28* 0.10*
The Iraq War Was "Worth It" (agree) .32^ 0.00 -0.34* 0.04
The Iraq War Decreased Terrorism (agree) -0.24^ -0.02 -0.34* -0.06
The Use of Torture in Interregotations (approve) 0.54*** 0.16 -0.05 -0.03
Sending Troops Into Iraq (approve) 0.16 0.14 -0.09 -0.05
Troops in Iraq Three Months from Today (more) 0.23 0.14 -0.28* -0.07
Deadline for Troop Withdraw (oppose) 0.00 0.15 -0.54*** 0.17***
Cutting Military Spending to Reduce Deficit  (oppose) -0.04 -0.14 -0.29* -0.03
Goal--Preventing Nuclear Proliferation (approve) 0.08 -0.50^ 0.19 0.03
Goal--Advancing Human Rights (approve) 0.03 0.03 0.02 .08*
Goal--Strengthening the UN (approve) -0.26* 0.13 0.30* 0.08*
Goal--Preventing Illegal Immigration (approve) 0.07 .039^ -0.28* -0.03
Goal--Spreading Capitalism (approve) 0.01 -0.18 0.15 0.03
Goal--Prevening International Terrorism (approve) -0.06 0.01 -0.03 0.04
Spending to Strengthen Border Security (increase) 0.05 -0.14 -0.16 0.03
Spending to Prevent Terrorism (increase) 0.14 -0.61*** -0.10 -0.09*
Spending on Defense (increase) 0.16 0.04 -0.28* -0.04
Spending on Foreign Aid (increase) -0.06 0.01 -0.27* 0.02
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Table 4.4 
Results from Logistic Regressions Predicting Men’s Foreign Policy Preferences 
 
 
Significance Codes: ^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p<. 001 
Note:  These tables present the results from logistic regressions predicting the foreign policy preference in the column titled “Foreign Policy 
Preference,” including all four factors and controls for age, education, income, religion, race, union membership, homeownership, marital status, 
parental status, and party identification.  Each question has a different N.  For ease of presentation, I do not include the N for each question in this 
table. 
Source: 2008 American National Election Study 
                                           
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Foreign Policy Q uestion Resource-Threat Socialization Feminism Knowledge
Afghan War (approve) 0.26 0.89* -0.36^ 0.04
Iraq War (approve) 0.05 0.56 -0.06 0.08
War on Terror (approve) 0.03 0.25 -0.12 0.05
Bush's Handling of Iraq (approve) 0.26 0.17 -0.34^ 0.20***
Bush's Handling of Foreign Policy (approve) 0.16 0.41 -0.26 0.00
U.S. Would be Better Off Isolationist (agree) -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.20***
The Iraq War Was "Worth It" (agree) 0.22 0.29 -0.19 0.06
The Iraq War Decreased Terrorism (agree) -0.06 0.05 -0.45*** -0.03
The Use of Torture in Interregotations (approve) 0.34^ -0.12 -0.62*** -0.06
Sending Troops Into Iraq (approve) 0.25 -0.15 -0.53*** 0.01
Troops in Iraq Three Months from Today (more) 0.27^ 0.30 -0.20 0.06
Deadline for Troop Withdraw (oppose) 0.15 0.49 -0.65*** 0.13*
Cutting Military Spending to Reduce Deficit  (oppose) -0.06 -0.18 -0.38** -0.06
Goal--Preventing Nuclear Proliferation (approve) -0.24 -0.28 0.48*** 0.11*
Goal--Advancing Human Rights (approve) 0.18 0.26 0.54*** 0.03
Goal--Strengthening the UN (approve) 0.23^ -0.17 0.30* -0.01
Goal--Preventing Illegal Immigration (approve) 0.16 0.17 -0.19 0.06
Goal--Spreading Capitalism (approve) 0.10 -0.12 0.01 0.03
Goal--Prevening International Terrorism (approve) -0.08 0.04 -0.04 0.13*
Spending to Strengthen Border Security (increase) 0.25^ -0.03 -0.54*** 0.12
Spending to Prevent Terrorism (increase) 0.33* 0.32 -0.13 -0.03
Spending on Defense (increase) 0.07 -0.21 -0.46*** -0.08*
Spending on Foreign Aid (increase) -0.07 0.24 -0.35*** -0.01
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Table 4.5 
Logistic Regression, Support for the War in Iraq 
 
 Main 
Effect 
Interaction 
(Biology) 
Interaction 
(Socialization) 
Interaction 
(Feminism) 
Interaction 
(Knowledge) 
      
Biology   1.234 -------- -------- -------- ------- 
Socialization   0.472 -------- -------- -------- ------- 
Feminism   1.452 -------- -------- -------- -------- 
Knowledge   0.668* -0.017 -0.026 -0.162** -------- 
Education   0.112  0.055  0.033 -0.010 -0.045 
Income   0.059* -0.016* -0.021 -0.005  -0.003 
Age   0.101* -0.009 -0.033^ -0.015 -0.080* 
Sex -0.883  0.005  0.803  0.598  0.095 
Married -3.041*  0.770 -0.187  0.433  0.166 
Republican -0.402 -0.035*  0.394  1.368**  0.175 
Democrat -0.063  0.130 -0.586  0.390 -0.155 
Black -2.222 -0.029  3.364** -0.387 -0.128 
White -0.821  0.473  0.698 -0.633  0.135 
Protestant  1.119  0.029 -0.737 -0.264 -0.074 
Catholic  2.253^ -0.085 -1.246 -0.997^ -0.085 
Parent  1.029  0.249  0.848 -0.035 -0.204^ 
Union  -1.694  0.165 -0.621 -0.521  0.188 
Homeowner -0.207 -0.457  0.209  0.307  0.069 
East -0.349 -0.298  3.405**  0.990 -0.260 
West -1.624 -0.347  1.834^  0.890  0.188 
South  0.514 -0.423  1.920^  0.260 -0.060 
Note:  ^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p<. 001  
Source: 2008 American National Election Study 
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Figure 4.4 
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Figure 4.6 
Reduction of Gender Gaps in  Support for the Foreign 
Policy Goal of Promoting Capitalism, by Factor 
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Figure 4.10 
Reduction of Gender Gaps in Support for Bush's 
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Table 5.1 
Gender Gaps in Social Policy Preferences 
 
Policy Preferences Male Opinion Female Opinion Gender Gap Year
Do you personally favor or oppose allowing homosexuals to serve openly in the United States military 
(percent opposing) 54 33 21 2000
The federal government making it more difficult for people to buy a gun than it is now (percent 
opposing) 42 60 18 2008
The amount of poverty in the United States (percent saying this is a not a problem or not a  serious 
problem) 30 14 16 2000
The federal government helping employers pay the cost of their workers' health insurance?  (percent 
opposed) 33 18 15 2004
The government should provide more services than it does now (percent disagreeing) 39 26 13 2008
Restricting the kinds of guns that people can buy (percent believing the federal government should do 
less or nothing about this) 29 17 12 2000
Which do you personally think is more important, cutting taxes or strengthening the Social Security 
system (Favor cutting taxes) 37 26 11 2000
Which do you personally think is more important, cutting taxes or strengthening the Medicare 
program? (Favor cutting taxes) 35 24 11 2000
Do you personally favor or oppose requiring a license for a person to buy a handgun? (percent 
opposing) 26 15 11 2000
Try to reduce the income differences between rich and poor Americans (percent opposing) 62 51 11 2000
The number of Americans losing their jobs because of foreign competition (percent saying this not 
too serious or not a problem) 38 27 11 2000
Government became bigger because government is doing things people should do themselves 
(percent agreeing) 46 35 11 2008
The death penalty for persons convicted of murder (percent favoring) 70 59 11 2008
Make sure all public schools student can pray as part of some official school activity (percent 
favoring) 52 62 10 2000
A law in yoru state that would allow two men to marry each other or two women to marry each 
other (percent opposing) 70 60 10 2004
Laws to protect homosexuals against job discrimination (percent opposing) 26 36 10 2008
Private investment of Social Security (percent favoring) 54 44 10 2008
Changing the recently passed Medicare prescription drug law to allow re-importing drugs from 
Canada (percent opposed) 13 22 9 2004
The federal government trying to reduce the income differences between rich and poor Americans 
(percent opposing) 43 34 9 2004
It's really a matter of some people not trying hard enough; if blacks would only try harder they could 
be just as well off as whites (percent agreeing) 75 66 9 2008
Allowing homosexual to serve in the United States Armed Forces (percent opposing) 26 17 9 2008
Do you personally favor or oppose the death penalty for some crimes? (percent favoring) 80 72 8 2000
The number of criminals who are not punished enough (percent saying this is an extremely serious 
problem or a serious problem) 79 87 8 2000
Who do you thin k would do a better job of strengthening Social Security and protecting Medicare 
(percent saying George W. Bush) 46 38 8 2000
Federal funding of research on diseases like Alzheimer's using stem cells taken from human embryos 
(percent opposing) 22 30 8 2004
The world is always changing and we should adjust our view of moral behavior to these changes 
(percent disagreeing) 38 46 8 2008
Legally permitting homosexual couples to adopt children (percent opposing) 54 46 8 2008
Do you personally favor or oppose allowing workers to invest some of their Social Security 
contributions in the stock market? (percent favoring) 66 59 7 2000
The number of people who cannot afford health insurance--is this a problem? (percent saying not too 
serious or not a problem at all) 12 5 7 2000
The rate of immigration in the United States (percent saying this is an extremely serious problem or a 
serious problem) 62 69 7 2000
Trying to stop job discrimination against homosexuals (percent believing the federal government 
should do less or nothing about this) 36 29 7 2000
Medicare bill, which among other things provides prescription drug coverage for senior citizens and 
allows private companies to provide some Medicare services? (percent opposing) 34 27 7 2004
Spending on the poor  (percent favoring less or none) 65 72 7 2008
Allowing younger people to invest some of their Social Security contributions in the stock market will 
reduce Social Security benefits for older people (percent opposing) 57 51 6 2000
Give tax credits or vouchers to help parents send their children to private schools--should the federal 
government do this? (percent favoring) 48 42 6 2000
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Table 5.1, cont. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The amount of illegal drug use (percent saying this is an extremely serious problem or a serious 
problem) 89 95 6 2000
Providing finaicial assistance to public elementary and secondary schools (percent believing 
government should provide less or no money at all) 15 9 6 2000
Who do you think would do a better job of improving education (percent saying George W. Bush) 47 41 6 2000
An Amendment to the U.S. Constitution saying that no state can allow two men to marry each other 
or two women to marry each other? (percent favoring) 49 43 6 2004
Over the past few years, blacks have gotten less than they deserve (percent disagreeing) 65 59 6 2008
Allowing illegal immigrants to work in the United States for up to three years, after which they would 
have to go back to their home country (percent opposing) 61 67 6 2008
Spending on Social Security (less or none) 67 73 6 2008
This fall, the government has decided to sell some of the country's strategic oil reserve to increase the supply 
of winter heating oil (percent favoring) 55 60 5 2000
The Confederate flag currently flies above South Carolina's state capitol (percent saying it should stay) 49 44 5 2000
Controlling the rising cost of health insurance (percent saying the government should do less or nothing at all) 22 17 5 2004
The federal government giving tax credits to help parents send their children to private schools (percent 
favoring) 54 49 5 2004
Limiting the amount of money people can be awarded in lawsuits (percent favoring) 65 70 5 2004
Legal abortion if staying pregnant could cause the woman to die (percent favoring) 86 81 5 2008
Legal abortion if the pregnancy was caused by sex the woman chose to have with a blood relative (percent 
favoring) 44 39 5 2008
Legal abortion if the pregnancy was caused by the woman being raped (percent favoring) 77 72 5 2008
The way George W. Bush is handling health care (percent approving) 27 22 5 2008
Do you personally favor or oppose using government money to help some parents send their children to 
private schools? (percent favoring) 38 34 4 2000
Do you personally favor or oppose using government funds to make sure that every children in the US is 
covered by health insurance? (percent opposing) 10 14 4 2000
Ban all abortions--should the federal governemnt do this? (percent favoring) 20 24 4 2000
Providing health care for people who do not already have it (percent believing the federal government should 
spend less or no money on this) 13 9 4 2000
Trying to stop job discrimination against blacks (percent believing the federal government should do less or 
nothing about this) 24 20 4 2000
Providing financial assistance to public elementary and secondary schools--should the federal government 
spend less or none on this (percent favoring) 10 6 4 2004
Legal abortion if staying pregnant would hurt the woman's health but is very unlikely to cause her to die 
(percent favoring) 50 46 4 2008
The newer lifestyles are contributing to the breakdown of our society (percent agreeing) 72 76 4 2008
Preferential hiring and promotion of blacks (percent opposing) 79 75 4 2008
The U.S. government paying for all of the cost of presscription drugs for senior citizens who are living on very 
little income (percent opposing) 12 8 4 2008
The U.S. government paying for all necessary medical care for all Americans (percent opposing) 39 35 4 2008
The free market can handle today's complex economic problems without government being involved (percent 
agreeing) 31 35 4 2008
Spending on schools  (percent favoring less or none) 77 81 4 2008
Spending on welfare  (percent favoring less or none) 28 32 4 2008
Protecting patients' rights in the health care system (percent believing the federal governemtn should do less or 
nothing about this) 11 8 3 2000
Protecting the environment and natural resources  (percent believing the federal government should do less or 
nothing about this) 13 10 3 2000
Providing health insurance for people who do not already have it--should the federal government spend less or 
none on this (percent favoring) 11 8 3 2004
The U.S. government making it possible for illegal immigrants to become U.S. citizens (percent opposing) 39 36 3 2008
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Table 5.2 
Results from Logistic Regressions Predicting Women’s Foreign Policy Preferences 
 
 
Significance Codes: ^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p<. 001 
Note:  These tables present the results from logistic regressions predicting the foreign policy preference in the column titled “Foreign Policy 
Preference,” including all four factors and controls for age, education, income, religion, race, union membership, homeownership, marital status, 
parental status, and party identification.  Each question has a different N.  For ease of presentation, I do not include the N for each question in this 
table. 
Source: 2008 American National Election Study 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Social Policy Question Resource-Threat Gender Role Socialization Feminism Knowledge
Spending on Social Security (favor decrease/cut) -0.08 0.29 -0.18^ -0.12***
Spending on Schools (favor decrease/cut) 0.10 0.64** -0.34** -0.01
Spending on Welfare (favor decrease/cut) -0.12 -0.34 -0.64*** 0.03
Spending on Aid to Poor (favor decrease/cut) -0.18^ 0.40* -0.43*** 0.05
Legal Aborition for Non-Fatal Risk to Mother (favor) 0.05 -0.42 0.18 0.17***
Legal Abortion for Fatal Risk to Mother (favor) -0.01 -0.60^ 0.36^ 0.09
Legal Abortion for Cases of Incest (favor) -0.06 -0.59* 0.21 0.15**
Legal Abortion for Cases of Rape (favor) -0.18 -0.75** 0.55*** 0.03
New Lifestyles Underlie Breakdown of Society (agree) 0.05 0.82* -0.13 -0.04
We Should Be More Tolerant of Others' Moral Standards (disagree) 0.30^ 0.11 -0.57*** 0.02
Blacks Have Gotten Less Than They Deserved (agree) -0.18 -0.55^ -0.56*** 0.02
Blacks Could Get Ahead If They Tried Harder (agree) 0.05 0.87** -0.45** -0.15**
Preferential Hiring for Blacks (oppose) -0.21 -0.67* -0.38* -0.10^
President Bush's Handling of Health Care (approve) -0.20 0.28 -0.14 -0.06
Medicare Drug Plan (oppose) 0.45^ -0.04 0.09 0.00
Universal Health Care (oppose) 0.10 0.05 -0.52*** 0.02
Private Investment of Social Security (favor) 0.22 -0.27 -0.22 -0.18**
Government Is Handling Things Individuals Should Do (agree) -0.05 0.27 -0.36* 0.09^
Market Can Handle Economic Problems Without Government (agree) -0.26^ -0.01 -0.25^ 0.17***
Government Should Provide Fewer Services (favor) -0.09 0.63^ -0.47* 0.16*
Allowing Immigrants to Work In U.S. for Up to Three Years (oppose) 0.22 0.05 -0.07 -0.07
Laws Preventing Discrimination Against Gays (oppose) 0.23 0.487^ -0.24^ -0.08^
LawsPreventing Gay Adoption (oppose) 0.25^ 1.11*** -0.35* 0.03
Laws Preventing Gays from Openly Serving In The Military (oppose) 0.16 0.86** 0.14 0.03
Using the Death Penalty to Punish Some Crimes (favor) 0.14 -0.82** -0.13 -0.05
Weaker Regulations on Purchasing Firearms (favor) 0.00 0.08 -0.226^ 0.05
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Table 5.3 
Results from Logistic Regressions Predicting Men’s Foreign Policy Preferences 
 
 
Significance Codes: ^p < .10, *p < .05, **p < .005, ***p<. 001 
Note:  These tables present the results from logistic regressions predicting the foreign policy preference in the column titled “Foreign Policy 
Preference,” including all four factors and controls for age, education, income, religion, race, union membership, homeownership, marital status, 
parental status, and party identification.  Each question has a different N.  For ease of presentation, I do not include the N for each question in this 
table. 
Source: 2008 American National Election Study 
 
 
 
Social Policy Question Resource-Threat Gender Role Socialization Feminism Knowledge
Spending on Social Security (favor decrease/cut) -0.23 0.06 0.24 0.16***
Spending on Schools (favor decrease/cut) 0.08 0.18 -0.33^ 0.04
Spending on Welfare (favor decrease/cut) -0.03 -0.50* -0.51*** 0.07^
Spending on Aid to Poor (favor decrease/cut) -0.21 0.17 -0.56*** 0.06
Legal Aborition for Non-Fatal Risk to Mother (favor) 0.37* -0.84** 0.00 -0.01
Legal Abortion for Fatal Risk to Mother (favor) -0.09 -0.20 0.46* 0.03
Legal Abortion for Cases of Incest (favor) -0.11 -0.16 0.16 0.00
Legal Abortion for Cases of Rape (favor) -0.22 -0.56^ 0.03 0.04
New Lifestyles Underlie Breakdown of Society (agree) 0.19 0.40 -0.20 -0.12*
We Should Be More Tolerant of Others' Moral Standards (disagree) 0.01 0.39 -0.16 -0.05
Blacks Have Gotten Less Than They Deserved (agree) -0.20 0.11 -0.89*** 0.04
Blacks Could Get Ahead If They Tried Harder (agree) 0.01 0.25 -0.85*** -0.20***
Preferential Hiring for Blacks (oppose) -0.14 -0.59^ -0.47* 0.03
President Bush's Handling of Health Care (approve) 0.02 0.98*** -0.07 0.05
Medicare Drug Plan (oppose) 0.20 0.76^ -0.48^ 0.13^
Universal Health Care (oppose) 0.01 0.28 -0.48* 0.18***
Private Investment of Social Security (favor) -0.05 0.37 -0.19 -0.13*
Government Is Handling Things Individuals Should Do (agree) -0.04 0.36 -0.41*** 0.13***
Market Can Handle Economic Problems Without Government (agree) 0.02 0.55^ -0.50*** 0.15***
Government Should Provide Fewer Services (favor) -0.23 0.17 -0.49* 0.19***
Allowing Immigrants to Work In U.S. for Up to Three Years (oppose) -0.01 -0.93*** -0.39* -0.14***
Laws Preventing Discrimination Against Gays (oppose) 0.26 0.74 -0.30^ -0.05
LawsPreventing Gay Adoption (oppose) 0.09 0.84*** -0.41*** 0.01
Laws Preventing Gays from Openly Serving In The Military (oppose) 0.37* 0.82*** -0.05 -0.07
Using the Death Penalty to Punish Some Crimes (favor) 0.09 -0.27 -0.38* -0.05
Weaker Regulations on Purchasing Firearms (favor) -0.40*** -0.10 -0.31* -0.02
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Figure 5.1 
Average Reduction of Gender Gaps on Questions 
About Social Policy, by Factor 
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Figure 5.2 
Average Reduction of Gender Gaps on Questions 
About Government Responsibilities, by Factor 
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About Social Policy Spending, by Factor 
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Figure 5.4 
Average Reduction of Gender Gaps on Questions 
About Minority Rights, by Factor 
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Figure 5.5 
Reduction of Gender Gaps in Opposition to the 
Government Providing More Services, by Factor   
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Figure 5.6 
Reduction of Gender Gaps in Support for the Statement that 
'Blacks Need to Try Harder to Succeed,' by Factor 
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Average Reduction of Gender Gaps on Questions 
About Social Morality, by Factor 
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